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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation M-01-007
Details
Synopsis: THESE RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING SAFETY ISSUES: ADEQUACY OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS, ADEQUACY OF PASSENGER AND CREW SAFETY, AND ADEQUACY OF ENGINEERING SYSTEMS DESIGN. THE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE DERIVED FROM THE SAFETY BOARD'S INVESTIGATION OF THE FIRE ON BOARD THE LIBERIAN PASSENGER SHIP ECSTASY NEAR MIAMI, FLORIDA, ON JULY 20, 1998, AND ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE WE FOUND AND THE ANALYSIS WE PERFORMED. AS A RESULT OF THIS INVESTIGATION, THE SAFETY BOARD HAS ISSUED TWELVE SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS, FOUR OF WHICH ARE ADDRESSED TO THE CRUISE LINE COMPANIES LISTED ON THE ATTACHMENT. INFORMATION SUPPORTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS IS DISCUSSED BELOW. THE SAFETY BOARD WOULD APPRECIATE A RESPONSE FROM YOU WITHIN 90 DAYS ADDRESSING THE ACTIONS YOU HAVE TAKEN OR INTEND TO TAKE TO IMPLEMENT OUR RECOMMENDATIONS.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS TO THE CRUISE LINE COMPANIES, INCLUDING THEIR SUBSIDIARY OPERATING CRUISE LINES, WHERE APPLICABLE: FOR EXISTING VESSELS WITH VENTILATION SYSTEM ARRANGEMENTS SIMILAR TO CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES' FANTASY CLASS SHIPS, INSTALL AN AUTOMATIC METHOD OR SYSTEM TO MITIGATE THE SPREAD OF SMOKE AND FIRE FROM LAUNDRY SPACES THROUGH THE VENTILATION DUCTS TO OTHER VESSEL AREAS.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Marine
Location: Harbor, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA98MM035
Accident Reports:
Fire On Board Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy
Report #: MAR-01-01
Accident Date: 7/20/1998
Issue Date: 5/14/2001
Date Closed: 5/24/2006
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: American Classic Voyages Company (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Carnival Corporation (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Crystal Cruises (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Disney Cruise Line (Closed - Reconsidered)
Imperial Majesty Cruise Line (Closed - Reconsidered)
Norwegian Cruise Line (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Norwegian Cruise Line, Orient Lines (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Princess Cruise Lines (Closed - Reconsidered)
Radisson Seven Seas Cruises (Closed - Reconsidered)
Regal Cruises (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Renaissance Cruises, Inc. (Closed - Reconsidered)
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. (Closed - Exceeds Recommended Action)
Royal Olympic Cruises (Closed - Reconsidered)
Silversea Cruises Ltd. (Closed - Reconsidered)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: Royal Olympic Cruises
Date: 2/25/2003
Response: Your letter indicates that the ventilation arrangements of Royal Olympic ships are not similar to those on the Fantasy Class ships of Carnival Cruise Lines and that the exhaust ducts terminate on deck number 9, the highest deck on Royal Olympic vessels. In addition, Royal Olympic has equipped the laundry ventilation ducts with a spring-activated damper that has a fusible link that melts at 720 degrees Celsius. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-7 is classified "Closed--Reconsidered."

From: Royal Olympic Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 12/13/2002
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 12/18/2002 3:15:10 PM MC# 2021047 The ventilation arrangements of our ships are not similar to the ones onboard the Fantasy Class Ships of CCL. In our ships, the exhaust ducts terminate on Deck No. 9, the highest deck. The Laundry ventilation ducts are equipped with a spring-activated damper with a fusible link that melts at 720C.

From: NTSB
To: Royal Olympic Cruises
Date: 11/12/2002
Response: On April 25, 2002, the Safety Board asked Royal Olympic Cruises for information on action that had been taken or was planned to implement this recommendation. To date, the Safety Board has not received a response from Royal Olympic Cruises on any of these recommendations. The Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement these recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Carol J. Carmody, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letters and related correspondence are enclosed for your reference.

From: Royal Olympic Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Silversea Cruises Ltd.
Date: 2/4/2002
Response: The Safety Board understands that the fire dampers located in the main laundry spaces of all Silversea ships are fitted with a spring-activated fusible link mechanism designed to melt at a given temperature, causing the fire damper to close. Given that this system was already in place at the time we issued our recommendation, Safety Recommendation M-01-7 is classified "Closed--Reconsidered."

