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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation H-68-017
Details
Synopsis: AT 8:10 A.M. ON OCTOBER 2, 1967, A SCHOOL BUS CARRYING 13 CHILDREN TO SCHOOL, TRAVELING EAST ON COUNTY ROAD 29 NEAR WATERLOO, NEBRASKA, WAS DRIVEN ACROSS AN UNPROTECTED HIGHWAY GRADE CROSSING 1/ AND WAS STRUCK BY A WESTBOUND UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD TRAIN. THE TRAIN, COMPOSED OF A LOCOMOTIVE, 96 EMPTY FREIGHT CARS AND A CABOOSE, WAS TRAVELING AT 56 M.P.H. THE LOCOMOTIVE STRUCK AND HELD THE RIGHT REAR QUARTER OF THE BUS, DRAGGING IT BACKWARD, AND THEN DEFLECTED IT INTO A COMMUNICATIONS POLE. THE REAR OF THE BUS BODY WAS DISINTEGRATED. FOUR OF THE CHILDREN ON THE BUS WERE KILLED AND THE OTHER NINE INJURED. THERE WERE NO OTHER FATALITIES OR INJURIES IN THE ACCIDENT.
Recommendation: TO THE OFFICE OF HIGH SPEED GROUND TRANSPORTATION, THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, RAILROADS OPERATING IN THE NORTHEAST CORRIDOR, AND STATES HAVING SAFETY REGULATORY AUTHORITY OVER RAILROADS: Consider the implications of this accident analysis for logical and necessary train operating speed reductions under restricted visibility wherever tracks cross unprotected grade crossings. The time needed by motor vehicles to cross tracks requires that drivers be able to detect the train at a considerable distance in order to be certain of crossing safely. This distance, as illustrated by this case and others, is already beyond the range of typical present-day train horns when the actual conditions under which the horn is to be heard are considered. Conditions which limit audibility at a distance, including enclosed vehicle passenger compartments, local vehicle noises, and restricted use of horns or bells, are now found so frequently as to be a normally anticipated situation. As train speeds rise, persons crossing a grade crossing must rely increasingly on ability to see approaching trains in order to determine that it is safe to proceed.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Reconsidered
Mode: Highway
Location: Waterloo, NE, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: 79559
Accident Reports: ​Waterloo, Nebraska, Public School, School Bus and Union Pacific Railroad Company Freight Train Accident
Report #: HAR-71-01
Accident Date: 10/2/1967
Issue Date: 9/18/1968
Date Closed: 9/10/1976
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: Association of American Railroads (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Commonwealth of Kentucky (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Closed - Reconsidered)
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Closed - Reconsidered)
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Closed - Reconsidered)
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (Closed - Reconsidered)
Commonwealth of Virginia (Closed - Reconsidered)
District of Columbia (Closed - Reconsidered)
FRA (Closed - Reconsidered)
Penn Central Transportation Company (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
State of Alabama (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Alaska (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Arizona (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Arkansas (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of California (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Colorado (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Connecticut (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Delaware (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Florida (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Georgia (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Hawaii (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Idaho (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Illinois (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Indiana (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Iowa (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Kansas (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Louisiana (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Maine (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Maryland (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Michigan (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Minnesota (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Mississippi (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Missouri (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Montana (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Nebraska (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Nevada (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of New Hampshire (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of New Jersey (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of New Mexico (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of New York (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of North Carolina (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of North Dakota (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Ohio (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Oklahoma (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Oregon (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Rhode Island (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of South Carolina (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of South Dakota (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Tennessee (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Texas (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Utah (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Vermont (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Washington (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of West Virginia (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Wisconsin (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Wyoming (Closed - Reconsidered)
Territory of American Samoa (Closed - Reconsidered)
Territory of Guam (Closed - Reconsidered)
Virgin Islands of the United States (Closed - Reconsidered)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: Association of American Railroads
To: NTSB
Date: 11/26/1968
Response: From Thomas M. Goodfellow, President: Thank you for sending me a copy of the Safety Board's report concerning a grade crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a Union Pacific train and a school bus. There are several recommendations in this report that interest me. Some of the problems which have been pinpointed by this investigation are under active study jointly by the AAR and the Department of Transportation - both the Federal Highway Administrator and Federal Railroad Administrator. In our consideration of the crossing accident problem, we have long paid particular attention to the operation of school busses and we heartily endorse any programs which can be carried out that will improve the qualifications of school bus operators, the selection of routes for school bus operation and improvement of procedures which will insure safe operation over railroad tracks. Discussions have been held recently with the Department of Transportation relative to investigations or research projects which will determine the usefulness of audible signals at crossings. We are aware of course of the trend to develop "sound-proof" passenger compartments in motor vehicles and the increase in driver distraction from radios, the traffic sounds, etc. This raises the question whether locomotive whistles or horns can practically be increased to a sound intensity sufficient to penetrate such vehicles and still be tolerated by the rest of the public within the range of such sounds. We will be happy to work with the Federal Railroad Administrator on further study of train braking systems. There are many practical requirements that must be taken into consideration in addition to the distance required for a train to stop after it becomes certain to the operator of the train that a collision with a vehicle at a crossing is probable. It is not clear to me that speculation about the rate of deceleration being a factor in this accident is productive. As in the case of the brakes, we stand ready to cooperate in investigations with respect to improving the visibility of approaching trains and I might add that a number of railroads have experience in the various types of oscillating lights which may be drawn upon. We will cooperate fully with all authorities involved in the northeast corridor in considering the train speed implications. It is quite clear that the objective of improving passenger train service in the corridor rules out imposing speed restrictions required only by the existence of grade crossings. Some other approach must be found to eliminate the problem of crossings in the corridor. It's interesting to consider the record with respect to the number of accidents that occur on crossings at various train speeds as this record indicates that the higher percentages occur at lower train speeds.

