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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation H-08-014
Details
Synopsis: About 7:30 p.m. on October 15, 2005, a 22-year-old truck driver departed Munster, Indiana, on an approximately 436-mile-long trip to Minneapolis, Minnesota, driving a truck-tractor semitrailer operated by Whole Foods Market, Inc. (Whole Foods). By 1:58 a.m., the truck driver had completed about 323 miles of his trip. The combination unit was traveling westbound on I-94 near milepost 85, at a police-estimated speed of 63 to 69 mph, when the unit departed the right-hand travel lane and paved shoulder at an approximate 3-degree angle. The unit left the roadway and entered the earthen, sloped roadside. The driver steered to the left, and the combination unit reentered the pavement and overturned onto its right side, sliding to a stop so that it blocked both westbound lanes and shoulders of I-94. The truck driver said that following the overturn, he turned off the ignition and was then thrown into the sleeper berth area by another impact.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION: Develop and use a methodology that will continually assess the effectiveness of the fatigue management plans implemented by motor carriers, including their ability to improve sleep and alertness, mitigate performance errors, and prevent incidents and accidents. (This safety recommendation was superseded by safety recommendation H-12-29)
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action/Superseded
Mode: Highway
Location: Osseo, WI, United States
Is Reiterated: Yes
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: HWY06MH003
Accident Reports: Truck-Tractor Semitrailer Rollover and Motorcoach Collision With Overturned Truck Interstate Highway 94
Report #: HAR-08-02
Accident Date: 10/16/2005
Issue Date: 2/2/2009
Date Closed: 8/16/2012
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FMCSA (Closed - Acceptable Action/Superseded)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FMCSA
Date: 3/6/2019
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) “Notice of application for exemption; request for comments,” which was published in 84 Federal Register 2304, on February 6, 2019. The request was made by several associations on behalf of drivers who transport livestock, insects, and aquatic animals. The groups have requested an exemption from certain provisions in the hours-of-service (HOS) rules to allow their drivers, after 10 consecutive hours off duty to: (1) drive through the 16th consecutive hour after coming on duty; and (2) drive a total of 15 hours during that 16-hour period. For the reasons outlined below, the NTSB believes that the FMCSA should deny this requested exemption, and any similar exemptions, to the HOS rules. More than a decade ago, in our report of the 2005 truck rollover and motorcoach collision in Osseo, Wisconsin, which was caused by driver fatigue, the NTSB concluded, “For fatigue management plans to be successfully implemented by motor carriers over time, FMCSA oversight is needed.”3 The NTSB recommended that the FMCSA, “Develop and use a methodology that will continually assess the effectiveness of the fatigue management plans implemented by motor carriers, including their ability to improve sleep and alertness, mitigate performance errors, and prevent incidents and accidents” (Safety Recommendation H-08-14). In response to Safety Recommendation H-08-14, the FMCSA informed the NTSB about the development of the North American Fatigue Management Program (NAFMP), which it referred to as, “a comprehensive approach for managing commercial driver fatigue.” The voluntary program includes fatigue management education for drivers and their families, carrier executives and managers, shippers and receivers, and dispatchers. It also includes information on sleep disorder screening and treatment, driver and trip scheduling practices, fatigue management technologies, and corporate culture. In 2009, the NTSB encouraged the FMCSA to move forward to complete and deploy the NAFMP and also to include in the program a methodology to assess the effectiveness of plans implemented by motor carriers. In our 2010 report of the 2009 truck rear-end collision into passenger vehicles in Miami, Oklahoma, which was caused by driver fatigue, we concluded that, “The use of fatigue management programs by motor carriers has the potential to reduce accidents caused by fatigued commercial drivers.”4 The NTSB reiterated Safety Recommendation H-08-14 and made a new Safety Recommendation H-10-9 to the FMCSA, calling on it to, “Require all motor carriers to adopt a fatigue management program based on the North American Fatigue Management Program guidelines for the management of fatigue in a motor carrier operating environment.” In its September 1, 2011, response to this recommendation, the FMCSA indicated that, before mandating the use of fatigue management programs, a nonregulatory approach should be tried. The FMCSA stated that it would continue to encourage carriers to implement such programs on a voluntary basis. On March 28, 2012, the NTSB reclassified Safety Recommendation H-10-9 “Open—Unacceptable Response,” pending the FMCSA’s requiring that all motor carriers adopt a fatigue management program based on NAFMP guidelines. In 2012, the NTSB reiterated Safety Recommendation H-10-9 in two reports in which the probable cause was attributed to driver fatigue: (1) the March 2011 motorcoach run-off-the-road and collision with a vertical highway signpost in New York City, New York, and (2) the May 2011 motorcoach roadway departure and overturn in Doswell, Virginia.5 In the Doswell report, the NTSB stated that, “Although some carriers will adopt fatigue management programs to improve the safety of their operations, many will not. In fact, those carriers with the weakest safety management—that is, the operations that most need a fatigue management program—are the least likely to implement one.” Also, in light of the initial progress the FMCSA had made on developing the NAFMP and assessing its utility, the NTSB reclassified Safety Recommendation H-08-14 “Closed—Acceptable Action/Superseded” and recommended that the FMCSA, “Establish an ongoing program to monitor, evaluate, report on, and continuously improve fatigue management programs implemented by motor carriers to identify, mitigate, and continuously reduce fatigue-related risks for drivers” (Safety Recommendation H-12-29).