From: Silversea Cruises Ltd.
To: NTSB
Date: 9/19/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 09/25/2001 11:09:38 AM MC# 2010765 In order to mitigate the spread of smoke and fire from the main laundry and dry?cleaning spaces, the fire dampers located in such areas of all our ships have always been fitted with a spring activated fusible link mechanism designed to melt at a given temperature, causing the fire damper to close. We consider such system to be very effective and the most suitable to the design of our vessels.

From: Silversea Cruises Ltd.
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Regal Cruises
Date: 8/30/2004
Response: Both Premier and Regal have ceased operations for financial reasons, and both have filed for bankruptcy protection. Safety Board staff initially became aware of the filings from notices posted on the companies' Internet home page and Federal Maritime Commission news releases. The Safety Board has further learned from various industry publications and from discussions with staff at the International Council of Cruise Lines and at the U.S. Coast Guard that all Premier and Regal vessels have been taken out of service and are being sold, as the companies are currently in receivership. Because these companies have ceased operation and are being dissolved, the following safety recommendations to Premier and Regal are classified "Closed-No Longer Applicable." Premier:M-00-6 and -7 Regal: M-00-6 and -7, and M-01-7 through -10 The Safety Board further believes that letters to Premier and Regal advising of their revised status would have little meaning for the companies and would serve no useful purpose; consequently, no letters will be sent.

From: NTSB
To: Regal Cruises
Date: 11/12/2002
Response: On September 26, 2001, the Safety Board requested an update on action that had been completed or was planned to implement Safety Recommendations M-01-7 through -10. The Safety Board has not received any information from Regal Cruises regarding actions take to implement these recommendations. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement these recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Carol J. Carmody, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letters and related correspondence are enclosed for your reference.

From: NTSB
To: Regal Cruises
Date: 9/26/2001
Response: The Safety Board requested a response from Regal Cruise within 90 days addressing the actions taken or planned to implement the recommendations. To date, the Board has not received your response. Please address your response to Ms. Marion C. Blakey, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number. A copy of the recommendation letter is enclosed for your reference.

From: Regal Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.
Date: 5/24/2002
Response: The Safety Board understands that RCCL had already commenced installing automatic fire dampers before Safety Recommendation M-01-7 was issued on May 14, 2001. The Board notes that, in addition, RCCL took the initiative of adding fire-quenching systems throughout the ventilation systems on its fleet of ships. RCCL also reports that it has a regular schedule for cleaning of the ventilation and galley ducts, with special attention to those coming from the laundry. The combination of appropriate fire dampers with the fire suppression systems and regular cleaning of ducts, according to RCCL, has mitigated the risks associated with the Ecstasy fire. In consideration of RCCL's proactive efforts to upgrade cruise ship safety, Safety Recommendation M-01-7 is classified "Closed--Exceeds Recommended Action."

From: Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.
To: NTSB
Date: 6/18/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 06/26/2001 10:20:52 AM MC# 2010519 On all existing ships and on our newbuildings, we have added fire quenching systems in the ventilation. In addition, we have upgraded automatic fire dampers on several older ships. We have established a regular schedule for cleaning of the ventilation and galley ducts, with special attention to those coming from the laundry. Further the access openings and grease traps for all galley ducts are installed. We believe the combination of appropriate fire dampers with the fire suppression systems and regular cleaning of ducts has mitigated the risks associated with the Ecstasy fire.

From: Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
Date: 10/21/2004
Response: V. Ships reports that this recommendation is applicable to only the Seven Seas Mariner, which entered service in February 2001 (three months before the recommendation was issued), and is the only Radisson vessel with deck design arrangements similar to Carnival Cruise Lines' Fantasy Class ships. V. Ships' letter indicates that an automatic method or system was installed when the vessel was built to mitigate the spread of smoke and fire from laundry spaces through the ventilation ducts to other vessel areas; accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-7 is classified "Closed--Reconsidered."

From: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 7/30/2004
Response: V.Ship email confirmed Seven Seas Mariner was built with the recommended arrangement.