From: FRA
To: NTSB
Date: 12/10/1968
Response: From A. Scheffer Lang, Administrator: This in further reference to the report and recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board on the collision between a school bus and Union Pacific Railroad freight train at Waterloo, Nebraska, October 2, 1967. Four of the Board's 11 recommendations are directed to the attention of this office, and I am pleased to provide our views concerning them. Audibility-Visibility Recommendation number two, asked FHWA and FRA to study the "questionable audibility" of sound signals at grade crossings and to "work toward creating a unified system of warnings and reliable reception." Recommendation number ten, asked that FRA study the visual effectiveness of white, fixed, sealed-beam headlights in comparison with certain other types of warning lights. Both recommendations are relative to the research program which is a major part of the Department's Grade Crossing Safety Action Program, for which FRA and FHWA are the operating administrations. Accordingly, FRA has had prepared several work statements for use as “Requests For Proposals” from research organizations most active and experienced in this area. Of direct interest here is the work statement on a project to “Investigate the Visibility and Audibility of Trains Approaching Highway-Railway Grade Crossings.” Purposes of the project are: 1. to define the performance level of devices in general use on train locomotives for attracting the attention of motor vehicle operators. 2. to demonstrate desirable performance levels for devices which are used to make a train more visible and/or audible to a motor vehicle operator as he and the train approach a crossing. 3. to identify the extent of nuisance under different conditions which audibility-visibility devices would have in rural, urban and suburban areas. 4. to propose devices which will meet desirable performance levels within acceptable nuisance levels. Prior to submission of the work statement for bidding purposes, we are exploring the possibility of joint sponsorship of the research project with highway and railway organizations. Train Brakes Recommendation number seven, cans upon the FRA, "under its authority to regulate railroad brakes," to conduct a study of the present capabilities of train brake systems. Train brake capability data, stopping distance tests, and lading damage experience in emergency brake applications are readily available from several reliable sources. Therefore, I do not believe a special study is necessary. I would recommend, however, that FAA and NTSB staff personnel meet with train brake experts from the railroad industry and equipment manufacturers to review the dynamics of railroad operations and the relationship of speed, tonnage and train stopping distances. I would be pleased to arrange such a conference. Train Speeds In recommendation number eleven, the Board asks Federal and State agencies and the railroad industry to consider “logical and necessary train operating speed reductions under restricted visibility wherever tracks cross unprotected grade crossings” Given the fact that only 20 percent of the Nation's 225,000 grade crossings have some type of special protection, the impact of any attempt to impose speed restrictions on virtually every mile of railroad track in the nation would be catastrophic to the economic flow of rail commerce. I respectfully submit that the Board's sincere desire to help reduce grade crossing hazards is misdirected when train speeds are singled out as a major contributing cause of grade crossing accidents. Adequate sight distance, highway and railway alignment, vertical and horizontal highway curvature, atmospheric and weather conditions, grade crossing surface conditions, motor vehicle ,speeds and adequate advance highway warning signs are among the many factors that affect grade crossing safety more than does the speed of trains. They are factors that can be controlled with little or no hindrance to highway and railway traffic flow. Significantly, the various formulas developed to determine grade crossing hazard indices, give more weight to the number rather than speed of trains. Where train speeds are higher than usual, such as in the high speed ground demonstration projects in the Northeast Corridor, extraordinary attention must be given to all aspects of the grade crossing problem. The Department recognizes the special nature of these experimental runs and is endeavoring to work with the States to provide appropriate protection at all crossings, with the goal of eventual elimination of most, through closings and separation projects. It should be noted that initial speeds in both the Boston-New York and New York-Washington segments will not be appreciably higher than present speeds. In the Boston-New York run, the top speed of 110 mph is programmed for the area in which one private and one protected public crossing are presently located. Maximum speeds in other sections are 90 and 95 mph, which is 10 to 15 mph faster than present maximums. Initial maximum speed in the New York-Washington run will be 110 mph over the 16 public crossings, all protected. The railroad is endeavoring to close the remaining three private crossings. Present train speeds on this line reach 100 mph. Through an NTSB observer, who meets regularly with the Department's Grade Crossing Safety Action Group, the Safety Board has full knowledge of the Department's concern about the grade crossing problem and its program to promote grade crossing safety. I, for one, would welcome an even closer relationship as we direct our common interest toward promoting highway and railway safety.

From: FRA
To: NTSB
Date: 11/14/1968
Response: Report being studied; NTSB's desire to reduce grade-crossing hazards misdirected when train speeds are singled out as major contributing cause of grade-crossing accidents; points out that adequate sight distance, highway and rail way alignment vertical and horizontal highway curvature, atmosphere and weather conditions, motor vehicle speeds, - must be considered. From A. Scheffer Lang, Administrator: This will acknowledge receipt of the report of the National Transportation Safety Board on a collision between a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad freight train, October 2, 1967, at Waterloo, Nebraska. The report was released November 8, 1968. The Board has directed four of its eleven recommendations to the attention of this Administration. We are completing an analysis of the recommendations and will provide you with our views shortly.