From: NTSB
To: FMCSA
Date: 4/23/2013
Response: Notation 8486: On March 11, 2013, the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) published a request for public comment on a document released on its website titled “Draft Recommendations Evaluation for Public Comment: Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMS)” (CSB Evaluation). Subsequently, CSB staff invited the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to share its experiences in investigating transportation accidents in which human fatigue was identified as a safety issue, and related NTSB safety recommendations. The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and issuing safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. The NTSB has a long history of making recommendations to reduce fatigue and fatigue-related transportation accidents and, since its inception, has issued over 200 recommendations addressing fatigue in the aviation, highway, marine, railroad, and pipeline modes. We are pleased to share our experiences with the CSB. The CSB Evaluation comments on actions taken by the American Petroleum Institute (API) and the United Steelworkers International Union (USW) in response to Recommendation No. 2005-04-I-TX-7, issued by the CSB in 2005 to those organizations. The CSB recommendation was issued as a result of the March 23, 2005, Texas City, Texas, refinery explosion and fire. The portion of the CSB recommendation pertinent to this letter reads as follows: [D]evelop fatigue prevention guidelines for the refining and petrochemical industries that, at a minimum, limit hours and days of work and address shift work…. In April 2010, the API issued an American National Standards Institute-approved Recommended Practice titled Fatigue Risk Management Systems for Personnel in the Refining and Petrochemical Industries, First Edition (RP-755), and an accompanying technical report titled Fatigue Risk Management Systems for Personnel in the Refining and Petrochemical Industries, Scientific and Technical Guide to RP 755. The CSB Evaluation presents the results of a CSB staff review in which the CSB staff determined that RP-755 does not meet the intent of the CSB recommendation in several areas. The NTSB has reviewed RP-755 as well as the CSB Evaluation. With respect to human fatigue, the NTSB has specific experience with the following issues that are discussed in the CSB Evaluation: • The hours-of-service limits described in RP-755, which are more permissive than what is indicated by current scientific knowledge, and the suggestion that voluntary FRMS programs will compensate for the risk from excessive hours and days at work, and • The emphasis of RP-755 on voluntary efforts by industry and its lack of explicit requirements, especially with respect to elements of an effective fatigue management system. With respect to the hours-of-service limits, RP-755 describes “work sets” during normative conditions, which may include 12-hour day shifts or night shifts for 7 consecutive days, with the possibility of an additional “holdover period” beyond the duty day for training or safety meetings. The RP states that the “holdover period should not exceed 2 hours and, where possible, occur at the end of the day shift.” However, the use of the language “should” is not a requirement but is defined by the document as a “recommendation or that which is advised but not required in order to conform to the RP.” Therefore, a worker could, during a normal work set, work shifts of 14 hours or greater in a 24-hour period for several days. RP-755 also states that during planned or unplanned outages, workers may be called on to work 12-hour shifts for up to 14 consecutive days, with as little as 36 hours between 14-day, 12-hour work sets. Holdover periods of up to 2 hours are also allowed during outages. The RP also has provisions for extending work shifts up to 18 hours. In several of its accident investigations, the NTSB has recognized the relationship between long duty days and fatigue, both directly and through their effects on reduced sleep lengths during off-duty periods. For example, in the investigation of the October 2004 Corporate Airlines accident in Kirksville, Missouri, the NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the pilots’ failure to follow established procedures and properly conduct an instrument approach at night, and that fatigue was one factor that contributed to the pilots’ degraded performance. The length of the pilots’ duty day (at the time of the accident, they had been on duty for 14 1/2 hours) was cited along with less-than-optimal overnight rest time, early reporting time for duty, the number of flight legs, and demanding flight conditions, as factors that resulted in the pilots’ fatigue. In the Kirksville report, the NTSB cited research showing that pilots who worked schedules that involved 13 or more hours of duty time had an accident rate that was several times higher than that of pilots working shorter schedules, and that airplane captains who had been awake for more than about 12 hours made significantly more errors than those who had been awake for less than 12 hours. As a result of the Kirksville investigation, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-06-10 to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which stated the following: A-06-10 Modify and simplify the flight crew hours-of-service regulations to take into consideration factors such as length of duty day, starting time, workload, and other factors shown by recent research, scientific evidence, and current industry experience to affect crew alertness. The NTSB reiterated Safety Recommendation A-06-10 in 2008 following its investigation of the April 2007 Pinnacle Airlines accident in Traverse City, Michigan. In that accident, the NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the pilots’ poor decision-making as they prepared to land the airplane. The NTSB stated that “This poor decision-making likely reflected the effects of fatigue produced by a long, demanding duty day and, for the captain, the duties associated with check airman functions.” The pilots had been on duty for more than 14 hours at the time of the accident. The effectiveness of fatigue management is directly related to the availability of work schedules that allow a sufficient period of time between work shifts for the employee to obtain sufficient restorative sleep. The NTSB has investigated several accidents and serious incidents that provided clear and compelling evidence that air traffic controllers were sometimes operating in a state of fatigue because of their work schedules and poorly managed utilization of rest periods between shifts, and that fatigue had contributed to controller errors. Consequently, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-07-30 to the FAA, which stated the following: A-07-30 Work with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association to reduce the potential for controller fatigue by revising controller work-scheduling policies and practices to provide rest periods that are long enough for controllers to obtain sufficient restorative sleep and by modifying shift rotations to minimize disrupted sleep patterns, accumulation of sleep debt, and decreased cognitive performance. The NTSB’s consideration of how long duty days affect fatigue and safety has not been limited to the aviation mode. Recently, in our investigation of the September 2010 collision of two freight trains near Two Harbors, Minnesota, the NTSB concluded that crew fatigue was a contributing factor in train crew errors that led to the collision. The train crewmembers who made the errors had been awake between 13 and 14 hours at the time of the accident, and the accident occurred during the final hour of a 12-hour shift. In its report, the NTSB cited a study showing that 12 hour work shifts have been associated with decrements in alertness and performance, compared to 8-hour shifts. Other studies of commercial drivers have found an exponential increase in crash risk with increasing driving times, especially for driving periods that extend beyond 8 or 9 hours. The NTSB has made numerous recommendations concerning hours of service across the transportation modes. A common theme of those NTSB recommendations has been an emphasis on establishing hours-of-service limits that are scientifically based, that set limits on hours of service, that provide predictable work and rest schedules, and that consider circadian rhythms and human sleep requirements. The second issue discussed in the CSB Evaluation with which the NTSB has experience concerns the lack of explicit requirements regarding essential elements of a fatigue management program. The CSB Evaluation remarks that The use of the word ‘should’ for most elements of a Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) in the RP means that they are optional, not required. In what is already a voluntary standard to begin with–employers can choose to conform to them, but they are not required by force of law to do so–‘should’ statements have very little force. The lack of required FRMS elements raises additional concerns because RP-755 states that its hours-of-service limits were “developed in the context of the existence of a comprehensive FRMS” and that “Consistently working at the limits shown is not sustainable and may lead to chronic sleep debt.” Hence, while RP-755 does not require the use of an FRMS, it does ostensibly allow operators to persistently schedule workers at the noted limits. The NTSB has recommended requiring the implementation of fatigue management programs. For example, as a result of its investigation of a June 2009 multivehicle accident near Miami, Oklahoma, in which a truck driver’s fatigue resulted in his failure to react to and avoid colliding with a slowing traffic queue, the NTSB emphasized the importance of comprehensive fatigue management programs. The report described the North American Fatigue Management Program (NAFMP), which is designed to address scheduling policies and practices, fatigue management training, sleep disorder screening and treatment, and fatigue monitoring technologies. In the report, the NTSB stated that “if the NAFMP guidelines remain voluntary—and are used by some carriers but ignored by others—this important safety tool might have only a limited effect in reducing fatigue-related highway accidents.” As a result of its investigation, the NTSB called on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to implement the following NTSB safety recommendation: H-10-9 Require all motor carriers to adopt a fatigue management program based on the North American Fatigue Management Program guidelines for the management of fatigue in a motor carrier operating environment. The NTSB has also made recommendations in the highway, railroad, and aviation modes to establish ongoing programs to evaluate, report on, and continuously improve fatigue management programs implemented by operators (NTSB Safety Recommendations H-08-14, R 12-007, A-06-11, and A-08-45). I hope that this information about the NTSB’s history of investigating fatigue-related accidents and the recommendations we have issued will be useful as the CSB moves forward with the evaluation of the API and USW responses to the fatigue-related CSB recommendation resulting from the Texas City investigation.

