Skip Ribbon Commands
Skip to main content
Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-09-138
Details
Synopsis: On September 27, 2008, about 2358 eastern daylight time, an Aerospatiale (Eurocopter) SA365N1, N92MD, call sign Trooper 2, registered to and operated by the MSP as a public medical evacuation flight, impacted terrain about 3.2 miles north of the runway 19R threshold at Andrews Air Force Base (ADW), Camp Springs, Maryland, during an instrument landing system (ILS) approach.1 The commercial pilot, one flight paramedic, one field provider, and one of two automobile accident patients being transported were killed. The other patient being transported survived with serious injuries from the helicopter accident and was taken to a local hospital. The helicopter was substantially damaged when it collided with trees and terrain in Walker Mill Regional Park, District Heights, Maryland. The flight originated from a landing zone at Wade Elementary School, Waldorf, Maryland, about 2337, destined for Prince George's Hospital Center, Cheverly, Maryland. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the departure; however, Trooper 2 encountered instrument meteorological conditions en route to the hospital and diverted to ADW. No flight plan was filed with the FAA, and none was required.
Recommendation: TO THE ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS OFFICIALS INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE CHIEFS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AIR MEDICAL COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALISTS, NATIONAL EMERGENCY NUMBER ASSOCIATION, AND THE NATIONAL SHERIFFS ASSOCIATION: Inform your members through your websites, newsletters, and conferences of the lessons learned from the emergency response to this accident, particularly emphasizing that search and rescue personnel need to understand how to interpret and use both global positioning system coordinates and the results of cell phone pinging.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: District Heights, MD, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: MIA08MA203
Accident Reports: Crash During Approach to Landing of Maryland State Police Aerospatiale SA365N1, N92MD
Report #: AAR-09-07
Accident Date: 9/27/2008
Issue Date: 11/13/2009
Date Closed: 11/20/2015
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: Association of Public - Safety Communications Officials International (Closed - Acceptable Action)
International Association of Chiefs of Police (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
International Association of Fire Chiefs (Closed - Acceptable Action)
National Association of Air Medical Communications Specialists (Closed - Acceptable Action)
National Emergency Number Association (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
National Sheriffs' Association (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Training and Education,

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: National Sheriffs' Association
Date: 4/6/2015
Response: Mr. Hutchinson attached to his e-mail a copy of an article you had published in the January/February 2015 issue of Sheriff. The article, titled “Emergency Response Communications Problems: Lessons Learned, Maryland State Police EMS Crash,” was based on information we had recently sent you regarding this recommendation. Publication of the article satisfies Safety Recommendation A-09-138, which is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: NTSB
To: National Sheriffs' Association
Date: 11/17/2014
Response: As I described on Friday, attached is an informational article describing the communication problems encountered by the search and rescue crews trying to locate the crash site (and survivor) of a Maryland State Police EMS helicopter flight that crashed near Andrews Air Force Base. We issued Safety Recommendation A-09-138 asking that NSA inform your members of the lessons learned from the emergency response to that accident, particularly that search and rescue personnel need to understand how to interpret and use both GPS coordinates and the results of cell phone pinging. I believe those lessons learned remain relevant and valuable today for personnel involved in search and rescue. To help distribute this information, I prepared the attached article. Feel free to publish it, or to modify it as appropriate for whatever publication or forum that you have. If you could send me a copy of whatever is published, or let me know of other places where this information was distributed, I would appreciate it. Distributing this information will likely result in A-09-138 being classified “Closed-Acceptable Action.” Let me know if I can be of any further help with this.

From: NTSB
To: National Sheriffs' Association
Date: 6/14/2011
Response: To date, the NTSB has received no information regarding the NSA’s efforts to address Safety Recommendation A-09-138. We would appreciate receiving a reply regarding what, if anything, has been done to address these important safety issues. The NTSB is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure the public the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that could be shared with others. A copy of the NTSB’s November 13, 2009, letter is enclosed for your review, and the full report of the District Heights, Maryland, accident investigation (Report Number AAR-09-07) is available on our website at www.ntsb.gov. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Mike Brown at 202-314-6174 or at brownm@ntsb.gov.