From: NTSB
To: Penn Central Transportation Company
Date: 11/12/1968
Response: From Stuart T. Saunders, Chairman of the Board: Thank you for your letter of November 6 concerning the Union Pacific accident near Waterloo, Nebraska, on October 2, 1967. I am referring the Safety Board's report to our President, Mr. A. E. Perlman, and asking him to provide you with any comments he might have. I appreciate your thoughtfulness in providing me an advanced copy of the report.

From: NTSB
To: State of New Mexico
Date: 1/22/1969
Response: From C.B. Lemon, Director, School Transportation Division: I appreciated receiving your letter of January 6,, 1969 and the Highway Railroad Accident Report which you also sent me. As per your invitation, may I respond to the following: Item No.3, Page 40 -- I concur that reasonable improvements should be incorporated in school bus construction as they are developed, but at the same time feel that there are limitations as to the practicality of attempting to construct a vehicle that would survive a collision with a locomotive. I do not foresee the feasibility of a Sherman Tank type construction for school buses when to me, the basic problem relates to a human function, that of the driver, as well as more practical routing to avoid railroad grade crossings. I agree with numbers 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. Item 5, Page 41 I believe it impractical in most cases to attempt to have a second person survey the railroad tracks and signaling the driver to proceed. There is always the problem of the time element involved as well as to the location where the second party would reboard the school bus. I cannot see the employment of an adult to simply perform this function, and I do see problems if students were to be used in this capacity. Again, the area of eliminating school bus crossings at a site where visibility is extremely limited, and the proper instruction of school bus drivers and procedures for making such crossings need priority. Again, thank you very much.

From: NTSB
To: State of New Mexico
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: State of Washington
To: NTSB
Date: 1/21/1969
Response: From Llewellyn O. Griffith, Consultant, Administrative Services: Thank you for your kind and informative letter of early January which included a copy of the Safety Board's report of the Waterloo, Nebraska, train-school bus accident. You may be assured that I am in wholehearted accord with the recommendations cited on pp. 40 and 41 of this document and will work for committee agreement in this regard.

From: State of Washington
To: NTSB
Date: 12/17/1968
Response: Donald G. Morehead, Administrative Assistant to the Director: In the absence of Director Douglas Toms, I am taking the liberty of responding to your recent request for comments concerning your report of a grade crossing accident near Waterloo, Nebraska, October 2, 1967. Drive tests for license applicants in the State of Washington include grade crossings wherever possible. Many areas of the state where tests are conducted do not have grade crossings, or are too far removed from the examining sites. By mid 1969, we plan to implement a new system of driver examining, utilizing driver simulators. With the development of our own films, we will be able to include grade crossings as well as other driving situations which cannot be tested at the present time. If I may be of any further service, please feel free to call upon me at any time.

From: NTSB
To: State of Washington
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: State of Maine
To: NTSB
Date: 1/20/1969
Response: From Charles F. Bragg, II, Chairman, State Board of Education: The State Department of Education of Maine has reviewed with interest the report of facts and circumstances of the school bus freight train collision at Waterloo, Nebraska, within the framework of the state laws with respect to school transportation and the leadership role the Department has in these matters. Maine state law supports utmost caution of all bus drivers at railroad crossings by requiring drivers to ascertain, beyond reasonable doubt, that no train, engine or car is approaching before they proceed across the tracks. Furthermore, the Assistant Commissioner of Education in charge of Field Services assists local school officials in their quest for seeking bus routes which eliminate travel over grade crossings. The various driver education courses operating throughout the state give emphasis upon defensive driving techniques to prevent possible disasters. In conclusion I would note that this Department participates in the National Conference on School Transportation and is constantly reviewing safety measures to actively support changes in bus standards to insure greater safety for our school children conveyed day by day.

From: NTSB
To: State of Maine
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: State of Iowa
To: NTSB
Date: 1/8/1969
Response: From Paul F. Johnston, State Superintendent of Public Instruction: Thank you for the copy of the report of the National Transportation Safety Board concerning a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a train. This is an excellent study and your board is to be commended for the thoroughness of the investigation and the compilation of the material for the report. You have asked for our comments on Recommendations 4, 5, and 8. Regarding Recommendation #4, in working with local school districts on establishing bus routes, our consultants have always planned routes to avoid grade crossings whenever possible. While we are not opposed to Recommendation #5, there has always been some concern as to a district's liability and other legal ramifications when pupil passengers are used to determine that no train is approaching, and to signal the driver to proceed over the crossing. At the present time, we have a committee which is revising the curriculum for the driver education program in Iowa. Your report will be given to that committee in order to incorporate Recommendation #8 in the course of study. While it was not a factor in the Waterloo accident, we have received complaints from school bus drivers about stationary railroad cars obscuring their vision at crossings. In some instances, the reports indicated the cars have remained in the same spot for several weeks at a time. It would seem that some potentially dangerous situations would be eliminated if this practice could be discontinued. Several weeks after the Waterloo accident, one of our Iowa school buses was struck by a train at a grade crossing near Weaver, Iowa. The bus driver and the five passengers were injured but fortunately no one was killed. The train hit the bus just behind the driver's seat and moved it 750 feet down the tracks. The engineer stated the driver had stopped at the crossing and then pulled out in front of the train. The bus driver contended she could not see the oncoming train because her vision was obscured by a line of tank cars on a siding near the crossing. Several days earlier, a cement truck was hit at this same crossing and that driver also reported he could not see the approaching train because of the parked tank cars. The personnel in our Division of Transportation have done considerable work in recording sounds and taking pictures of trains as they approach grade crossings. At the present time they are working with officials of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company in developing materials for use in our school bus driver's training program as well as in the regular high school driver education course. You may be assured that the Iowa State Department of Public Instruction will cooperate with you to the utmost in reducing accidents at grade crossings.