From: NTSB
To: FMCSA
Date: 8/16/2012
Response: From the NTSB report Motorcoach roadway departure and overturn on Interstate 95 near Doswell, Virginia on May 31, 2011 (report adopted July 31, 2012, report published August 16, 2012): In its 2008 accident report on a semitrailer rollover and subsequent strike by a motorcoach in Osseo, Wisconsin, the NTSB discussed the merits of fatigue management programs and their use by motor carriers to reduce fatigue-related accidents.74 The programs are designed to manage fatigue within a specific industry, such as commercial motor transportation, and to address how fatigue affects that operational environment. Some motor carriers have established such programs on a voluntary basis. An effective fatigue management program for a motor carrier might include program-focused efforts to help employees avoid and mitigate fatigue as well as management practices for implementing, overseeing, and evaluating the effectiveness of the program. Possible elements of such a program might be testing and treatment options for sleep disorders; evaluation of off-duty actions (such as drivers’ sleep when off duty); informational brochures/training for all carrier personnel on fatigue, including its consequences and countermeasures; implementation of a nonpunitive reporting system permitting drivers to report fatigue and request relief; training for dispatchers and management personnel on improving scheduling to consider driver sleep needs; company-imposed consequences for HOS violations; and use of fatigue management technologies. In the Osseo report, the NTSB made the following recommendation to the FMCSA: Develop and use a methodology that will continually assess the effectiveness of the fatigue management plans implemented by motor carriers, including their ability to improve sleep and alertness, mitigate performance errors, and prevent incidents and accidents. (H-08-14) This recommendation is currently classified “Open—Acceptable Response.” A 2009 NAFMP study to address the effects of fatigue management programs on driver fatigue found the programs can be beneficial to both drivers and companies.75 In the study, drivers who had been working for 3 months under a fatigue management program that included educational sessions, sleep disorder diagnoses, and efforts to improve dispatch practices with respect to fatigue generally reported favorable results. Drivers indicated they had better sleep, in both quality and duration, and experienced fewer “close calls” associated with fatigue while driving. Motor carriers participating in the study reported benefits from the programs as well, indicating their accident rates declined and their drivers were absent less frequently. For more than 10 years, the NAFMP has been studying driver fatigue to develop a comprehensive, integrated fatigue management program that could be implemented by motor carriers to reduce the safety risks associated with fatigue. The NTSB expects the NAFMP to issue guidance materials for a model fatigue management program by the end of 2012. In its 2010 report on a truck-tractor accident that took place in Miami, Oklahoma, the NTSB made the following recommendation to the FMCSA:76 Require all motor carriers to adopt a fatigue management program based on the North American Fatigue Management Program guidelines for the management of fatigue in a motor carrier operating environment. (H-10-9) In its September 1, 2011, response to this recommendation, the FMCSA indicated that, before mandating the use of fatigue management programs, a nonregulatory approach should be tried. The FMCSA stated it would continue to work to encourage carriers to implement such programs on a voluntary basis. The NTSB believes that, although some carriers will adopt fatigue management programs to improve the safety of their operations, many will not. In fact, those carriers with the weakest safety management—that is, the operations that most need a fatigue management program—are the least likely to implement one. For example, it seems improbable that a carrier such as Sky Express, given its extremely limited effort to train and supervise its drivers, would have enacted a fatigue management program unless required to do so to stay in business. Consequently, on March 28, 2012, the NTSB reclassified Safety Recommendation H-10-9 “Open—Unacceptable Response.” In its 2012 report on a March 12, 2011, motorcoach accident in New York City, New York, the NTSB reiterated Safety Recommendation H-10-9 due to the fatigue-related failures associated with the driver and carrier in that accident.77 In connection with the Doswell accident, the NTSB considers that, had Sky Express taken reasonable steps toward overseeing the activities of its drivers, such as those that would normally appear in a fatigue management program, the driver might have been better rested and avoided falling asleep while driving, thus preventing this accident. Therefore, the NTSB again reiterates Safety Recommendation H-10-9 to the FMCSA, and the recommendation remains classified “Open—Unacceptable Response.” The NTSB does not consider, however, that Sky Express, which was reluctant to take even minimal steps to ensure the safety management of its operations, would necessarily have become a safer company simply by initiating a fatigue management program. As the NTSB found during this investigation, Sky Express lacked any systematic approach to maintaining safety and provided only the minimum safety management required by the FMCSA to keep its operating authority. (See section 2.4, “Motor Carrier Oversight.”) Sky Express undertook safety management actions only when forced to do so by FMCSA oversight. There is little reason to expect that Sky Express would have maintained an effective fatigue management program unless the FMCSA also undertook to ensure its effective continuance. Therefore, the NTSB concludes that, if the FMCSA requires carriers to implement fatigue management programs without ensuring the programs stay active and effective, some may not have the intended result of reducing driver fatigue and increasing safety. In the 4 years since the NTSB first issued Safety Recommendation H-08-14, recommending that the FMCSA assess those fatigue management programs adopted voluntarily by motor carriers, the NTSB has issued Safety Recommendation H-10-9, and substantial progress has been made on the NAFMP. Given these developments, the NTSB reclassifies Safety Recommendation H-08-14 CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION/ SUPERSEDED and recommends that the FMCSA establish an ongoing program to monitor, evaluate, report on, and continuously improve fatigue management programs implemented by motor carriers to identify, mitigate, and continuously reduce fatigue-related risks for drivers.

