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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-73-026
Details
Synopsis: DURING THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S INVESTIGATION OF THE GROUND COLLISION ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED AT O'HARE INTERNATIONALAIRPORT, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, ON DECEMBER 20, 1972, WE LEARNED THAT VISIBILITY FROM THE TOWER CAB, OFFICIALLY REPORTED AS ONE-FOURTH OF A MILE, LIMITED SEVERELY THE CONTROLLERS' ABILITY TO SEE GROUND TRAFFIC ON THE AIRPORT. THEREFORE, CONTROLLER PERSONNEL CONCERNED WITH THE TWO AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE COLLISION WERE UNABLE TO MONITOR VISUALLY THE MOVEMENTS OF EITHER AIRCRAFT AT ANY TIME, EXCEPT FOR A BRIEF TIME WHEN THE DC-9 TAXIED FROM THE TERMINAL GATE.UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES, NO ONE IN THE TOWER CAB SAW THE ACCIDENT.
Recommendation: REQUIRE PILOTS TO OBTAIN THE CONTROLLERS' APPROVAL BEFORE CROSSING ALIGHTED RUNWAY DURING PERIODS OF RESTRICTED VISIBILITY ON THE ORDER OF 1/2 MILE.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: Chicago, IL, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: 81275
Accident Reports: North Central Airlines, Inc., McDonnell Douglas DC-9-31, N954N and Delta Air Lines, Inc., Convair CV-880, N8807E
Report #: AAR-73-15
Accident Date: 12/20/1972
Issue Date: 5/17/1973
Date Closed: 8/16/1974
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 8/16/1974
Response: Closed--Unacceptable Action.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 6/1/1973
Response: A-73-26-THE FAA STATE THAT IF A PILOT IS CLEARED "TO" A RUNWAY, ATC IS TELLING HIM THAT TRAFFIC CONDITIONS PERMIT HIM TO USE THE APPROPRIATE TAXIWAY AND TO CROSS ALL RUNWAYS EN ROUTE TO THE ACTIVE RUNWAY. CONTROLLERS SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO ISSUE DUAL CLEARANCES TO "REINFORCE" THAT AN INACTIVE RUNWAY IS CLEAR OF TRAFFIC. IF, WHILE TAXING "TO" THE ACTIVE RUNWAY, A PILOT WANTS CONFIRMATION THAT HE IS CLEARED TO CROSS A RUNWAY, IT IS THE PILOT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO ASK FOR CONFIRMATION. A CONTINUING REQUIREMENT TO APPROVE EACH SPECIFIC CROSSING OF A LIGHTED RUNWAY WOULD RESULT IN AN INTOLERABLE COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEM AND ADDED CONTROLLER WORKLOAD.