From: NTSB
To: Association of Public - Safety Communications Officials International
Date: 1/11/2013
Response: We note that, in response to this recommendation, APCO International did the following: • Placed a copy of the safety recommendation letter in the APCO Resource Library • Issued an announcement to APCO members regarding this recommendation and directed them to the Resource Library • Included this announcement in APCO’s Membership Minute and/or Communiqué publications • Added this information to the News section of the APCO web page These actions satisfy Safety Recommendation A 09 138, which is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: NTSB
To: National Association of Air Medical Communications Specialists
Date: 7/9/2013
Response: We believe that the link to the NTSB accident report that you included on your website, your encouraging NAACS members to review the search and rescue section of the report, your revision of the NAACS Certified Flight Communicator course to address the various formats of GPS/Geocoding, and the related tutorial you have placed on your website together satisfy Safety Recommendation A-09-138. Accordingly, the recommendation is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: National Association of Air Medical Communications Specialists
To: NTSB
Date: 4/11/2013
Response: -From Steven Goff, President Elect, National Association of Air Medical Communication Specialists: After speaking with numerous cell providers and law enforcement representatives NAACS still holds the opinion that communications specialists are not in a position to request or initiate a "cell ping". However, I have instructed our IT manager to post the link, which you provided, on the NAACS website. I would expect this action to occur within the next 15 days. Please understand that NAACS has aggressively addressed and initiated the other recommendations you offered.

From: NTSB
To: National Association of Air Medical Communications Specialists
Date: 3/26/2013
Response: We are encouraged by your revision of the NAACS Certified Flight Communicator course to address the various formats of GPS/Geocoding, by your encouragement of NAACS members to identify and relay the correct/corresponding format during all communications in both normal and emergency search situations, and by the related tutorial you have placed on your website. However, we are concerned about the NAACS’s determination that “pinging” may not be a viable or teachable option for air medical communication specialists. We issued this recommendation because neither Prince George’s County, Maryland, dispatchers nor MSP dispatchers fully understood the importance of obtaining distance and bearing information, or the cell tower location, before releasing a location obtained from cell phone pinging. We believe that awareness of the resultant disjointed search and rescue efforts and the techniques eventually employed to locate the accident site could provide valuable lessons to air communication specialists. The portion of this recommendation related to pinging could be addressed by including a link on your website to the NTSB accident report and encouraging NAACS members to review the search and rescue section of the report. We encourage you to consider this action or an alternative action that would satisfy the intent of the recommendation. In the meantime, pending action by NAACS to address the portion of this recommendation related to pinging, Safety Recommendation A-09-138 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: National Association of Air Medical Communications Specialists
Date: 1/22/2013
Response: This letter addresses Safety Recommendation A-09-138, which the NTSB issued to the National Association of Air Medical Communication Specialists (NAACS) as a result of our investigation of the September 27, 2008, crash during approach to land of a Maryland State Police helicopter in District Heights, Maryland. To date, the NTSB has received no information regarding NAACS actions to address Safety Recommendation A-09-138. We would appreciate receiving a reply regarding any actions that the association has either taken or planned to address this important safety issue. We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure the public the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that can be shared with others. A copy of our November 13, 2009, letter issuing Safety Recommendation A-09-138 is enclosed for your convenience, and the full NTSB report of the District Heights, Maryland, accident investigation (Report Number AAR-09/07) is available on our website at www.ntsb.gov.

From: National Association of Air Medical Communications Specialists
To: NTSB
Date: 12/4/2012
Response: -From Steven Goff, President Elect, National Association of Air Medical Communications Specialists: Since receiving the recommendation, A-09-138, NAACS has taken the following actions: 1. Added curriculum addressing the various formats of GPS/Geocoding into the "flight following and mapping" sections of the Certified Flight Communicator Course. 2. Stressed the importance of identifying and relaying the correct/corresponding formats during all communications, whether normal operations or emergency search situations. 3. Provided a tutorial addressing these concerns on the NAACS Website. Note: After researching "pinging" as a viable option, it was determined that this practice may not be a viable, teachable option for the ACS. Thank you.