From: State of Iowa
To: NTSB
Date: 11/13/1968
Response: From Jack M. Fulton, Commissioner, Department of Public Safety: Our Department of Public Safety is most anxious to improve its education and examination of drivers in regard to motor vehicle and railroad conflict and more particularly in the field of school bus, railroad relationships. The report issued from your office concerning the Waterloo, Nebraska school bus accident of 1967 will prove extremely valuable to this department in planning future recommendations and changes. At present, study material and examinations have included this subject of railroad crossing. It is however the opinion of our drivers license officials that perhaps sufficient emphasis has not been given to the seriousness of the subject. The drivers license division of this Department is constantly attempting to update our drivers license examination and will continue to include questions and study material in regard to railroad crossings, and likewise will continue to point out to the motoring public the seriousness of the situation. Any further recommendations your board may suggest will be given serious consideration.

From: NTSB
To: State of Iowa
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: State of California
To: NTSB
Date: 12/27/1968
Response: From E.K. Ball, Chief, Division of Drivers Licenses: This is in reply to your letter of 6 November 1968 in which you requested information on actions within California in response to recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board. Specifically in response to Recommendation No.9, the proper procedure for motorists at railway crossings has been highlighted in our new Driver's Handbook which will soon be off the press. Additionally, questions on such procedures have been included in our driver's license examinations. In our School Bus Driver's Examination, at least four of the questions are on the subject of railroad crossings. The other recommendations, which would require the cooperation of other state departments for implementation, have been scheduled for early discussion with the appropriate agencies. We will be happy to keep you apprised of any progress which is made in these areas.

From: NTSB
To: State of California
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: State of New Jersey
To: NTSB
Date: 12/10/1968
Response: From June Strelecki, Director, Division of Motor Vehicles: I have your letter of November 6, 1968, requesting my comments concerning the accident report completed in connection with the school bus - railroad train accident of October 2, 1967 in Waterloo, Nebraska. I will comment on the recommendations contained in the report in chronological order. 1. The New Jersey motor vehicle laws presently require that the driver of any school bus carrying a child or school children shall stop such vehicle within fifty feet but not less than fifteen feet from the nearest rail of such railroad and while stopped listen and look in both directions for any approaching train and for any signals for the approach of the train. It is further required that the actual crossing of the tracks be made without shifting gears. A legislative amendment would be necessary to require that school bus doors be opened prior to crossing the tracks. However, an amendment to the regulations issued by the State Department of Education concerning school bus transportation, could have the same effect without requiring legislative change. To this end I will refer a copy of your report to the Department of Education with a request that they comment directly to you. 2. It is my opinion that the suggested study concerning the audibility of external sound signals and the creation of a system of warnings and reliable reception would be desirable; 3. Comments concerning this recommendation should be provided by the State Department of Education, since their regulations are directly concerned with school bus body and chassis construction standards. 4. School bus routes are presently developed on the basis of avoiding railroad grade crossings wherever possible. 5. This recommendation should also be the subject of comment by the Department of Education. However, it would seem that it would not be possible to implement this recommendation in many cases. Those buses transporting small children would not have a responsible individual other than the driver available to leave the bus and check the railroad tracks for safe crossing. 6. I am in agreement with this recommendation and would be pleased to consider, for adoption in this state, the federal standards developed in this area. 7. Comments concerning this recommendation should be provided by railroad transportation authorities. 8. Instruction in proper seeing habits should be a basic part of any driver instruction program. However, I can see no objection to re-emphasizing the need for such instruction. 9. This suggestion may be difficult to implement, due to the lack of available railroad grade-crossings in areas where the driver examination road test is given. Grade-crossing procedure is presently emphasized in the examination of bus drivers, both in the driving test portion and as part of the test knowledge written examination. 10. I would see no objection to the completion of such a study. 11. Although this recommendation should more logically be the subject of comment by those authorities having jurisdiction in the area of railroad transportation, it would seem that a speed reduction for railroad tram operating in areas where unprotected grade-crossings exist may be worthy of serious consideration. In regards to those recommendations more directly concerned with the Department of Education regulations, I am confident you will receive a reply from that agency wi thin a short period of time.

From: NTSB
To: State of New Jersey
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of New Jersey
Date:
Response: Your prompt response to my request for comments on the recommendations in the Waterloo, Nebraska train-school bus collision on October 2, 1967, is appreciated. A copy of this report to them from you will certainly carry weight in securing their attention and response. The Board is please that New Jersey has emphasized grade crossing procedures in bus driver examination. Such action by all of the State Motor Vehicle Administration will certainly be a step in the right direction toward the reduction of school bus grade-crossing accident. We have received excellent response to our distribution of this report. You are to be congratulated on your interest in and effort toward highway safety.

