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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation M-01-009
Details
Synopsis: THESE RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING SAFETY ISSUES: ADEQUACY OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS, ADEQUACY OF PASSENGER AND CREW SAFETY, AND ADEQUACY OF ENGINEERING SYSTEMS DESIGN. THE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE DERIVED FROM THE SAFETY BOARD'S INVESTIGATION OF THE FIRE ON BOARD THE LIBERIAN PASSENGER SHIP ECSTASY NEAR MIAMI, FLORIDA, ON JULY 20, 1998, AND ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE WE FOUND AND THE ANALYSIS WE PERFORMED. AS A RESULT OF THIS INVESTIGATION, THE SAFETY BOARD HAS ISSUED TWELVE SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS, FOUR OF WHICH ARE ADDRESSED TO THE CRUISE LINE COMPANIES LISTED ON THE ATTACHMENT. INFORMATION SUPPORTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS IS DISCUSSED BELOW. THE SAFETY BOARD WOULD APPRECIATE A RESPONSE FROM YOU WITHIN 90 DAYS ADDRESSING THE ACTIONS YOU HAVE TAKEN OR INTEND TO TAKE TO IMPLEMENT OUR RECOMMENDATIONS.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS TO THE CRUISE LINE COMPANIES, INCLUDING THEIR SUBSIDIARY OPERATING CRUISE LINES, WHERE APPLICABLE: IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW PASSENGER SHIPS, USE QUALITATIVE FAILURE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES TO IDENTIFY SYSTEM COMPONENTS WHOSE FAILURE MIGHT CAUSE A COMPLETE LOSS OF PROPULSIVE POWER AND TAKE ACTION TO MITIGATE IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Marine
Location: Harbor, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA98MM035
Accident Reports:
Fire On Board Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy
Report #: MAR-01-01
Accident Date: 7/20/1998
Issue Date: 5/14/2001
Date Closed: 5/24/2006
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: American Classic Voyages Company (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Carnival Corporation (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Crystal Cruises (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Disney Cruise Line (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Imperial Majesty Cruise Line (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Norwegian Cruise Line (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Norwegian Cruise Line, Orient Lines (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Princess Cruise Lines (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Radisson Seven Seas Cruises (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Regal Cruises (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Renaissance Cruises, Inc. (Closed - Reconsidered)
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. (Closed - Exceeds Recommended Action)
Royal Olympic Cruises (Closed - Reconsidered)
Silversea Cruises Ltd. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: Royal Olympic Cruises
Date: 7/1/2003
Response: The Safety Board notes that Royal Olympic does not plan in the near future to build any new passenger ships. Royal Olympic reviewed the propulsion and power distribution characteristics of its two latest passenger ships and determined that the electrical power failure and loss of propulsion exhibited in the Ecstasy casualty would not have occurred on Royal Olympic cruise ships that use more redundant conventional propulsion and power distribution systems. The Board also notes Royal Olympic Cruises' basic design criteria eliminates the possibility of a complete loss of propulsion power. This recommendation currently is not applicable because Royal Olympic is not engaged in, nor does it anticipate, any new building projects. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-9 is classified "Closed--Reconsidered." Thank you for your careful consideration of this recommendation. The Safety Board asks that if future construction should occur, Royal Olympic Cruises Limited use qualitative failure analysis (failure modes and effects analysis) techniques.

From: Royal Olympic Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 3/14/2003
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 3/26/2003 9:35:59 AM MC# 2030178 We have noted that all recommendations are closed, with the exception of M-01-9 that is still open pending clarification. We would like to inform you that we do not have at present any vessels under construction nor do we plan on any new buildings in the near future. Nevertheless we examined our two newly built cruiseships in order to identify whether they have any system components whose failure might cause a complete loss of propulsive power. In this respect the propulsion and power distribution characteristics of our two new ships the "OLYMPIA VOYAGER" and the "OLYMPIA EXPLORER," adhere to a more conventional philosophy, (as opposed to the Azipod electrical propulsion of the "ECSTASY" whose associated electrical control failed during the fire in her after mooring station). This philosophy will not allow a complete loss of propulsion power. To elaborate on the above, please note the following: 1. Our propulsion system consists of four main diesel engines grouped in two pairs. Each pair drives through clutches and a reduction gear box the propeller shaft with a variable pitch propeller. Each of the two Main Engines that drive one tail-end shaft is housed in a different watertight compartment. This means that a loss of one of these compartments would still allow operation of both shafts at half the rated horsepower. 2. Local controls on each Main Engine and local controls at each variable pitch propeller unit enable in situ full control. 3. The two reduction gear boxes are located in different compartments from the Main Engine, and clutching - declutching of any of the four Engines can be effected both locally and remotely from the Central Room. 4. The new technology carbon shafts transmitting the power from the engines to the reduction gears, are protected from fire by water spray units operated by quick-open valves. 5. Electrical power redundancy is ensured by four auxiliary engines in pairs. Each pair again located in a different compartment. 6. The Electric Switchboard is split in two switchboards fed from generators located in different compartments. The above basic design criteria ensures a fundamentally sound and reliable platform that eliminates any possibility of a complete loss of propulsion power.

From: NTSB
To: Royal Olympic Cruises
Date: 2/25/2003
Response: Your letter indicates that, while Royal Olympic does not have any vessels under construction, the company's technical department is studying this issue to identify whether any problems exist. The Safety Board would appreciate a clarification of this statement. The Board would appreciate being informed if Royal Olympic has any plans to construct new passenger ships in the future and, if so, whether qualitative failure analysis techniques be used. Pending clarification of these issues, Safety Recommendation M-01-9 is classified "Open--Acceptable Response."