From: NTSB
To: FMCSA
Date: 3/3/2011
Response: Notation 8286: Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled “Hours of Service of Drivers,” which was published at 75 Federal Register (FR) 82170 on December 29, 2010. The notice proposes to revise the regulations for hours of service (HOS) for drivers of property-carrying commercial motor vehicles (CMV). Background of HOS Rule The NTSB has a long history of making recommendations to reduce the likelihood of fatigue-related highway accidents, including recommendations concerning HOS, electronic on board recorders (EOBR), obstructive sleep apnea (OSA), fatigue education and training, vehicle- and environment-based countermeasures, and fatigue risk management programs. With respect to HOS, in 1995, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation H-95-1, which urged the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to require sufficient rest provisions to enable drivers to obtain at least 8 continuous hours of sleep. At the same time, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation H-95-2, which asked the FHWA to eliminate the provision that allowed drivers to split the required 8 hours off duty into two separate periods, so that drivers would have the opportunity to obtain 8 continuous hours of sleep. Both of these recommendations were added to the NTSB Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements (Most Wanted List) in 1995. On May 11, 1999, the NTSB classified both recommendations “Closed—Unacceptable Action/Superseded” and issued Safety Recommendation H-99-19, which asked the FMCSA to do the following: Establish within 2 years scientifically based hours-of-service regulations that set limits on hours of service, provide predictable work and rest schedules, and consider circadian rhythms and human sleep and rest requirements. At a minimum, and as recommended by the National Transportation Safety Board in 1995, the revised regulations should also (a) require sufficient rest provisions to enable drivers to obtain at least 8 continuous hours of sleep after driving for 10 hours or being on duty for 15 hours, and (b) eliminate 49 Code of Federal Regulations 395.1 paragraph (h), which allows drivers with sleeper berth equipment to cumulate the 8 hours off-duty time in two separate periods. (H-99-19) On April 28, 2003, the FMCSA promulgated a final rule (68 FR 22455) for CMV drivers that extended the driving time from 10 to 11 hours but limited the driving window to 14 consecutive hours after coming on duty. The daily off-duty period requirement was extended from 8 to 10 hours. Although the maximum weekly limits were not changed, drivers were allowed to restart the calculation of weekly hours by taking an off-duty break of 34 consecutive hours (termed the “34-hour restart” provision). Based on this new rule, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation H-99-19 “Closed—Acceptable Alternate Action” at a Board Meeting on November 18, 2003. In a letter to the FMCSA dated February 23, 2004, the NTSB commended the FMCSA for revising the HOS regulations for truck drivers for the first time in more than 60 years and stated that, although the sleeper berth provision was not eliminated as requested, the revision met the main objectives of the safety recommendation. On July 16, 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (DC Circuit) vacated the 2003 rule, stating that the FMCSA “failed to consider the impact of the rules on the health of drivers, a factor that the agency must consider under its organic statute.” Subsequently, Congress directed that the 2003 regulations remain in force until the effective date of a new final rule or until September 30, 2005, whichever occurred first. On January 24, 2005, the FMCSA issued an NPRM on CMV driver HOS published at 70 FR 3339. On March 10, 2005, the NTSB responded to this NPRM by first acknowledging the FMCSA’s efforts to develop a rule based on current scientific research on fatigue. Additionally, the NTSB’s comments on the proposed rule reiterated concerns about issues that were not addressed by the 2003 rulemaking. Specifically, the NTSB urged the FMCSA to eliminate provisions or exemptions that would permit a daily sleep period for drivers of less than 8 continuous hours. The NTSB also highlighted the continuing need for tamper-proof EOBRs to assist in the enforcement of HOS regulations. On August 25, 2005, the FMCSA published a revised final rule, which, while similar to the 2003 rule, also revised the sleeper berth provision to require at least 8 consecutive hours in the sleeper berth. Drivers using the sleeper berth provision were required to take an additional 2 hours either off duty or in the sleeper berth. The 2005 rule also provided an exception for CMV drivers who operate within 150 air miles of their work-reporting location and who drive CMVs that do not require a commercial driver’s license (CDL). The rule permitted such drivers to extend the driving window and on-duty time to 16 hours twice a week. Based on additional legal challenges to the 2005 rule, on July 24, 2007, the DC Circuit vacated provisions of the 2005 rule that involved the 11-hour driving limit and the 34-hour restart provision. Subsequently, the FMCSA published an interim final rule on December 17, 2007, and a final rule on November 19, 2008, which repromulgated both the 11-hour driving limit and the 34-hour restart provision and provided the full regulatory evaluation and an explanation of the agency’s methodology in support of its rationale. In 2009, a new petition was filed with the DC Circuit challenging the 2008 rule, and a settlement was reached whereby the petition would be held in abeyance pending the publication of a revised final rule by July 26, 2011. Proposed HOS Rule Revisions The NTSB understands that the subject NPRM proposes to make several changes to the current HOS rule, as summarized in the table on page 4 of this letter. The NTSB supports those provisions of the proposed rule that are scientifically based and would reduce continuous duty or driving time, encourage break-taking, promote nighttime sleep, and foster scheduling patterns that are predictable and consistent with the normal human diurnal circadian rhythm, because extended periods of time awake and time on task, as well as inverted or rotating schedules, have been associated with fatigue-related performance decrements and increased accident risk. By limiting on-duty time to 13 hours and consecutive driving time without breaks to 7 hours, and by choosing to reduce the 11-hour maximum driving time to 10 hours, the FMCSA will reduce continuous time on task and increase rest periods for some drivers. Additionally, limiting how often drivers may use the restart provision and requiring that the 34-hour restart interval include two periods between midnight and 6 a.m. should have the effect of increasing the amount of sleep that drivers receive during the restart period and