From: NTSB
To: International Association of Fire Chiefs
Date: 11/20/2015
Response: Mr. Goldstein included in his e-mail a link to a September 15, 2015, article you had published in OnScene, an IAFC member publication, and that you have posted on your website. The article, titled “GIS Use to Improve Response of Emergency Services,” discusses the September 27, 2008, MSP accident and ways that miscommunications regarding the GPS coordinates of the accident site delayed the emergency response to the scene. We note, however, that the article did not discuss the problems associated with the use of cell phone pinging for locating the survivor of the accident. Nevertheless, publication of the article satisfies Safety Recommendation A-09-138, which is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION. Thank you for your commitment to improving the response times and overall operations of emergency service responders, police, and fire departments.

From: NTSB
To: International Association of Fire Chiefs
Date: 11/17/2014
Response: As I described on Friday, attached is an informational article describing the communication problems encountered by the search and rescue crews trying to locate the crash site (and survivor) of a Maryland State Police EMS helicopter flight that crashed near Andrews Air Force Base. We issued Safety Recommendation A-09-138 asking that IACP inform your members of the lessons learned from the emergency response to that accident, particularly that search and rescue personnel need to understand how to interpret and use both GPS coordinates and the results of cell phone pinging. I believe those lessons learned remain relevant and valuable today for personnel involved in search and rescue. To help distribute this information, I prepared the attached article. Feel free to publish it, or to modify it as appropriate for whatever publication or forum that you have. If you could send me a copy of whatever is published, or let me know of other places where this information was distributed, I would appreciate it. Distributing this information will likely result in A-09-138 being classified “Closed-Acceptable Action.” Let me know if I can be of any further help with this.

From: NTSB
To: International Association of Fire Chiefs
Date: 6/7/2011
Response: CC# 201100190: To date, the NTSB has received no information regarding the IAFC’s efforts to address Safety Recommendations I-07-3 and A-09-138; we would appreciate receiving an update regarding what, if anything, has been done to address these important safety issues. The NTSB is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure the public the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that could be shared with others. Copies of the NTSB’s June 27, 2007, and November 13, 2009, letters are enclosed for your review. The full reports of the Wilmer, Texas, accident investigation (Report Number: HAR07/01) and the District Heights, Maryland, accident investigation (Report Number AAR-09-07) are available on our website at www.ntsb.gov. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Mike Brown at 202-314-6174 or brownm@ntsb.gov.

From: NTSB
To: National Emergency Number Association
Date: 2/12/2016
Response: Until your recent letter, we had not received any information describing activities you might be taking to satisfy this recommendation. As a result, on September 24, 2015, we classified Safety Recommendation A-09-138 “Closed—Unacceptable Action/No Response Received.” In that letter, we asked that you inform us if you had completed, or planned to complete soon, any action to address Safety Recommendation A-09-138 and stated that, if we received a timely reply, we would consider changing the classification of the recommendation. You replied on September 25, 2015, that you recognized the need to improve operational use of location data that is not in a “civic address” format, and that you have participated in standards development and educational activities aimed at addressing this issue. You also described your activities working with companies developing and selling software used by public safety access point (PSAP) centers (typically 911 emergency response centers) to ensure that the software supports both civic and geodetic location coordinates. Finally, you described a 2014 magazine article that you had published, describing how such technologies as global positioning systems (GPS) use measurements of range and bearing to compute a location. Although these actions are commendable, they do not address either of the two primary concerns of Safety Recommendation A-09-138: (1) miscommunication problems regarding the format of GPS coordinates (decimal degrees or degree-minute-second format) when coordinates are entered into the software described in your letter, and which you advocate that PSAPs use, or (2) limitations on the use of cell phone pinging to locate persons in need of emergency assistance. These problems involving the Prince George’s County 911 center resulted in significant delays in the emergency response to the MSP accident near Andrews Air Force Base. We issued this recommendation so that personnel at other PSAPs would have the opportunity to learn from the emergency response in the accident. Although these problems occurred during the response to an aviation accident, we emphasize that the lessons learned are applicable whenever a PSAP is involved in locating someone in need of emergency assistance, regardless of the circumstances necessitating the assistance. The information provided in your letter is not sufficient to justify changing the classification of the recommendation; however, we encourage you to provide us with additional information, if there is any, about actions you have taken to satisfy this recommendation. We point out that, on December 1, 2014, we mailed to you a sample article that could be distributed to your membership to satisfy this recommendation. We can supply another copy of this article if it would be helpful.