From: NTSB
To: State of New York
Date: 12/27/1968
Response: I thank you for your cogent and constructive letter of December 10th concerning the Board's report of the freight train- school bus accident at Waterloo, Nebraska. The Safety Board Members are well aware of the advanced position of New York in traffic safety, and especially of your Department' s reputation in the fields of accident record keeping and analysis and vehicle safety. We also know of your interest in the in-depth investigation approach, and have heard of some of the legislative proposals which would support such investigation. Thus a discussion of our approaches and philosophy in that Waterloo case may be of professional interest. Your observation that school bus grade crossing collisions are rare is certainly true, and it is also true that school buses are involved in only a tiny fraction of all traffic accidents. If our methods limited us solely to the school bus aspects, the report would have been very short and might never have been written at all. It is true, as you say, that people are interested in dramatic school bus accidents far out of proportion to fatalities. As it developed, that was an advantage because more detailed attention was paid to this case by local authorities and eager witnesses prevented loss of evidence, as sometimes occurs. Our method in such cases is to analyze them in depth. When all aspects for which there was evidence had been studied, it was found that the case "as not only a school bus grade crossing accident but also (1) an obstructed view grade crossing accident, (2) an ineffective sun visor accident, (3) a hood reflections accident, (4) a poor route planning accident, (5) a vague driver's manual accident, (6) a driver error accident, (7) a bus engine noise, (8) a soundproof vehicle accident, (9) a" inaudible train horn accident, (10) a low contrast train headlight accident, (11) a delayed train brake application accident, (12) a poor design effectiveness train brake accident, (13) a freight train pull-apart accident, (14) a low strength bus structure accident, and (15) a destructive locomotive front end accident. These factors were found with varying degrees of certainty and contributory effect. Some are merely mentioned in the report, others are assigned a strong causative role. Of course, the lessons and recommendations have wide application far beyond school buses at grade crossings. In your own discussion, you have found that two of the recommendations could be extended, one to cover all buses at grade crossings, the other to cover school bus route problems in relation to other highway hazards. We also look at the detailed factor analysis in these cases from a long range point of view. For example, the destruction of the school bus body is a rare event, which was analyzed even though it could not be related to injuries. However, the same weaknesses are known to be present in other types of buses. There has already been another accident in which some of the same school bus weaknesses were directly identified as injury sources by investigating physicians. The school bus damage also had to be described to show the destructive effects of the locomotive front. These effects are found in 76% of all grade crossing accidents, and our review of the statistics was found to justify a special study, now under way. We already have indications that this longer range view is an advantage. The Waterloo case referenced an earlier Safety Board grade crossing case of 1967 in which the audibility of train horns inside passenger cars was questioned. The earlier case was somewhat tentative, but in the Waterloo case the Board's second recommendation has served to initiate a funded study by the Federal Railroad Administration. The fact that the Waterloo school bus case was spectacular may have led the railroad to have the sound transmission tests performed; however, the FRA study will be conducted in cooperation with vehicle agencies, and it will seek to solve the horn inaudibility problem for all types of vehicles at all grade crossings. We feel that initiation of such research action based on only two properly reported cases is a new way of doing business in both highway and railroad safety. It rather reminds one of practices in the aircraft industry. I am pleased to see your idea that school bus routes should also detour all high accident locations on highways which are required to be identified by Highway Safety Program Standard 4.4.9 School Standard. The general subject of school bus routing is being considering by a special school bus safety advisory committee working with National Highway Safety Bureau. I was also pleased to see your favorable reaction to increased emphasis on grade crossing instruction in your licensing program. In the past there have been some administrator who felt that emphasis should not be given to a driving problem associated with only 3% of the fatalities, but we know that there are problems, and even booby traps, in crossing railroad tracks that are not understood by drivers. The Safety Board has received many replies to the Waterloo case report. Yours is the first to perceive the significance of the low statistical incidence of school bus grade crossing accidents. It is true that we sometimes take cases as “major accidents” on the basis of the interest exhibited by the general public, and it is desirable policy to do so. I hope I have also explained how intensive mining of the available information can broadened the effect of the case. The Safety Board will be issuing these cases periodically, and I trust we can look forward to your continued thoughtful criticism.

From: State of New York
To: NTSB
Date: 12/10/1968
Response: From Vincent L. Tofany, Commissioner, Department of Motor Vehicles: I reviewed the well-documented report concerning the Freight Train – School bus accident occurring in Nebraska. Apparently this accident event was vey dramatic and created a large safety reaction from public officials. However, the report did not contain any data which reflects the total magnitude of railroad – school bus accidents. New York State’s accident data shows that this phenomenon is not really a problem. A study of the 715 School Bus accidents reported during 1967 showed that none involved collision with a train. Another study of motor vehicle accidents occurring in January-September 1964 involving collision of Railroad Trains with Motor Vehicles showed that only 136 events of this type occurred. None of the vehicles involved was a school bus. However, I do see a need for recommendations for bother school bus operations and the railroad crossing problem. For the calendar years 1965, 1966, and 1967 in New York State there was a total of 598 collisions for motor vehicles with railroad trains. During the same period there were more than 1,200,000 accidents involving more than 2,300,000 motor vehicles of which 2,471 were School Buses. As to the recommendations proposed – I have a few suggestions and comments. All of the recommendations are well thought out ideas which would definitely contribute to motor vehicle safety. The first recommendation concerning “opening the door” could very well be extended in the Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law to include all busses and other vehicles carrying passengers for hire. Recommendations 2, 3, and 6 relating to vehicle standards are definitely needed. The fourth recommendation concerning bus routing should be extended to include any high accident location site. Highway Safety Program Standard 4.4.9 requires the identification of high accident locations and many states, as well as New York, should have such capabilities by 1970. In regard to recommendation No.9, I will have some emphasis placed upon grade crossing procedures in our licensing program. After January 1, 1969 three hours of classroom instruction is required of new license applicants. The curriculum for this training has not been finalized as yet, and the grade crossing procedure could be included in either the “defensive driving” or “traffic control device.”