may encourage drivers to adopt schedules that are more diurnally oriented. Table. Summary of changes to the current HOS rule proposed in the December 29, 2010, NPRM issued by the FMCSA. Provision Current Rule Proposed Rule Daily off-duty period 10 consecutive hours No change Daily driving window For most drivers, 14 consecutive hours (may continue on duty/not driving after 14 hours); "Regional" drivers allowed one 16-hour period "weekly," but release from duty required after 16 hours; Non-CDL drivers within 150 miles of work reporting location allowed two 16 hour periods "weekly" (may continue on duty/not driving after 16 hours) For all property-carrying CMV drivers (unless excepted): • 14 consecutive hours with release from duty required at end of driving window; • 16 consecutive hours no more than twice "weekly," with release from duty required at end of driving window Maximum on-duty time within driving window Normally 14 hours; 16 hours once per week for "regional" drivers; 16 hours twice per week for non-CDL drivers within 150 miles of work-reporting location 13 hours* Maximum driving within driving window 11 hours 10 or 11 hours (both being considered) Maximum consecutive driving No limit May drive only if it has been 7 hours or less since last off-duty period of at least 30 minutes* Weekly on-duty maximum 60 hours in 7 days or 70 hours in 8 days No change Weekly restart May restart weekly limits after at least 34 hours off duty 34-hour restart retained but may only be used once per week and must include two off-duty periods between midnight and 6 a.m. Sleeper berth exception May split off duty into two periods: one period must be at least 8 consecutive hours in sleeper berth; the other, at least 2 hours in sleeper berth or off duty (shorter period does not extend the driving window) No change, but apply same new driving, on duty, and duty-period limits as proposed for non-sleeper-berth drivers Definition of “on duty” Includes any time in CMV except in sleeper berth Does not include any time resting in a parked CMV; In a moving CMV, does not include up to 2 hours in passenger seat immediately before or after 8 consecutive hours in sleeper berth Oilfield exemption “Waiting time” for certain drivers at oilfields (which is off duty but does not extend 14 hour duty period) must be recorded and available to the FMCSA, but no method or details are specified for recordkeeping “Waiting time” for certain drivers at oilfields must be shown on record of duty status or electronic equivalent as off duty and identified by annotations in “remarks” or a separate line added to “grid” *Provision is not applicable to non-CDL drivers operating within 150 air miles of work-reporting location. The NTSB acknowledges the challenges associated with establishing HOS regulations that promote safety and driver health while still providing drivers and operators sufficient flexibility to make scheduling decisions and carry out operations in a competitive manner. Although many drivers do not have schedules that extend to the regulatory limits, as the NPRM notes, some carriers have elected to incorporate maximum on-duty periods into their supply chain planning. This fact shows that some carriers will routinely schedule drivers to the regulatory limits. Because some carriers will inevitably incorporate the minimum rest periods and maximum duty periods into their standard operating practices, in the absence of scientific data, the NTSB encourages the FMCSA to select conservative thresholds to protect the safety and health of drivers, as well as the safety of the traveling public. The NTSB commends the FMCSA for acknowledging in this NPRM that there are insufficient scientific data to support a specific maximum driving time and for particularly requesting data from stakeholders to address this issue. The NTSB has continually and consistently recommended scientifically based HOS regulations. In the absence of relevant scientific data, a conservative maximum driving period is warranted. For these reasons, the NTSB supports reducing the 11-hour maximum driving period within the driving window to a 10-hour maximum, unless or until relevant scientific data justify a departure from this limit. The NTSB has significant reservations about several of the other proposed rule changes. Although allowing the driving window to be extended to 16 hours up to 2 days per week may not lead to an increase in duty or driving hours, it is likely to lead to a forward schedule rotation and may, therefore, adversely affect drivers’ circadian rhythms and sleep quality. Further, the NTSB is strongly opposed to special provisions providing exemptions to certain HOS requirements, such as those the proposed rule applies to passenger-carrying CMVs, oilfield operations, and various other groups. Such exemptions are likely to lead to increased risk for the exempted population and the driving public. NTSB Fatigue Recommendations As stated above, the NTSB supports those provisions of the proposed HOS rule that are likely to reduce driver fatigue. Nevertheless, the NTSB notes that, although driver scheduling is a foundational factor in reducing driver fatigue, an improved HOS rule alone cannot solve the problem of fatigue-related crashes. The NTSB believes several additional issues must be addressed concerning driver fatigue and safety. In recent years, the NTSB has made recommendations to the FMCSA concerning additional actions that can reduce the likelihood drivers will have fatigue-related crashes. Such actions include the following: • Requiring the use of EOBRs for monitoring and assessing HOS compliance; • Reducing the incidence of drivers with undetected, or untreated, OSA; • Developing and employing in-vehicle technologies to reduce the occurrence of fatigue-related accidents; • Providing education about fatigue and fatigue countermeasures; and • Requiring motor carriers to adopt fatigue management programs. Because we believe these actions are vital in addressing the risks posed by driver fatigue, we would like to highlight the relevant open NTSB recommendations to the FMCSA in these areas. Electronic On-Board Recorders. EOBRs have the potential to efficiently and accurately collect and verify HOS information for all drivers, establish the proper incentives and a level playing field for compliance with HOS requirements, and, ultimately, make our highways safer. For more than 30 years, the NTSB has advocated the use of in-vehicle recording devices to improve highway safety. The first NTSB recommendation urging mandatory use of on-board recorders resulted from our 1990 safety study on Fatigue, Alcohol, Other Drugs, and Medical Factors in Fatal-to-the-Driver Heavy Truck Crashes, which concluded that on-board recording devices could provide a tamper-proof mechanism to enforce HOS regulations. More recently, as a result of the NTSB investigation of a 2004 multiple-vehicle accident near Chelsea, Michigan, which resulted in one