From: National Emergency Number Association
To: NTSB
Date: 9/25/2015
Response: -From Brian F. Fontes, CEO: Thank you for your letter of the second instant concerning safety Recommendations A-09-138 and P-12-19. In the since those recommendations were issued, and consistent with our mission to foster the technological advancement, availability, and implementation of a universal emergency telephone number system, NENA has worked diligently to improve coordination between emergency response telecommunicators, dispatchers, preparedness officials, and both the aviation and pipeline communities. In particular, we have taken several actions to improve our members' awareness of the unique issues that arise in aviation and pipeline emergencies. Prior to your agency's issuance of Recommendation A-09-138, NENA recognized the need to improve operational use of location data that is not in a "civic address" format. With the advent of cellular E9-1-1 service, the use of geodetic or "GPS" coordinates became commonplace in 9-1-1 centers. However, as your recommendation recognizes, the ability to receive such coordinates does not guarantee the ability to use them. Consequently, NENA undertook extensive standards development and educational activities aimed at operationalizing this new location paradigm. Moreover, we engaged with the vendor community to ensure the proliferation of PSAP software that could support both civic and geodetic location coordinates. Specifically, our conferences have, for many years now, included extensive programming related to the deployment, management, and use of Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) within 9-1-1 centers. This programming has brought special attention to the available GIS tools that allow telecommunicators and dispatchers to "reverse geo-code" geodetic coordinates to a civic address to which field responders can be dispatched. In a 2014 magazine article, we went further by explaining in detail how geodetic coordinates define a "fix," and how different technologies, such as GPS, use measurements of range and bearing to compute a fix. This information was well received, and NENA has fielded a number of inquiries from PSAPs that wished to better understand the purpose and use of geodetic coordinates. Finally, we are currently developing a 1.5 hour online training course on PSAP involvement with aviation emergencies. This course is being developed primarily by a NENA staffer who gained extensive experience with aviation-related PSAP operations while serving as Director of the on-site PSAP for Indianapolis International Airport (KIND). We anticipate that this training will be available sometime in late 2016. With respect to Recommendation P-12-19, we have worked closely with pipeline operators to ensure that PSAPs have access to timely, accurate information about pipeline emergencies, along with specialized training in handling such situations. First, we established the PSAP Information for Pipeline Emergencies database. This database allows pipeline operators to quickly contact PSAPs within the counties transited by their lines, using 24x7 emergency numbers that are normally answered with the same priority as 9-1-1 calls. As part of this effort, we have also communicated to PSAPs the importance of actively updating their contact information in the database, and stepped-up our own efforts to actively validate the data by regularly contacting PSAPs ourselves. Second, we published articles about the Marshall, Michigan incident in the Winter 2012 and Spring 2014 editions (both online and print) of our membership publication, The Call. Those articles can be accessed by NENA members at www.nena.org/thecall. Third, we collaborated with Enbridge Pipeline to develop a one hour online training course targeted specifically at 9-1-1 telecommunicators and dispatchers. That training is available for free to any 9-1-1 center at www.mypipelinetraining.org. Third, NENA staff acted as Subject-Matter Experts during the development of a pipeline industry standard for interaction with 9-1-1 centers. That document has now been jointly published by the American Petroleum Institute and the Association of Pipe Lines. Following that publication, NENA has initiated development of a complementary standard for PSAP interaction with pipeline operators. The development working group for that standard is currently forming, and should begin active development work in the first quarter of 2016. We appreciate the opportunity to assist NTSB in improving the safety and security of our nation's transportation networks and look forward to doing so again in the future. Should you have any further questions concerning Recommendations A-09-138 or P-12-19, or any other matter of mutual concern to the transportation and emergency response communities, please accept our open invitation to collaborate on future improvements.