From: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 7/16/2004
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 7/21/2004 11:11:24 AM MC# 2040435 V.Ships, management company for Radisson reports that M-01-8 is not applicable to Seven Seas Navigator, Seven Seas Voyager, and Radisson Diamond. However, for Seven Seas Mariner, V.Ships reports that for ship's laundry, ducting access is via fan room to deck 13. Crew laundry ducts to fan room. Passenger laundry's duct to fan room directly from each deck.

From: NTSB
To: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
Date: 5/28/2004
Response: On October 1, 2001, and on November 12, 2002, the Safety Board requested information from Radisson Seven Seas Cruises on the action taken or planned to be taken to implement Safety Recommendations M-01-7 through -10. To date the Safety Board has not received any further information from Radisson Seven Seas Cruises regarding these Safety Recommendations. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement the recommendation. Please address your response to Ms. Ellen Engelman Conners, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendation by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letter and related correspondence is enclosed for your reference. Please call me at 202-314-6174 or by email at brownm@ntsb.gov if you have any questions.

From: NTSB
To: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
Date: 11/12/2002
Response: On October 1, 2001, the Safety Board requested information from Radisson Seven Seas Cruises on the action taken or planned to be taken to implement Safety Recommendations M-01-7 through -10. The Safety Board has not received any further information from Radisson Seven Seas Cruises regarding these recommendations. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement these recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Carol J. Carmody, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letters and related correspondence are enclosed for your reference.

From: NTSB
To: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
Date: 10/1/2001
Response: The Safety Board requested a response from Radisson Seven Seas Cruises within 90 days, addressing the actions taken or planned to implement the recommendations. To date, the Board has not received your response. The Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Marion C. Blakey, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letter is enclosed for your reference.

From: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Carnival Corporation
Date: 3/16/2005
Response: The Safety Board notes that all other Carnival Corporation vessels whose arrangements are similar to the Fantasy class have the means to mitigate the spread of smoke and fire from laundry spaces through the ventilation system to other parts of the vessel. Further, in instances where the arrangements are not similar, smoke and fire risks have been assessed and any improvements considered necessary are being implemented. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-7 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Carnival Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 12/22/2004
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 12/28/2004 3:26:30 PM MC# 2040732

From: Carnival Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 10/20/2004
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 10/25/2004 2:54:53 PM MC# 2040636 For Princess Cruises M-01-7 is classified 'Closed - Reconsidered'. NTSB letter dated 14 June 2002 refers. All other Corporation vessels, where the arrangements are similar to the Fantasy class, have means provided to mitigate the spread of smoke and fire from laundry spaces through the ventilation system to other parts of the vessel. Where the arrangements are not similar, the smoke and tire risks have been assessed and any improvements considered necessary are being implemented.

From: NTSB
To: Carnival Corporation
Date: 4/23/2004
Response: Thank you for your letter of December 18, 2003, inviting my staff and me to meet with Mr. Charles Arkinstall, of Carnival’s new corporate maritime affairs department, to discuss the implementation of the National Transportation Safety Board’s recommendations on a corporatewide basis, and to review the comments in the Safety Board’s letters of December 3, 2003, relating to the installation of audible smoke alarms in crew and passenger accommodation areas. I look forward to meeting with you and your staff and to having productive discussions on our safety recommendations. My staff will contact your office soon to arrange a meeting.

From: Carnival Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 12/18/2003
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 12/31/2003 11:41:13 AM MC# 2030615: Thank you for your letter of December 3,2003 regarding the implementation of Safety Board’s recommendations M-01-02, M-01-03, M-01-7 thru 01-10, made as a result of the Safety Board’s investigation of the fire on Carnival Cruise Line passenger ship M/V Ecstasy, on July 20,1998. Further, we acknowledge and thank you for recognition of Holland America’s efforts to improve the safety equipment carried aboard their vessels, in direct response to the Board’s recommendations. I would like to take this occasion to affirm to you, and the Safety Board, that Carnival Corporation treats the safety and security of its passengers, along with the promotion of a safe operating environment for its crew, with the utmost and paramount attention. Therefore, in consideration of the Safety Board’s recommendations M-01-2, M-01-3, and M, -01-7 thru M-01-10, I do wish to confirm that Carnival Corporation did ensure that all of these recommendations were addressed by our subsidiary cruise line brands. However, pursuant to our historical corporate philosophy, we deferred to the individual operating lines on the actual methodology and reporting of the implementation of the Board’s recommendations. I have nonetheless asked Carnival Corporation’s Maritime Services Group to review the status of implementation of the recommendations and confirm such. With the continued growth of Carnival Corporation and its operating subsidiaries, I a m very pleased to inform you that we have recently created a corporate maritime affairs department within Carnival Corporation that is responsible for the establishment and promotion of fleetwide safety, health and security policies throughout Carnival Corporation and its 13 global cruise brands. Mr. Charles Arkinstall, a twenty-one year veteran of P&O Princess Cruises and a naval architect with 40 years of shipping and shipbuilding experience, has been named as senior vice president of the new maritime affairs department as of November 11, 2003. Mr. Arkinstall reports directly to Carnival Corporation Vice Chair Howard Frank. I welcome the opportunity to have you and your staff meet with Mr. Arkinstall and his staff, in our Florida offices, in order to allow him to present our new program to you, discuss the implementation of the Safety Board’s recommendations on a corporatewide basis and specifically review the comments contained in your December 3rd letters including those relating to installation of audible smoke alarms in corridors. We look forward to hosting you, your fellow members of the Safety Board, and any of your staff, at your earliest convenience. Please feel free to have your staff contact us to arrange this meeting.

