



NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

*Office of Railroad, Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety*

Collision of Two WMATA Metrorail Trains Near Fort Totten Station, June 22, 2009

Deborah A.P. Hersman
Chairman

Presentation to
WMATA Board of Directors


Accident Summary



Accident Summary



Animation



Animation



Animation



Animation



Probable Cause

- Failure of the track circuit modules that caused the automatic train control system to lose detection of train 214 and thus transmit speed commands to train 112 up the point of impact
- WMATA's failure to ensure that an enhanced track circuit verification test was institutionalized and used system-wide after the 2005 Rosslyn near collisions, which would have identified the faulty track circuit before the Fort Totten accident



Contributing to the Accident

- WMATA's lack of a safety culture
- WMATA's failure to effectively maintain and monitor performance of the ATC system
- GRS/Alstom failure to provide a maintenance plan to detect spurious signals that could cause a malfunction
- Ineffective oversight by WMATA Board of Directors
- Ineffective oversight by TOC and its lack of safety oversight authority
- FTA's lack of statutory authority to provide Federal safety oversight



Recommendations

- 23 new recommendations
- USDOT (1)
- FTA (2)
- TOC (1)
- WMATA Board of Directors (1)
- WMATA (15)
- Alstom (2)
- Other transit agencies (1)



Recommendation to WMATA Board

- Elevate safety oversight role of WMATA Board:
- (1) Develop a policy statement to explicitly and publicly assume the responsibility for continual oversight of system safety;
- (2) Implement processes to exercise oversight of safety system, including appropriate proactive performance metrics; and,
- (3) Evaluate actions taken in response to NTSB and FTA recommendations, as well as the status of open corrective action plans and the results of audits conducted by the TOC.





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