From: NTSB
To: National Emergency Number Association
Date: 9/24/2015
Response: We have received no information from you in the past 6 years regarding any actions that you have taken or planned in response to this recommendation, despite numerous requests for an update, including a November 9, 2012, e-mail, a March 13, 2014, letter, and a December 1, 2014, letter that included a sample article that could be easily included on your website or in any publications that you provide to your members that would satisfy this recommendation. We have also sent several e mails to Mr. Trey Forgety, Director of Government Affairs, requesting information regarding your actions or intentions. Because we have been unable to learn, despite our repeated inquiries, whether you have taken or planned any action to address Safety Recommendation A 09 138, it is classified CLOSED—UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: National Emergency Number Association
Date: 12/1/2014
Response: We issued this recommendation 5 years ago, but we have received no reply regarding any action you have taken in response. We continue to believe that the lessons learned about communicating GPS coordinates and the use of cell phone “pinging” remain relevant and important for your members. To assist you in distributing this information to them, we have prepared the enclosed article, which you may use as-written or may use to develop your own article or presentation. NTSB: In EMS Helicopter Crash, Failure to Communicate It was nearly midnight on September 27, 2008, when an emergency medical services (EMS) helicopter registered to the Maryland State Police (MSP) crashed in District Heights, Maryland, 3.2 miles north of the runway at Andrews Air Force Base. The pilot, a flight paramedic and another field medical provider died. So did one of two automobile accident patients who the helicopter had been transporting. The second patient, already seriously injured in the automobile accident, survived – with additional serious injuries from her second accident in one night. And for about two hours she remained at the accident site alone and without medical assistance, because search and rescue personnel had problems locating the downed helicopter – problems that could have been avoided with better communication. The report on the accident by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) highlighted concerns of interest to all personnel involved in search and rescue (SAR) operations. The helicopter struck terrain in Walker Mill Regional Park in District Heights, Maryland. The flight, designated Trooper 2, had been diverted to Andrews because of bad weather, known in aviation as instrument meteorological conditions. The air traffic controller at Andrews noticed that Trooper 2 was missing almost immediately after radar contact was lost. Andrews notified the Prince George’s (PG) County Communications Center and the Maryland State Police (MSP) Forestville barrack. But MSP’s System Communications Center (SYSCOM) and PG County dispatchers communicated poorly, the first of several missteps in the search and rescue effort. SYSCOM had been tracking the flight using global positioning system (GPS) data transmitted from the helicopter, and provided PG County dispatchers with Trooper 2’s last coordinates. But the SYSCOM duty officer read out a string of numbers without designating their format: “three eight five two one seven, north was seven six five two two six.” The coordinates were in degrees, minutes, and seconds. PG County dispatchers incorrectly assumed that the coordinates were in degrees and decimal minutes, the format to which they were accustomed. The SYSCOM duty officer also indicated that the crash site was about two miles southwest of FedEx Field, a large football stadium. PG County dispatchers sent patrol vehicles to the area southwest of FedEx Field. But they also plotted the coordinates in an online mapping program, using the wrong format. The program returned a location near Calvert Cliffs, Maryland, about 30 miles southeast of the accident site. Now PG County dispatchers had two different locations for the accident. A county dispatcher called SYSCOM to verify the location, but nobody located the SYSCOM duty officer to verify the location and possibly resolve the confusion. To determine which general accident location was correct (and to refine the location, if it was in the FedEx Field vicinity,) PG County dispatchers asked the cellular phone service provider to “ping” the cell phones of the helicopter’s crew. The cellular provider pinged the phones, but gave dispatchers only the street address of the closest tower, without providing a distance or bearing from the tower. Dispatchers then provided the address of the tower to PG County officers and MSP Forestville barrack troopers. Officers converged on that location. But releasing the address information without a distance and bearing only served to distract and confuse units that were already searching an area closer to the crash. Neither PG County nor MSP dispatchers fully understood the importance of the distance and bearing information. About two hours after the crash, personnel from the MSP aviation command located the crash site and the lone survivor. They had changed tactics after the cell phone tower address proved unhelpful. Rather than continuing to focus on the tower, they found the accident site by searching along the path of the runway’s extended centerline. In this accident, personnel engaged in search and rescue conveyed and collected only partial information. GPS coordinates were given without reference to the format, and misinterpreting them based on an assumed format effectively rendered them moot. Similarly, the address information based on “pinging” the cell phones did not include distance and bearing. In its report on the accident the NTSB recommended that the lessons learned be widely disseminated. Now, six years later, the details of this accident are still largely unknown outside of Maryland. It is hoped that sharing the details can help prevent a recurrence elsewhere. More detailed information about the accident and the NTSB’s recommendation can be found on the agency’s website at http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2009/A09_138.pdf

