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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-10-067
Details
Synopsis: On January 15, 2009, about 1527 eastern standard time,1 US Airways flight 1549, an Airbus Industrie A320-214, N106US, experienced an almost total loss of thrust in both engines after encountering a flock of birds and was subsequently ditched on the Hudson River about 8.5 miles from LaGuardia Airport (LGA), New York City, New York. The flight was en route to Charlotte Douglas International Airport (CLT), Charlotte, North Carolina, and had departed LGA about 2 minutes before the in-flight event occurred. The 150 passengers, including a lap-held child, and 5 crewmembers evacuated the airplane via the forward and overwing exits. One flight attendant and four passengers received serious injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The scheduled, domestic passenger flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Once the development of the checklist and procedure for a dual-engine failure occurring at a low altitude has been completed, as asked for in Safety Recommendation A-10-66, require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, Part 135, and Part 91 Subpart K operators of turbine-powered aircraft to implement the checklist and procedure.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: Weehawken, NJ, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA09MA026
Accident Reports: Loss of Thrust in Both Engines, US Airways Flight 1549 Airbus Industrie A320-214, N106US
Report #: AAR-10-03
Accident Date: 1/15/2009
Issue Date: 5/21/2010
Date Closed: 7/23/2014
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Checklist, Engine Out

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 7/23/2014
Response: The FAA’s response to these recommendations is dependent on the successful completion of Safety Recommendation A-10-66, and the resulting availability for existing airplanes of checklists and procedures for a dual engine failure at low altitude. Because you do not plan to mandate changes to existing manuals to address this issue, Safety Recommendations A 10 67 and 69 are classified CLOSED—UNACCEPTABLE ACTION. We invite you to submit any additional information that we did not consider concerning actions that you have taken or plan to complete soon that address or will address these recommendations. If we receive this information in a timely manner, we may reclassify them.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 1/11/2013
Response: The FAA’s response to this recommendation is dependent on the successful completion of Safety Recommendation A-10-66. However, if the original equipment manufacturers develop a dual-engine failure at low altitude checklist and procedure for turbine-powered aircraft, the FAA will consider the use of policy guidance, such as an advisory circular or revisions to Order 8900.1 to implement these revisions. We believe that the use of such policy guidance may constitute an acceptable alternate method of satisfying the recommendation. Accordingly, pending completion of this action, Safety Recommendation A-10-67 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 10/29/2012
Response: -From Michael P. Huerta, Acting Administrator: We plan to address this recommendation after completion of the review that we are conducting in response to recommendation A- I 0-66. However, if the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) develop a dual-engine failure at low altitude checklist and procedure for turbine-powered aircraft. We will consider the policy guidance options available to implement a global checklist change to include it.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 3/17/2011
Response: The NTSB looks forward to reviewing the results of the FAA's review of existing requirements for a checklist and procedure for a dual-engine failure, as well as its requirement for the development and implementation of a specific checklist for a dual-engine failure occurring at a low altitude. Pending our review of this information, once the FAA's reviews and subsequent actions have been completed, Safety Recommendations A-10-66 and -67 are classified OPEN – ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 9/23/2010
Response: CC# 201000368: - From J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator: As indicated in our response to recommendation A-I 0-66, we will review the existing part 25 requirements for a checklist procedure for a dual-engine failure and investigate the feasibility of requiring original equipment manufacturers (OEM) to develop a specific checklist for a dual-engine failure occurring at a low altitude. Should a dual-engine failure at low altitude checklist procedure be developed for turbine-powered aircraft, we will consider the policy guidance options available to implement a global checklist change to include it.