fatality, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendations H-07-41 and -42 to the FMCSA on December 17, 2007. The recommendations call on the FMCSA to take the following actions: Require all interstate commercial vehicle carriers to use electronic on-board recorders that collect and maintain data concerning driver hours of service in a valid, accurate, and secure manner under all circumstances, including accident conditions, to enable the carriers and their regulators to monitor and assess hours of-service compliance. (H-07-41) As an interim measure and until industrywide use of electronic on-board recorders is mandated, as recommended in Safety Recommendation H-07-41, prevent log tampering and submission of false paper logs by requiring motor carriers to create and maintain audit control systems that include, at a minimum, the retention of all original and corrected paper logs and the use of bound and sequentially numbered logs. (H-07-42) In January 2007, the FMCSA published an NPRM proposing to require motor carriers with a “demonstrated history of serious noncompliance with hours-of-service rules” to be subject to mandatory installation of EOBRs meeting proposed standards of accuracy, validity, and security. In response, the NTSB asserted that, because of deficiencies in the compliance review program, the FMCSA did not have the resources or processes necessary to identify all carriers and drivers that are pattern violators of HOS regulations. The NTSB reiterated its long-held position that the only way by which EOBRs can effectively stem HOS violations is to mandate their installation and use by all operators subject to HOS regulations. On April 5, 2010, the FMCSA issued a final rule (75 FR 17209) that required EOBRs only for those motor carriers found during compliance reviews to have a 10 percent (or higher) violation rate for HOS regulations. In the final rule, the FMCSA acknowledged that many responses to the 2007 NPRM stated the limited scope of the rule would keep it from making a meaningful difference in highway safety. Consequently, the FMCSA committed to exploring a broader EOBR mandate in a new rulemaking process. Safety Recommendations H-07-41 and -42 are currently classified “Open—Unacceptable Response” because the FMCSA has not yet mandated the use of EOBRs by all motor carriers. Under the framework we envision, HOS regulations will be refined and, of necessity, more detailed; there will continue to be temptations for companies and drivers to evade the rules to gain economic advantage over their competitors, or they may inadvertently violate the rules due to the complexity of the regulatory scheme; and, accordingly, enforcement will remain a challenge for state and federal officials. EOBRs can provide readily accessible, objective, and convincing information to maintain the integrity of the new HOS rule. The NTSB is aware that the FMCSA issued an NPRM concerning EOBRs on February 1, 2011. The NTSB is currently reviewing the NPRM and anticipates providing comments to the FMCSA. Obstructive Sleep Apnea. OSA is a condition in which an individual’s airway becomes obstructed while sleeping, typically resulting in hypoxia at night, interruptions in breathing lasting several seconds at a time, loud snoring, and nonrestful sleep. Individuals with the disorder are frequently unaware of the condition and may have extreme daytime sleepiness. OSA is associated with significant cognitive and psychomotor deficits, which are at least partially reversible with appropriate treatment. Such deficits are particularly problematic during commercial highway operations where immediate and appropriate responses to external stimuli are often essential to safety. Accident rates have been shown to be considerably higher in drivers with OSA than in those without the disorder, with one case-control study demonstrating a more than six-fold higher risk of traffic accidents in drivers with OSA, after controlling for other possible confounding factors. On October 20, 2009, the NTSB recommended that the FMCSA do the following: Implement a program to identify commercial drivers at high risk for obstructive sleep apnea and require that those drivers provide evidence through the medical certification process of having been appropriately evaluated and, if treatment is needed, effectively treated for that disorder before being granted unrestricted medical certification. (H-09-15) Develop and disseminate guidance for commercial drivers, employers, and physicians regarding the identification and treatment of individuals at high risk of obstructive sleep apnea (OSA), emphasizing that drivers who have OSA that is effectively treated are routinely approved for continued medical certification. (H-09-16) In a letter dated February 1, 2010, the FMCSA noted it was in the process of developing medical examiner, employer, and driver guidance on sleep disorders, including OSA. The letter also described several other actions the agency had taken or was planning to take, including sponsoring a National Sleep Apnea and Trucking Conference, developing a chapter in its on-line medical examiner handbook to include guidance on sleep disorders, providing a revised medical examination report form to include items specific to the assessment of sleep disorders, developing a best practices guide on medical certification of drivers with OSA, and possibly conducting rulemaking to strengthen the pulmonary/respiratory requirements for driver medical qualification to include sleep disorders. Pending completion of the described efforts and implementation of the recommended program, guidance, and requirement, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendations H-09-15 and -16 “Open—Acceptable Response” on July 20, 2010. In-Vehicle Technologies. In-vehicle fatigue-related technologies are designed to monitor driver behaviors, such as eyelid closure or head position, or vehicle actions, such as steering wheel input or lane drift. In its report on a 2005 accident in Osseo, Wisconsin, which involved the rollover of a truck-tractor semitrailer combination unit and a motorcoach’s collision with the truck wreckage, and which resulted in five fatalities, the NTSB found that technologies to detect fatigue might have prevented or mitigated the severity of the fatigue-related rollover, had the truck been so equipped. Because technologies to detect fatigue could make fatigued drivers more aware of their condition, the NTSB recommended that the FMCSA do the following: Develop and implement a plan to deploy technologies in commercial vehicles to reduce the occurrence of fatigue-related accidents. (H-08-13) On May 11, 2009, the FMCSA responded to this recommendation and indicated that the development of an advanced drowsy driver warning system was underway, and the program would move into principal research and prototype development in 2009. The FMCSA projected this phase would last 2 years, after which a commercialization