From: NTSB
To: National Emergency Number Association
Date: 3/28/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed in within 3 to 5 years. A recommendation such as Safety Recommendation A-09-138 is frequently completed in 12 months or less. As we issued this recommendation more than 4 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: International Association of Chiefs of Police
Date: 11/17/2014
Response: As I described on Friday, attached is an informational article describing the communication problems encountered by the search and rescue crews trying to locate the crash site (and survivor) of a Maryland State Police EMS helicopter flight that crashed near Andrews Air Force Base. We issued Safety Recommendation A-09-138 asking that IACP inform your members of the lessons learned from the emergency response to that accident, particularly that search and rescue personnel need to understand how to interpret and use both GPS coordinates and the results of cell phone pinging. I believe those lessons learned remain relevant and valuable today for personnel involved in search and rescue. To help distribute this information, I prepared the attached article. Feel free to publish it, or to modify it as appropriate for whatever publication or forum that you have. If you could send me a copy of whatever is published, or let me know of other places where this information was distributed, I would appreciate it. Distributing this information will likely result in A-09-138 being classified “Closed-Acceptable Action.” Let me know if I can be of any further help with this.

From: NTSB
To: International Association of Chiefs of Police
Date: 5/5/2011
Response: On December 4, 2002, the NTSB sent a letter to the IACP requesting information on what action, if any, your organization had taken or had planned to take to implement Safety Recommendations H-01-36 and H-02-6. On April 22, 2010, the NTSB sent a letter requesting information on what action, if any, the IACP had taken or had planned to take to implement Safety Recommendations H-01-36, H-02-6 and A-09-138. On November 23, 2010, the NTSB sent a letter requesting information on what action, if any, IACP had taken or had planned to take to implement Safety Recommendations H-01-36, H-02-6, I-07-3 and A-09-138. With the exception of the IACP’s May 2, 2008, reply to the NTSB’s August 20, 2007, letter, which resulted in our classifying Safety Recommendation I-07-3 “Open—Acceptable Response,” we have received no information from the IACP regarding what, if anything, your organization has done to address these important safety issues. The NTSB is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. Accordingly, because the NTSB has been unable to confirm that the IACP has completed action to address these issues, Safety Recommendations H-01-36, H-02-6, and A-09-138 are classified CLOSED – UNACCEPTABLE ACTION – NO RESPONSE RECEIVED, and Safety Recommendation I-07-3 is classified “Closed—Unacceptable Action.” Should the NTSB receive a timely response from you indicating that the IACP has acted to address these recommendations, with details of the actions taken, we may reevaluate their classifications.

From: NTSB
To: International Association of Chiefs of Police
Date: 11/23/2010
Response: The NTSB is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure the public the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we attempt to monitor the progress of all our recommendations. Accordingly, the NTSB would appreciate receiving information from the IACP regarding any actions taken or being contemplated in response to Safety Recommendations H-01-36, H-02-6, I-07-3 and A-09-138. Please note that this is our third request for information about Safety Recommendations H-01-36 and H-02-6. Copies are enclosed of the following letters: the NTSB’s December 20, 2001 (enclosure 1), May 24, 2002 (enclosure 2), December 4, 2002 (enclosure 3), June 27, 2007 (enclosure 4), May 2, 2008 (enclosure 5), November 13, 2009 (enclosure 6), and April 22, 2010 (enclosure 7), letters, and the IACP’s August 20, 2007 (enclosure 8) letter. Please refer to Safety Recommendations H-01-36, H-02-6, I-07-3, and A-09-138 in your reply.

From: NTSB
To: International Association of Chiefs of Police
Date: 4/22/2010
Response: NMC# 103416: The NTSB is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure the public the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we attempt to monitor the progress of all of our recommendations. The NTSB would appreciate receiving information from the IACP, therefore, on any actions being contemplated in response to Safety Recommendations H-01-36, H-02-6 and A-09-138. Note, this is the second request for information on Safety Recommendations H-01-36 and H-02-6. Copies of the NTSB’s December 20, 2001, May 24, 2002, December 4, 2002, and November 13, 2009, letters are enclosed. Please refer to Safety Recommendations H 01-36, H-02-6 and A-09-138 in your reply, and address your response to Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman.