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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-72-060
Details
Synopsis: CAPITOL INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC., DOUGLAS DC-8-63F, N4909C, CRASHED FOLLOWING AN UNSUCCESSFUL TAKEOFF ATTEMPT FROM THE ANCHORAGE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, ANCHORAGE, ALASKA. THE FLIGHT WAS BEING OPERATED AS A MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND (MAC) CONTRACT FLIGHT FROM McCHORD AIR FORCE BASE, TACOMA, WASHINGTON, TO CAM RANH BAY, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM, WITH EN ROUTE FUELING STOPS AT ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, AND YOKOTA AIR BASE, JAPAN. THERE WERE 219 MILITARY PASSENGERS AND A CREW OF 10 ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT. FORTY-SIX PASSENGERS AND ONE FLIGHT ATTENDANT RECEIVED FATAL INJURIES IN THE POST-CRASH FIRE. AT THE TIME OF THE TAKEOFF, PRECIPITATION, IN THE FORM OF FREEZING DRIZZLE, WAS OCCURRING AT THE AIRPORT AND THE RUNWAY WAS COVERED WITH A LIGHT COATING OF ICE. EVIDENCE OF TIRE SKID MARKS, DEGRADED RUBBER, AND SHREDDED TIRE CASINGS WERE FOUND OVER MOST OF THE LENGTH OF THE RUNWAY. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DETERMINED THAT THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT WAS THE FAILURE OF THE AIRCRAFT TO ATTAIN THE NECESSARY AIRSPEED TO EFFECT LIFTOFF DURING THE ATTEMPTED TAKEOFF. THE LACK OF ACCELERATION, UNDETECTED BY THE CREW UNTIL AFTER THE AIRCRAFT REACHED V1 SPEED, WAS THE RESULT OF A HIGH FRICTIONAL DRAG WHICH WAS CAUSED BY A FAILURE OF ALL MAIN LANDING GEAR WHEELS TO ROTATE. ALTHOUGH IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A BRAKING PRESSURE SUFFICIENT TO LOCK ALL OF THE WHEELS WAS IMPARTED TO THE BRAKE SYSTEM, THE SOURCE OF THIS PRESSURE COULD NOT BE DETERMINED. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF THE UNWANTED BRAKING PRESSURE WERE EITHER A HYDRAULIC/BRAKE SYSTEM MALFUNCTION OR AN INADVERTENTLY ENGAGED PARKING BRAKE.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: In cooperation with the aircraft manufacturers and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, utilize the results of already extensive research and accident investigation data to develop and implement major improvements in the design of transport aircraft interiors. Of particular concern are improvements in the crashworthiness of galley equipment, stewardess seats and restraining devices, and the flammability cabin interior materials. (Superseded by A-83-78)
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Superseded
Mode: Aviation
Location: Anchorage, AK, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA71AZ012
Accident Reports: Capitol International Airways, DC-8-63F, N4909C
Report #: AAR-72-12
Accident Date: 11/27/1970
Issue Date: 3/9/1972
Date Closed: 4/30/1984
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Superseded)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 4/30/1984
Response:

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 10/31/1983
Response: To promote a comprehensive program to address the potentially hazardous situation posed by in-flight fires, the Safety Board is issuing new Safety Recommendations rather than reiterating relevant Safety Recommendations previously issued to the FAA. The Safety Board will close Safety Recommendations A-73-68, A-73-70, and A-74-5 as having been superseded by recommendations A-83-70 through A-83-81.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 6/30/1982
Response:

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 4/17/1979
Response:

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 3/22/1979
Response: FAA LTR LISTS THE FOLLOWING RESPONSIVE ACTIONS: (1) ANPRM 74-38; (2) ANPRM 75-3; (3) NPRM 75-31; (4) ESTABLISHMENT OF A CABIN SAFETY PROGRAM; AND (5) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SAFER ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/28/1978
Response:

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 6/21/1972
Response: FAA LTR: FAA REFERRED TO AN EARLIER BOARD RECOMMENDATION ON THIS ACCIDENT (A-71-3 DATED 1/20/71, REGARDING TAKEOFF PROCEDURES AND RUNWAY REFERENCE) AND STATED THAT THEIR POSITION IN THEIR LETTER OF 2/4/71 HAD NOT CHANGED. THE FAA ALSO REFERRED TO ANOTHER BOARD RECOMMENDATION ON THIS ACCIDENT (A-71-59 DATED 11/12/71 REGARDING FUEL SYSTEM FIRE AND EXPLOSION SUPPRESSION) AND STATED THAT A REGULATORY PROGRAM BASED ON MAJOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT RESULTED IN ADOPTION ON FEBRUARY 15, 1972, OF AMENDMENT 25-32 TO FAR PART 25. THIS AMENDMENT UPGRADED DESIGN STANDARDS FOR FUEL CONTAINMENT AND FLAMMABILITY STANDARDS FOR CABIN INTERIOR MATERIALS. 8/16/73 - NTSB STAFF MET WITH FAA: FAA PLANS TO ISSUE AN ADVANCED NPRM AND NPRM ON CABIN MATERIALS TOXICITY AND ON REVISED STANDARDS FOR MATERIALS FLAMMABILITY TESTING. FAA ADVISED THAT A SAFETY PROGRAM ASSURING ADEQUATE CABIN ATTENDANT SEATING PROVISIONS AND CRASHWORTHINESS FEATURES OF GALLEY EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN COMPLETED.