decision would be made. However, the FMCSA also stated it was unaware of any available technology that commercial drivers could use for both day and night driving. The NTSB responded that although no products were available commercially that could be used effectively both day and night, the agency’s recently published review of activities underway to develop unobtrusive, in-vehicle, real-time, drowsy driver detection and alertness systems discussed at least five separate systems capable of functioning under a variety of conditions. Therefore, on October 2, 2009, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation H-08-13 “Open—Unacceptable Response.” The NTSB subsequently reiterated Safety Recommendation H-08-13 in its report on a 2009 truck tractor semitrailer rear end collision into passenger vehicles that took place in Miami, Oklahoma, and resulted in 10 fatalities. The NTSB continues to believe in-vehicle technologies can reduce the incidence and seriousness of fatigue-related accidents and urges the FMCSA to move forward with a plan to deploy such technologies in commercial vehicles. Fatigue Education and Information. The provision by the FMCSA of new and updated information on sleep, fatigue, and alertness, based on contemporary scientific research, is essential to ensuring commercial drivers have the necessary guidance to enable them to be well rested and remain alert when operating their vehicles. Since the 1980s, the NTSB has called on the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and its modal agencies to develop and disseminate educational materials for transportation industry personnel concerning fatigue risks and countermeasures. In the mid-1990s, the FHWA Office of Motor Carriers coordinated with several other agencies to produce materials and sponsor meetings to educate drivers and others about fatigue. During its investigation of the 2009 Miami, Oklahoma, accident, the NTSB reviewed some of the existing FMCSA fatigue-related training materials. The NTSB determined that, although the fatigue training materials available to truck drivers provided some valuable guidelines, some of the information was outdated, and the available guidance video concerning fatigue did not include vital information pertaining to current HOS regulations and risk factors for OSA. Because updating the information provided to truck drivers about fatigue and fatigue countermeasures, HOS, and OSA could help reduce accidents, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation H-10-8, which asks the FMCSA to do the following: Create educational materials that provide current information on fatigue and fatigue countermeasures and make the materials available in different formats, including updating and redistributing your truck-driver-focused driver fatigue video; make the video available electronically for quicker dissemination; and implement a plan to regularly update the educational materials and the video with the latest scientific information and to regularly redistribute them. (H-10-8) The NTSB is awaiting a response to this recommendation. Fatigue Management Programs. Although employee education about fatigue is extremely valuable, it alone is insufficient to constitute an adequate fatigue management program, which should involve all aspects of a carrier’s operation. A fatigue management program is a system designed to take a comprehensive, tailored approach to the issue of fatigue within an industry or a workplace and address it in an operational environment. Typically, a fatigue management program incorporates individual program-focused efforts to help manage fatigue. For example, it might include policies and practices addressing scheduling and attendance; employee education, medical screening, and treatment; personal responsibility during nonwork periods; task/workload issues; rest environments; and commuting and/or napping. There should also be an overall organizational strategy for implementing, supervising, and evaluating the plan. Many motor carriers have developed and put into action their own fatigue management programs, although the extent and nature of the plans vary widely. On February 2, 2009, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation H-08-14 as a result of the Osseo, Wisconsin, accident investigation, and on October 21, 2010, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation H-10-9 as a result of the Miami, Oklahoma, accident investigation. The recommendations asked the FMCSA to take the following actions: Develop and use a methodology that will continually assess the effectiveness of the fatigue management plans implemented by motor carriers, including their ability to improve sleep and alertness, mitigate performance errors, and prevent incidents and accidents. (H-08-14) Require all motor carriers to adopt a fatigue management program based on the North American Fatigue Management Program guidelines for the management of fatigue in a motor carrier operating environment. (H-10-9) The NTSB is aware that, since 1999, the FMCSA has been involved in the North American Fatigue Management Program (NAFMP) initiative, which is a four-phase cooperative program including participants from the U.S. and Canadian transportation industries, as well as government organizations. In the first phase, researchers identified fatigue management plan requirements targeted toward drivers, dispatchers, and company managers. In phase 2, educational, training, and assessment materials were designed for a field test. In phase 3, researchers conducted a field operational test that included an evaluation of the effectiveness of the NAFMP compared to current industry practices. The FMCSA has informed the NTSB it is reviewing the report on the field test to determine whether to continue to the final phase of the project, which would include developing a deployment strategy for the NAFMP. The NTSB has encouraged the FMCSA to move forward with the completion and deployment of the final phase and has urged the agency to include in the program a methodology to continually assess the effectiveness of the plans implemented by motor carriers. Based on this information, on October 2, 2009, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation H-08-14 “Open—Acceptable Response.” Safety Recommendation H-10-9 is currently classified “Open—Await Response.” Summary In developing the proposed rule, the FMCSA has considered current scientific findings concerning fatigue, and many of its provisions affecting driver scheduling and associated factors have the potential to reduce driver fatigue and fatigue-related CMV accidents. However, the NTSB remains concerned that the FMCSA is not aggressively pursuing other fatigue reduction and mitigation opportunities concerning EOBRs, OSA, in-vehicle technologies, fatigue education, and fatigue management programs. The NTSB appreciates the opportunity to comment on this NPRM addressing the revision of HOS regulations.