From: NTSB
To: Carnival Corporation
Date: 4/9/2002
Response: Your letter also addressed Safety Recommendations M-01-2 and -3, and M-01-7 through -10, which were issued to the Carnival Corporation because they are applicable to corporatewide policies rather than policies that should be developed individually by Carnival Corporation's subsidiary cruise lines. We appreciate the information regarding Carnival Cruise Lines' specific actions in response to these recommendations. By separate correspondence, the Safety Board has requested information from Carnival Corporation on how it intends to implement Safety Recommendations M-01-2 and -3, and M-01-7 through -10. That letter is also enclosed for your reference.

From: Carnival Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 10/8/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 10/22/2001 5:09:25 PM MC# 2010870 : Lint filters have been installed on all ships in our fleet. Automatic fire dampers have been installed on DESTINY and SPIRIT and new buildings are also receiving automatic fire dampers. As an additional measure, the feasibility of a deluge fog system fitted inside the ducts is under evaluation.

From: NTSB
To: Carnival Corporation
Date: 9/28/2001
Response: The Safety Board requested a response from Carnival Corporation, Inc., within 90 days, addressing the actions taken or planned to implement the recommendations. To date, the Board has not received your response. The Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Marion C. Blakey, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number. A copy of the recommendation letter is enclosed for your reference.

From: Carnival Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Renaissance Cruises, Inc.
Date: 3/8/2002
Response: The Safety Board is pleased to learn that before the Ecstasy accident, temperature sensitive switches had been installed on the fire dampers in the laundry spaces of Renaissance ships to activate the closing motor of the dampers. Further, according to your letter, this system is fail-safe because a loss or interruption of power results in the dampers being closed. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-7 is classified "Closed--Reconsidered."

From: Renaissance Cruises, Inc.
To: NTSB
Date: 6/27/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 07/06/2001 5:07:08 PM MC# 2010553 The fire dampers on Renaissance R-Series ships that are located in the laundry spaces are fitted with a temperature sensitive switch that activates the closing motor on the damper. The system is fail-safe in that a loss or interruption of the main source of electrical power causes an alternate source to provide activation of the motor and subsequent closure of the damper. This proven system ensures that all dampers will close, should a dead ship condition occur. In that way, the spread of smoke and heat through the ventilation system is eliminated.