From: NTSB
To: State of New York
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: State of Connecticut
To: NTSB
Date: 12/6/1968
Response: From William J. Sanders, Commissioner of Education, Connecticut Board of Education: Mr. William Horowitz, Chairman of the Connecticut State Board of Education, has referred your letter of November 6, and the accompanying Highway-Railroad Accident Report to this office. School bus safety in this state is a function of the Motor Vehicle Department. I should be glad to refer this to that Department.

From: NTSB
To: State of Connecticut
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: State of Missouri
To: NTSB
Date: 12/2/1968
Response: From Dale M. Thompson, President, Missouri State Board of Education: The report by the National Transportation Safety Board of the school bus-train accident near Waterloo, Nebraska, and the recommendations of your Board concerning selection and analysis of school bus routes, training of drivers of motor vehicles, and school bus operations have been reviewed by the State Department of Education staff, as was indicated in my letter to you dated November 13, 1968. We are enclosing the latest edition of the State Board of Education publication entitled Pupil Transportation Laws, Regulations, and Standards. This publication is updated and revised in three- to five-year intervals, adopted by the State Board and filed with the Secretary of State, and, therefore, has the effect of law. The most recent edition, you '''ill note, was published in 1967. The intent is to maintain standards which are consistent with national standards and the Missouri statutes. Relative to the specific recommendations of your Board, which you called to our attention, we refer you to the following items in the publication noted above: Page 7, Item 2d, and Page 11, Item ld(2). Consideration will be given to all of the National Transportation Safety Board's recommendations when Missouri's regulations and standards are next revised. I would add that it is planned to include a statement similar to Recommendation Number 8 in your report in the revised Missouri Driver Education Curriculum Guide scheduled for printing in 1969. You will be interested to know, also, that we are conducting a series of school bus driver workshops throughout the State this year with funds made available under P. L. 89-564, the Highway Safety Act of 1966. Please be assured again that the safety of pupils transported to and from school in Missouri will continue to be a major concern of the State Board of Education.

From: State of Missouri
To: NTSB
Date: 11/13/1968
Response: From Dale M. Thompson, President, Missouri State Board of Education: I appreciate your courtesy in sending me an advance copy of your report concerning a grade-crossing accident near Waterloo, Nebraska. This report is being referred to the member of our staff responsible for school transportation for immediate study and recommendations to our State Board. I can assure you that we are greatly concerned with student safety and propose to take any steps within our power to avoid accidents. We shall be glad to send you our more specific comments after the report has received further study.

From: NTSB
To: State of Missouri
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: Commonwealth of Massachusetts
To: NTSB
Date: 12/2/1968
Response: From the Registry of Motor Vehicles: In response to your letter of November 6, 1968, we have reviewed the National Transportation Safety Board report on the grade crossing school bus accident at Waterloo, Nebraska on October 2, 1967. We are generally in agreement with the Board's recommendations, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 11 on page 40 of the report. Our comments on the others are as fol1ows: Recommendation 1) Massachusetts does not now include this requirement in the statute but we plan to offer it as suggested legislation for the 1969 legislative session. Recommendation 8) It appears that the Supervisors of Driver Training and Examination in the various State Motor Vehicle Departments should be included. It appears that the Supervisors of Driver Training various State Motor Vehicle Departments should be included. Recommendation 9) We now include questions relative to railroad crossings in our license applicant examination and will investigate the feasibility and practicability of further compliance with your recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: State of Vermont
To: NTSB
Date: 11/27/1968
Response: From Rupert J. Spencer, Director, School Administrative Services, Department of Education: I am responding to your letter of November 6, 1968 to Mrs. Marian C. Taylor, Chairman, State Board of Education and commenting on recommendations 4, 5, and 8 in the "Highway-Railroad Accident Report". We heartily agree with recommendation No.4. It is suggested in our School Bus Manual published in July, 1968. Recommendations 5 and 8 appear to be sound. We have one question on recommendation 5. Could the responsible individual be a high school student or a pupil in grades 7 or 8?

From: NTSB
To: State of Vermont
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Vermont
Date:
Response: Thank you for your comments on the recommendations contained in the Safety Board’s report of the Waterloo, Nebraska grade-crossing accident. You raise the question whether the responsible individual suggested in Recommendation 5 could be a high-school student or a pupil in the seventh or eighth grade. That is a determination which will have to be made at the local level, with each situation being decided on its own merit. There has been a great deal of discussion pro and con concerning the responsibilities that can properly be assigned to students of various ages. Parent Teacher Associations, school officials, and students, themselves, have conflicting opinions on the subject of proper age for schoolboy and schoolgirl patrol duties, classroom and passageway patrols, and so forth. In many cases, however, where only elementary schools are involved, school officials utilize seventh and eighth grade children as school bus patrols. In other areas, including Maryland and Virginia, qualified high school students are employed as drivers of school busses. Your interest in and efforts on behalf of highway safety are appreciated.

From: NTSB
To: District of Columbia
Date: 1/7/1970
Response: Notation 344A: Reference is made to the Federal Highway Administration’s proposed rulemaking in Docket Number 69-14, Notice I, concerning horns and other audible warning devices for highway vehicles. It is highly desirable that warning be both deliverable and receivable, in many operations of highway vehicles, and the consideration of this subject is very welcome. The Safety Board wishes to call attention to our prior recommendation regarding this subject. In our reports of the grade-crossing accident at Sacramento, California, and Waterloo, Nebraska, we recommended that “FHWA study the questionable audibility of external sound signals within motor vehicles, both in relation to grade-crossing signals and train horns, and for all other audible warnings which can assist a driver. Such a study should be executed in cooperation with the Federal Railroad Administration, and should be aimed toward creating a unified system of warnings and reliable reception which could be made effective through Federal regulation and State laws.” From the wording in Docket Number 69-14, it appears that our recommendation may not have been considered in the framing of the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM). The question of the audibility of external signals in other vehicles is discernible in the ANPRM only by implication. There is no indication of any concept of a unified system intended to address the entire problem of existing unreliable audible warnings, and of course that includes a warning systems by means other than audio signals. We believe it is necessary to define the conditions under which warnings are to be receivable, and the definition of these conditions is a substantial task which should precede the final notice of proposed rulemaking for standards for transmitting devices. Among the conditions which should be considered are (1) pedestrians and drivers of varying hearing ability (no State prohibits totally deaf drivers); (2) Interference within signals due to competing signals of other traffic; (3) reception interference caused by engine noise or noise of the receiving vehicle, radio sounds, air conditioner operation, children’s shouts or pet noises, and complete closing of the vehicle window. To meet these problems, the Board has been advised of a number of possible devices including such no radio-operated warning, external sound and sound filtering devices, dash methods. Many of these devices would involve modification of the receiving vehicle, whether the ANPRM… text unreadable…. It should also be observed that warning problems entirely made by audible signals will necessarily increase noise pollution and thus tend to degrade environmental quality. The Safety Boar5d is aware of the contract issued by the Federal Railroad Administration for a study of train visual and audible warnings as related to highway grade crossings. We feel certain that some FHWA members of that group are cognizant of the need for a full approach which includes reliable reception; however, that need is not directly apparent in the ANPRM. It is recommended that the Safety Board’s recommendation in the Sacramento and Waterloo report be included in connection with the formulation of the next notice of proposed rulemaking under Docket Number 69-14. Specific and systematic consideration should be given to a definition by FHWA of the full spectrum of reception conditions which exist, including those mentioned above. FHWA should determine what is needed to operate under existing conditions effectively. Further, other methods of warning between vehicles should be considered, and especially those which do not add to noise pollution. Your consideration of this recommendation will be appreciated.

From: District of Columbia
To: NTSB
Date: 11/26/1968
Response: From Herman S. Cole, Acting Director Motor Vehicles, Department of Motor Vehicles: I refer to the Highway-Railroad Accident Report dated September 18, 1968 of the National Transportation Safety Board which you forwarded for our comment. The subject of school busses and grade crossing accidents has little relevance to the District of Columbia situation. The public schools do not have a school bus system, with the exception of a few busses for crippled children and there are no railroad crossings at grade in the city. Nevertheless, this Department concurs with the intent of the recommendations, in particular with recommendations 8 and 9, calling for greater educational attention to the determination of existence of possible hazards and greater emphasis on proper grade crossing procedures during driver license examinations.

From: NTSB
To: District of Columbia
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: State of Georgia
To: NTSB
Date: 11/25/1968
Response: From James S. Peters, Chairman, State Board of Education: In reply to your letter of the 22nd I submitted this question to Mr. John C. Maddox, Chief, Pupil Transportation Services in the State Department of Education asking him to give me a statement of his achievements and his objectives with response to school buses crossing unprotected railroad-highway crossing. I am glad to submit herewith Mr. Maddox's statement and I might say in so doing the State Board of Education and the State Superintendent of Schools, Dr. Jack P. Nix, undertakes to keep a constant eye on this particular situation. I feel sure we are doing everything we can to assure safe crossings but the human element is one we can not overcome and herein lies our greatest danger. In closing let me say that if there is any additional information you desire let me know and with assurances of high regards, let me remain yours truly.

From: State of Georgia
To: NTSB
Date: 11/22/1968
Response: From John C. Maddox, Chief, Pupil Transportation Services, Department of Education: Your letter to Mr. Paul Wills and a report of the Waterloo, Nebraska school bus and train accident have been referred to this office for study and a reply. I have studied the accident report very carefully and wish to advise you on some of the things this Unit has been doing to prevent this type of tragedy from happening in Georgia. For the past nine years, we have exerted every effort to route school buses over protected grade crossings only. However, we still have many routes that involve unprotected railroad grade crossings due to the road patterns in certain counties. You may rest assured that we will continue to route school buses in the safest possible way to and from school even though it may require additional miles to eliminate hazardous conditions. On December 14, 1961 a Greeley, Colorado school bus transporting 36 junior high school pupils to school at 8:00 AM, crossed an unprotected grade crossing and was struck by a Union Pacific passenger train traveling at 86 miles per hour. This accident killed 20 pupils instantly. Since that accident, the staff of the Transportation Unit has really preached safety at railroad grade crossings all over this State. For two years, Mr. W. E. Thombs and I Visited almost every county in Georgia presenting a safety program on railroad grade crossings. This program was developed by The Dow Chemical Company near Denver, Colorado who made a complete study of the Greeley accident. As ironical as it may seem, the Waterloo and Greeley accidents have similar circumstances throughout each report. The policy statement of the State Board of Education relating to Pupil Transportation, which was adopted April 17, 1968, describes the proper procedure for crossing railroad grade crossings with or without the use of school patrols. The Department of Public Safety is constantly assisting us with this problem in their safety education programs with school bus drivers and public school pupils. Early this year, the Transportation Unit began a new school bus driver training program utilizing the new multi-media teaching system which is being used by the Atlanta Transit System, the Greyhound Corporation, and the United States Air Force. This type of program reduces the instruction time by approximately 50% and appeals to school bus drivers at all education levels. The above companies informed me that these programs had reduced their accident rate by at least 15% and their training time by 50%. We presently have 9 hours of safety lessons for our drivers and plan to make 9 more in the near future. One of the first that we plan to make will deal with railroad grade crossings and school bus emergency evacuation. This will be a combination lesson. Our future plans are to ~available to every school bus driver in Georgia a three to four hour safety program annually. We realize that this is a mass program but with the complex traffic problems confronting our school buses daily, it is essential that the driver be trained to cope with these problems to provide the safety, efficiency and economy necessary for our public school pupils. In closing, I wish to express my sincere appreciation for your concern in the safety of our program. Any suggestions or recommendations you or the Board may have will always be welcome by this office.

From: NTSB
To: State of Georgia
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Georgia
Date:
Response: Thank you very much for your prompt action in response to our letter forwarding a copy of the train-school bus accident near Waterloo, Nebraska. Mr. Maddox’s letter, which you sent us is very informative. The Board is familiar with the Interstate Commerce Commission report on the Greeley, Colorado train-school bus grade-crossing accident and the excellent program developed by Mr. F.H. Langell and distributed by the Dow Chemical Company. The Georgia State Department of Education is to be complimented for its efforts to improve the safety aspects of its school bus program. Your response is appreciated.

From: State of Oregon
To: NTSB
Date: 11/13/1968
Response: From Vern L. Hill, Director, Department of Motor Vehicles: In Oregon, the training of school bus drivers and development of regulations pertaining to operation of school buses is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Education. We believe their program includes considerable information on grade crossings and the need for care at them, but you may wish to send a copy of your report to Mr. Harvey Wright, who is in charge of their program, if you have not already done so. His address is Director of transportation, Department of Education, Public Service Building, Salem Oregon. With respect to the recommendation that greater emphasis be placed on grade crossing procedures during the examination process for driver license applications, we can only say that we will review our current procedures to determine if such a need exists in our state. Our Driver's Manual includes information on grade crossing laws, signs and signals, and applicants must be able to identify these signs. We also provide additional information about grade crossing safety through publications distributed in our field offices. Our film library contains a number of films on this subject. Thank you for providing us with a copy of your report.

From: NTSB
To: State of Oregon
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: State of Wisconsin
To: NTSB
Date: 11/12/1968
Response: From Dan F. Schutz, Director, Bureau of Highway Safety Promotion: The report and recommendations respecting the grade crossing accident involving a school bus will receive careful attention in Wisconsin, you may be sure. This information will be called to the attention of the Department of Public Instruction's Supervisor of School Transportation and our own Supervisor of Inspection Services, as well as the State Director of Driver Control. Our own public information service will also incorporate the recommendations into our public information releases and announcements, for the benefit of the general public.

From: NTSB
To: State of Wisconsin
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Alabama
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Alaska
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Arizona
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Arkansas
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Colorado
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Delaware
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Florida
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Hawaii
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Idaho
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Illinois
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Indiana
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Kansas
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Kentucky
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Louisiana
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Maryland
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Michigan
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Minnesota
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Mississippi
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Montana
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Nebraska
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Nevada
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of New Hampshire
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of North Carolina
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of North Dakota
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Ohio
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Oklahoma
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Rhode Island
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of South Carolina
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of South Dakota
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Tennessee
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Texas
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Utah
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Virginia
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of West Virginia
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Wyoming
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: Territory of American Samoa
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: Territory of Guam
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: Virgin Islands of the United States
Date: 11/6/1968
Response: The Safety Board has adopted a report of a grade-crossing accident which occurred on October 2, 1967, near Waterloo, Nebraska, involving a school bus and a Union Pacific Railroad train. The report is to be release to the public on November 8, 1968. The report contains a number of recommendation relating to school bus operations and the training of drivers of motor vehicles. A copy of the report is enclosed for your information. Your comments concerning these recommendations are invited. Recommendation No. 9 is addressed to the attention of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators and, through that association, to the Motor Vehicle Administrator in each State. The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action within your State in response to this recommendation.