From: NTSB
To: FMCSA
Date: 9/30/2010
Response: Notation 8248: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s (FMCSA) Announcement of Public Listening Session and Request for Comment, which was published at 75 Federal Register 53015 on August 30, 2010. The notice announced that the FMCSA planned to hold a public listening session to solicit input on key challenges facing the motor carrier industry, issues facing stakeholders, and concerns that should be considered by the agency in developing its next 5-year Strategic Plan. NTSB staff attended the listening session and provided the FMCSA with a list of open recommendations that have been issued to the FMCSA. The FMCSA also invited written comments, suggestions, and recommendations from all individuals and organizations regarding the FMCSA’s mission, vision, and strategic objectives (goals) for the plan. This letter provides a more detailed history of the currently open recommendations the NTSB has made to the FMCSA (attached), a summary of the key safety issues the FMCSA should address to improve truck and bus safety as presented during the NTSB’s April 28, 2010, testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security (attached), and responds to the questions most relevant to the NTSB’s mission for which the FMCSA is seeking input. Question 2. How can the FMCSA have a greater impact in the reduction of injuries and loss of life on our nation’s highways? The NTSB currently has 51 open recommendations that were issued to the FMCSA with the intent to improve safety on our highways. The implementation of these recommendations would allow the FMCSA to have both an immediate and lasting impact on reducing loss on our highways. We continue to believe that a plan to implement the recommendations on the NTSB’s Federal Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements (MWL) would significantly contribute to transportation safety. Question 5. How can the FMCSA balance driver-focused, vehicle-focused, motor carrier- focused compliance, interventions, and enforcement to achieve its safety mission? The NTSB has recommended that the FMCSA change the “balance” of its motor carrier oversight since 1999. The two most important factors related to safe motor carrier operations are the condition of the vehicles and the performance of the drivers. Current rules prevent the FMCSA from putting carriers out of service with an unsatisfactory rating in only one of the 6 rated factors. They must be unsatisfactory in at least 2 factors. In other words, they could be unsatisfactory in either the vehicle or driver areas and still be allowed to operate. The NTSB believes that an unsatisfactory in either category should be sufficient cause to place a carrier out of service. The NTSB recommended that the FMCSA do something relatively simple: change the safety fitness rating methodology so that adverse vehicle- or driver performance-based data alone would be sufficient to result in an overall “unsatisfactory” rating for a carrier. To date, the FMCSA has not acted on this recommendation. As a result, the NTSB added this recommendation to our Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements. The NTSB has been encouraged that the FMCSA is developing the CSA 2010 Initiative to include a greater emphasis on vehicle and driver safety. However, the NTSB is disappointed that the FMCSA did not make the incremental changes to the current safety system necessary to make either driver or vehicle deficiencies sufficient to affect the safety rating of a carrier. As such, the NTSB believes the FMCSA’s strategic plan should recognize the importance of getting carriers with unsafe drivers or unsafe vehicles off the road. Question 8. What technological changes could positively impact highway safety? The NTSB has recommended numerous technological improvements to both the FMCSA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Two technologies, forward collision warning systems (FCWs) and electronic onboard recording systems (EOBRs), are currently on the NTSB’s Federal MWL. Both of these technologies have been available for the last decade and could have improved highway safety. More recently, the NTSB has recommended to NHTSA technologies for driver fatigue detection, stability control for buses, event data recording, and lane departure warning for buses. The implementation of these recommendations would significantly improve highway safety. Question 9. How will technology affect driver behavior? Well designed technology can improve driver performance. Current research by the FMCSA on vehicle based collision warning systems found improved driver performance as a result of technology. However, technology not designed for use in vehicles, such as cell phones, can distract the driver from the road. That is why the NTSB supported the FMCSA’s ban on texting. Further, the NTSB has included restricting bus drivers from using a cell phone on its Federal MWL. The NTSB appreciates the opportunity to comment on this notice addressing concerns that should be considered in developing the FMCSA’s 5-year Strategic Plan. Many of the issues discussed here have been around for decades, and much is left to be done to improve highway safety. Prompt action is needed so that the trucks and buses that surround us on the nation’s highways are safely designed, maintained, and operated. We look forward to working with FMCSA in the near future to address the concerns presented in these comments.

From: NTSB
To: FMCSA
Date: 9/28/2010
Response: As a result of its investigation of the truck-tractor semitrailer rear-end collision into passenger vehicles on interstate 44 near Miami, Oklahoma on June 26, 2009, the National Transportation Safety Board reiterates Safety Recommendation H-08-14.

From: NTSB
To: FMCSA
Date: 10/2/2009
Response: The NTSB notes that, since 1999, the FMCSA has been involved in the North American Fatigue Management Program (NAFMP) initiative, a multi-phased cooperative program with stakeholders including U.S. and Canadian industry and government organizations. A field test was recently completed that collected baseline and post-test data during drivers’ regular routes; provided educational workshops on fatigue (including sleep disorder assessment and treatment) for drivers, their families, and dispatchers; and offered ongoing management support and consultation to help companies develop policies and implement practices (such as scheduling) consistent with a fatigue management program. The FMCSA is currently reviewing the report on the field test to determine whether to continue to the final phase of the project, in which the steering committee would use lessons learned to improve the program; finalize recommended practice guidelines, manuals, and other training materials; and develop the deployment strategy. The NTSB encourages the FMCSA to move forward with the completion and deployment of the NAFMP and urges the agency to include in the program a methodology that will continually assess the effectiveness of the plans implemented by motor carriers. Pending successful completion of these actions, Safety Recommendation H-08-14 is classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. The NTSB would appreciate receiving a copy of the final report on the field test results when it becomes available.

From: FMCSA
To: NTSB
Date: 5/11/2009
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 5/12/2009 11:40:11 AM MC# 2090289: - From Rose A.McMurray, Acting Deputy Administrator: Since 1999, FMCSA has been involved in the North American Fatigue Management Program (NAFMP), an initiative that aims to develop, implement, evaluate, and finalize a comprehensive, integrated fatigue management program for the motor carrier industry operating under various regulatory jurisdictions of North America. This collaborative international project is sponsored by FMCSA, Transport Canada, Alberta Infrastructure and Transportation, the Alberta Workers’ Compensation Board, the Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail du Québec (the Quebec Workers’ Compensation Board), and the Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec (Quebec Automobile Insurance Corporation). In-kind, operational, and other support is provided by the motor carrier industry through the participation of the Alberta Motor Transport Association, the American Transportation Research Institute, the Association du camionnage du Québec (Quebec Trucking Association), the Canadian Trucking Alliance, and Canadian and American motor carrier companies that take part in various aspects of program development and operational testing. The NAFMP entails four phases. In Phase I, researchers identified requirements for an effective fatigue management plan and developed a comprehensive approach designed specifically for drivers, dispatchers, and company managers. Phase II involved development of educational and training materials as well as the development and assessment of procedures for field testing the NAFMP. In Phase III, researchers conducted an FOT that included protocol development and field testing of the effectiveness of the comprehensive NAFMP compared to current industry practices. This FOT involved three motor carriers in Alberta, Quebec, and California. The FOT collected baseline data during drivers’ regular routes; provided sleep disorder assessment and treatment educational workshops on fatigue for drivers, their families, and dispatchers; offered on-going management support and consultation to help companies develop policies and implement practices consistent with an FMP (e.g., scheduling, etc.); and collected post-FMP data during drivers’ regular routes. This FOT concluded recently and FMCSA is in the process of reviewing the final report. Based on the draft final Phase III report, FMCSA would determine whether or not to continue with Phase IV of this effort. In Phase IV, the steering committee would use lessons learned to improve the program and to finalize recommended practice guidelines, manuals, and other training materials. In this phase, the deployment strategy for the NAFMP will also be developed. FMCSA is committed to improving education and training for motor carrier professionals to reduce driver fatigue, mitigate performance errors, and prevent fatigue-related incidents and crashes. The Agency will consider the voluntary adoption of standardized fatigue management plans at the conclusion of the NAFMP.