Attachment 14

Operations Group Chairman's
Factual Report

DCA06MA009

Flight Crew Comments

Kirchgessner David

From: Chris Perkins [chrisperkins@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 10:01 AM
To: NTSB Ops Group
Cc: Jeff Hefner
Subject: SWA1248 PIlot concerns with press release

- Pilot comments after initial interview

Hello Dave/Katherine-

The pilots from SWA1248 had some concerns with the accuracy of the Dec 15 press release (http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2005/051215.htm). After discussing the matter with SWA/SWAPA, etc., they decided that their concerns should be forwarded to the NTSB via the operations group. It seems to me that most of their concerns are moot since they are accurately reflected in the field notes but I said that I would pass them along to you to do with what you wish.

Have a great Xmas/Happy Holidays and I look forward to seeing you in the sim!
Chris

Captain Bruce Sutherland and FO Steve Oliver read the NTSB Press Release of
3:54pm Thursday, December 15, 2005 and noted the following inaccuracies and
they did not make statements as reported about these matters:

From Captain Sutherland:

1. F/O did have a problem activating the thrust reversers, I saw him struggle with them.

2. At some point, I saw the airplane not decelerating....it was immediately
when the anti-skid stopped which was about 3-5 seconds after it started.

3. 4500' left on the rwy is misleading, need to check overrun lengths and
take displaced threshhold into place. There is only 5800' available on rwy

31C. Landing was within approach parameters.

4. Activation of the T/R 18 seconds after touchdown seems like a long time,
it may have been that long by the time they went to max reverse thrust.

5. I don't remember dispatch telling us to land on 31, our alternate yes.
I know they compute data in order for us to go, ...and the only option was 31C. I did not state that I agreed with the dispatcher's assessment of
the conditions for landing on runway 31C.

From FO Oliver:

1. We never listened to the ATIS. All weather messages and dispatch communications were via ACARS. I did not state that I agreed with the dispatcher's assessment of the conditions for landing on runway 31C.

2. After an outside evaluation period, I stepped on the brakes with full force. I stated "BRAKES, BRAKES, BRAKES" to the Captain.

3. I then checked the speed brake lever to be fully up.

4. I pushed Captain's hands aside and attempted to pull the thrust reverser
levers to max reverse. The thrust reverser levers did not allow me to enter
reverse until the third or fourth pull on the levers. I stated that "I pulled so hard that I wouldn't be surprised if the levers were bent, and that it was probably only seconds for actual deployment but it seemed like a
year."

5. At no point during my entire aviation career have I moved my seat during
a landing. I expressed to the interviewer that I used the handle by the FO
windscreen to apply extra force to the brakes and to brace for impact. I
assure you that I am always in position to take over the controls of the aircraft during critical phases of flight should the need arise as I was,
and did that evening. I believe I may have told the board that the

handle
is primarily used to get in and out of the seat and for seat
adjustment but,
I can't stress enough that at no point during the rollout was my seat
ever
adjusted.