From: Renaissance Cruises, Inc.
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Norwegian Cruise Line, Orient Lines
Date: 10/1/2002
Response: The NCL Group reports that all of its vessels either are of a completely different design from that of the Carnival Cruise Lines' Fantasy Class ships or have installed an automatic method or system to mitigate the spread of smoke and fire from the laundry spaces through the ventilation ducts to other vessel areas. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-7 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Norwegian Cruise Line, Orient Lines
To: NTSB
Date: 6/17/2002
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 06/26/2002 7:57:47 AM MC# 2020640 Norwegian Sky, Norwegian Sun. Norwegian Star, Norwegian Dawn. Norwegian Sea, Crown Odyssey and Marco Polo: There are no laundry ventilation ducts exhausting on the mooring decks. Norwegian Dream & Norwegian Wind: The mooring stations are semi-enclosed with a crew laundry exhaust fun outlet on the forward mooring station deck 6. All ducts are fitted with manually operated closing devices. There is no detection or fire extinguishing devices within the ducts. The mooring stations are not equipped with fire detection system and the only means of fire fighting are fire hoses. The laundry exhaust ducts of the Norwegian Wind have been fitted with five (5) automated dampers. Same modifications are planned for the Norwegian Dream during the upcoming dry-dock during April 2002. Norwegian Majesty: The crew laundry exhaust duct is located on the forward mooring station deck 4. There are no automated dampers or fire extinguishing system within the laundry duct, neither any fire detection or fire suppression means other than fire hoses, within the mooring stations. The laundry exhaust ducts of the Norwegian Majesty fitted with (4) automated dampers during the dry-dock of April 2002. Norway: There is a laundry duct exhausting on the aft mooring station. The laundry ducts are equipped with dampers, which close on power shutdown. Also there is a manual damper fitted just inside mooring deck aft.

From: Norwegian Cruise Line, Orient Lines
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Crystal Cruises
Date: 7/16/2002
Response: Crystal Cruises reports that neither of its existing ships, Crystal Symphony nor Crystal Harmony, have ventilation systems similar to the Fantasy class ships. However, Crystal Cruises has taken steps to mitigate the spread of smoke and fire from laundry spaces through ventilation on the Crystal Harmony by installing a heat-activated damper in the exhaust duct from the laundry. Further, because the Crystal Symphony is built so that the ventilation from the laundry vents up the mast, no modifications are planned. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-7 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Crystal Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 11/29/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 12/05/2001 3:47:12 PM MC# 2010950 Neither of our existing ships, Crystal Symphony nor Crystal Harmony are believed to have ventilation systems similar to the Fantasy class ships. Regardless, we are taking steps to mitigate the spread of smoke and fire from laundry spaces through ventilation on Crystal Harmony. This will be accomplished by installing heat-activated damper in the exhaust duct from the laundry. This modification will be accomplished by 1 January 2002. Crystal Symphony is built so that the ventilation from the laundry vents up the mast. Because of this no modifications are planned.

From: NTSB
To: Crystal Cruises
Date: 9/28/2001
Response: The Safety Board requested a response from Crystal Cruise within 90 days, addressing the actions taken or intended to implement the recommendations. To date, the Board has not received your response. We would appreciate knowing what action is planned or has been taken to implement these recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Marion C. Blakey, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number. A copy of the recommendation letter is enclosed.

From: Crystal Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: American Classic Voyages Company
Date: 10/3/2002
Response: Closed by Notation 6837B adopted 3 OCT 2002. From the Notation Memorandum: Because these companies have ceased operation and are being dissolved, staff recommends that safety recommendations to Renaissance and ACV be classified "Closed-No Longer Applicable" as follows: Renaissance: M-00-6 and -7, and M-01-10 and -18 AMC: M-00-6 and -7, and M-01-7 through -10 and -18

From: NTSB
To: American Classic Voyages Company
Date: 10/2/2001
Response: The Safety Board requested a response from American Classic Voyages Company within 90 days, addressing the actions taken or planned to implement the recommendations. To date, the Board has not received your response. The Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Marion C. Blakey, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letter is enclosed for your convenience.

From: American Classic Voyages Company
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Disney Cruise Line
Date: 1/23/2002
Response: The Safety Board is pleased to learn that, before the Ecstasy fire, the ventilation systems on Disney ships had fire dampers with temperature-sensitive sensors that automatically closed the dampers and stopped the fans. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-7 is classified "Closed--Reconsidered."

From: Disney Cruise Line
To: NTSB
Date: 8/14/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 08/21/2001 1:13:46 PM MC# 2010672 Disney Cruise Line ships already comply with this recommendation, since our ships' ventilation fire dampers have sensors that automatically close the dampers and stop fans when the sensors reach a certain temperature, i.e. 95 degrees C for higher temperature vents, such as galley hoods and 72 degrees C for vents throughout: the rest of the ship.

From: Disney Cruise Line
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Imperial Majesty Cruise Line
Date: 5/24/2006
Response: The Safety Board understands from Captain Vurdubakis's letters that, because these recommendations are not required by the International Maritime Organization (NO) or by the International Council of Cruise Lines, that Imperial Majesty Cruise Line views the above recommendations simply as guidelines to improve passenger and crew safety. The Safety Board recognizes that, for the Regal Empress (Imperial Majesty Cruise Line's only vessel) to operate in the cruise ship trade, it must comply with current IMO regulations, Bureau Veritas classification rules, Bahamas Registry Flag State requirements and C.S. Port State Requirements. Current international regulations require the installation of smoke detectors throughout the vessel that sound in a central location such as the wheel house, and that certain spaces such as the engine room must have fire (heat) detectors that sound locally in the event of a fire. Further, the Board has reviewed the Report to the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), dated February 15, 2006, from the International Maritime Organization's Subcommittee on Fire Protection (FP 50121), and notes that the FP subcommittee has recommended changes to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Chapter 11-2, regulation 7, Detection und Alarm. Specifically, the subcommittee is recommending to the MSC, in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3.1, the following new text to be added at the end of the paragraphs: "Detectors fitted in cabins, when activated, shall also be capable of emitting, or cause to be emitted, an audible alarm within the space where they are located." While the Safety Board certainly applauds the recommendation by the FP and supports the MSC's adoption later this year, the Board's recommendations go beyond these existing regulations and proposed requirements. The Board's recommendations call for all smoke detectors in accommodation spaces, not just those in passenger and crew staterooms, to sound locally. Because Imperial Majesty Cruise Line has not taken action to implement Safety Recommendations M-00-6 and -7, and M-0 1-9 and - 10, as requested, these recommendations are classified "Closed-Unacceptable Action." With respect to Safety Recommendations M-01-7 and -8, because Imperial Majesty Cruise Lines operates only the 50-year-old Regal Empress, which is not similar in any way to the Carnival's Fantasy Class vessels, these recommendations are classified "Closed-Reconsidered." The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency charged with investigating marine accidents, determining cause and issuing safety recommendations to prevent recurrence of similar accidents. For your information, eight cruise lines (Celebrity Cruises, Crystal Cruises, Disney Cruise Line, Norwegian Cruise Line, Orient Lines, Radisson Seven Seas Cruises, Royal Caribbean International and Royal Olympic) have taken action as requested to implement Safety Recommendations M-0-6 and -7; nine cruise lines (Carnival Corporation, Crystal Cruises, Disney Cruise Line, Norwegian Cruise Line, Orient Lines, P & 0 Princess Cruises International, Radisson Seven Seas Cruises, Royal Caribbean Cruises and Silversea Cruises) have taken action to implement Safety Recommendation M-01-9; and seven cruise lines have implemented Safety Recommendation M-0 1- 10 (Carnival Corporation, Crystal Cruises, Disney Cruise Line, P & 0 Princess Cruises International, Radisson Seven Seas Cruises, Royal Caribbean Cruises and Silversea Cruises). Two cruise lines (Norwegian Cruise Line and Orient Lines) are nearing completion of action to implement Safety Recommendation M-0 1- 10. Should Imperial Majesty Cruise Line reconsider its position, and implement one or all four of the safety recommendations, and inform the Board of this action in a timely manner, we will consider reclassifying these recommendations.

From: Imperial Majesty Cruise Line
To: NTSB
Date: 12/19/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 1/3/2006 2:07:26 PM MC# 2060012 9-17-05: No formal response from Imperial Majesty Cruise Line, so the Board sent a request for information. 10-15-04: We are in receipt of your letter dated September 17, 2004 regarding the safety recommendations on the above referenced vessel, M/v Regal Empress. Imperial Majesty Cruise Line's top priority is Safety and compliance, the M N Regal Empress holding a Bahamas Registry is and has been in full compliance of all safety rules and regulations as allowed by SOLAS and IMO. The Regal Empress has always been found in full compliance with no deficiencies during our routine Flag, Class and Port State Control inspections and surveys Beside the electronic monitors and smoke detectors we also have a very efficient constant Fire Patrol of crew members who are trained in this task. As the contents of your letter have not been in forced by IMO and ICCL we should however use them as a guide line in order to further improve the safety of the ship for both passengers and crew. Andreas Vurdubaltis, Director Marine Operations/ DPA 12-19-05: We are in receipt of your letter dated December 12, 2005 regarding the safety recommendations on the above referenced vessel, M/V Regal Empress. Our standards for the Company are unchanged. For your reference we arc attaching our response to your letter dated September 17, 2004. As always, Imperial Majesty Cruise Line's top priority is Safety and compliance, the M/V Regal Empress holding a Bahamas Registry and Bureau Veritas Class, has successfully passed all Safety Requirements of all rules and regulations implemented by Class, Flag State, USCG, SOLAS and IMO. If you should have any questions or need further information please do not hesitate to contact me. Andreas Vurdubakis, VP Marine Operations/ DPA

From: NTSB
To: Imperial Majesty Cruise Line
Date: 12/12/2005
Response: Safety Recommendations M-01-7 through -10 were issued on May 14, 2001, as a result of the Safety Board's investigation of a fire aboard the passenger ship Ecstasy on July 20, 1998. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you, as the new owner of the Regal Empress, regarding actions taken or planned to implement these recommendations. Please refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letters and related correspondence are enclosed for your reference.

From: NTSB
To: Imperial Majesty Cruise Line
Date: 9/17/2004
Response: The Safety Board is aware that Regal Cruise Lines has ceased operations and is no longer in business and that in 2003 Imperial Majesty Cruise Line purchased the Regal Empress. Accordingly, these safety recommendations are being reassigned to Imperial Majesty Cruise Line for action, as they pertain to material condition and operation of the vessel. While several requests were made, the Safety Board never received any information from Regal Cruise Lines regarding these recommendations. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you, as the new owner of the Regal Empress, regarding actions taken or planned to implement these recommendations.

From: NTSB
To: Norwegian Cruise Line
Date: 10/1/2002
Response: The NCL Group reports that all of its vessels either are of a completely different design from that of the Carnival Cruise Lines' Fantasy Class ships or have installed an automatic method or system to mitigate the spread of smoke and fire from the laundry spaces through the ventilation ducts to other vessel areas. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-7 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Norwegian Cruise Line
To: NTSB
Date: 6/17/2002
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 06/26/2002 7:57:47 AM MC# 2020640 Norwegian Sky, Norwegian Sun. Norwegian Star, Norwegian Dawn. Norwegian Sea, Crown Odyssey and Marco Polo: There are no laundry ventilation ducts exhausting on the mooring decks. Norwegian Dream & Norwegian Wind: The mooring stations are semi-enclosed with a crew laundry exhaust fun outlet on the forward mooring station deck 6. All ducts are fitted with manually operated closing devices. There is no detection or fire extinguishing devices within the ducts. The mooring stations are not equipped with fire detection system and the only means of fire fighting are fire hoses. The laundry exhaust ducts of the Norwegian Wind have been fitted with five (5) automated dampers. Same modifications are planned for the Norwegian Dream during the upcoming dry-dock during April 2002. Norwegian Majesty: The crew laundry exhaust duct is located on the forward mooring station deck 4. There are no automated dampers or fire extinguishing system within the laundry duct, neither any fire detection or fire suppression means other than fire hoses, within the mooring stations. The laundry exhaust ducts of the Norwegian Majesty fitted with (4) automated dampers during the dry-dock of April 2002. Norway: There is a laundry duct exhausting on the aft mooring station. The laundry ducts are equipped with dampers, which close on power shutdown. Also there is a manual damper fitted just inside mooring deck aft.

From: Norwegian Cruise Line
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Princess Cruise Lines
Date: 6/14/2002
Response: The Safety Board understands that Princess Cruises inspected all of its ships and found that the main ventilating ducts, both supply and exhaust, are fitted with automatic fire dampers in the laundry space or within a short distance inside the ventilation trunking. As this system was in place prior to the issuance of this safety recommendation, Safety Recommendation M-01-7 is classified "Closed--Reconsidered."

From: Princess Cruise Lines
To: NTSB
Date: 10/30/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 01/29/2002 5:17:42 PM MC# 2020096 We have reviewed the systems in our ships and confirm that the main ventilating ducts, both supply and exhaust, are fitted with automatic fire dampers in the laundry space or within a short distance inside the ventilation trunking.

From: NTSB
To: Princess Cruise Lines
Date: 10/2/2001
Response: The Safety Board requested a response from P&O Princess Cruises International, Ltd., within 90 days, addressing the actions taken or planned to implement the recommendations. To date, the Board has not received your response. The Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Marion C. Blakey, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letter is enclosed for your reference.

From: Princess Cruise Lines
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.