From: Royal Olympic Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 12/13/2002
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 12/18/2002 3:15:10 PM MC# 2021047 We do not have any new ships under construction at present. Nevertheless, our Technical Department is studying this issue to identify if any problems exist.

From: NTSB
To: Royal Olympic Cruises
Date: 11/12/2002
Response: On April 25, 2002, the Safety Board asked Royal Olympic Cruises for information on action that had been taken or was planned to implement this recommendation. To date, the Safety Board has not received a response from Royal Olympic Cruises on any of these recommendations. The Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement these recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Carol J. Carmody, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letters and related correspondence are enclosed for your reference.

From: Royal Olympic Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Silversea Cruises Ltd.
Date: 2/4/2002
Response: The Safety Board understands that Silversea is not currently engaged in any new building projects, but should a new project be undertaken, Silversea will ensure that qualitative failure analysis techniques are employed, as recommended. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-9 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Silversea Cruises Ltd.
To: NTSB
Date: 9/19/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 09/25/2001 11:09:38 AM MC# 2010765 Should the Company plan for the construction of a new passenger vessel, appropriate use of qualitative failure analysis techniques will be adopted, in order to identify system components whose failure might cause a complete loss of propulsive power and take action to mitigate identified problems.

From: Silversea Cruises Ltd.
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Regal Cruises
Date: 8/30/2004
Response: Both Premier and Regal have ceased operations for financial reasons, and both have filed for bankruptcy protection. Safety Board staff initially became aware of the filings from notices posted on the companies' Internet home page and Federal Maritime Commission news releases. The Safety Board has further learned from various industry publications and from discussions with staff at the International Council of Cruise Lines and at the U.S. Coast Guard that all Premier and Regal vessels have been taken out of service and are being sold, as the companies are currently in receivership. Because these companies have ceased operation and are being dissolved, the following safety recommendations to Premier and Regal are classified "Closed-No Longer Applicable." Premier:M-00-6 and -7 Regal: M-00-6 and -7, and M-01-7 through -10 The Safety Board further believes that letters to Premier and Regal advising of their revised status would have little meaning for the companies and would serve no useful purpose; consequently, no letters will be sent.

From: NTSB
To: Regal Cruises
Date: 11/12/2002
Response: On September 26, 2001, the Safety Board requested an update on action that had been completed or was planned to implement Safety Recommendations M-01-7 through -10. The Safety Board has not received any information from Regal Cruises regarding actions take to implement these recommendations. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement these recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Carol J. Carmody, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letters and related correspondence are enclosed for your reference.

From: NTSB
To: Regal Cruises
Date: 9/26/2001
Response: The Safety Board requested a response from Regal Cruise within 90 days addressing the actions taken or planned to implement the recommendations. To date, the Board has not received your response. Please address your response to Ms. Marion C. Blakey, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number. A copy of the recommendation letter is enclosed for your reference.

From: Regal Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.
Date: 5/24/2002
Response: The Safety Board is aware that, before the Ecstasy fire, RCCL was using qualitative failure analysis as part of its design process, that RCCL will ensure that the analysis of all new builds is carefully reviewed to identify components whose failure may cause complete loss of propulsion, and that action will be taken to mitigate identified problems. Further, the Board understands that the safety systems on RCCL's new classes of ships, including Voyager, Radiance, and Millennium, have all been designed with complete redundancy and have been so recognized by Lloyds Register of Shipping's propulsion machinery redundancy (PMR), steering machinery redundancy (SMR), and propulsion-steering machinery redundancy (PSMR) notation assignments. This is an exceptional safety upgrade. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-9 is classified "Closed--Exceeds Recommended Action."

From: Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.
To: NTSB
Date: 6/18/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 06/26/2001 10:20:52 AM MC# 2010519 We do undertake qualitative failure analysis as part of our design process, and we will ensure that we carefully review this specific aspect of the analysis for all newbuildings. Our new classes of ships, Voyager, Radiance and Millennium, are all designed with complete redundancy for all safety systems.

From: Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
Date: 10/21/2004
Response: V. Ships reports that the Seven Seas Voyager (the only vessel built since May 2001, when the recommendation was issued) was constructed using qualitative failure analysis techniques to identify system components whose failure might cause a complete loss of propulsive power. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-9 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 7/16/2004
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 7/21/2004 11:11:24 AM MC# 2040435 V.Ships, management company for Radisson reports that the Seven Seas Mariner, Seven Seas Navigator and the Radisson Diamond were built prior to May 2001. However the Seven Seas Voyager was build using qualitative failure analysis techniques to identify system components whose failure might cause a complete loss of propulsive power and take action to mitigate identified problems.

From: NTSB
To: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
Date: 5/28/2004
Response: On October 1, 2001, and on November 12, 2002, the Safety Board requested information from Radisson Seven Seas Cruises on the action taken or planned to be taken to implement Safety Recommendations M-01-7 through -10. To date the Safety Board has not received any further information from Radisson Seven Seas Cruises regarding these Safety Recommendations. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement the recommendation. Please address your response to Ms. Ellen Engelman Conners, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendation by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letter and related correspondence is enclosed for your reference. Please call me at 202-314-6174 or by email at brownm@ntsb.gov if you have any questions.

From: NTSB
To: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
Date: 11/12/2002
Response: On October 1, 2001, the Safety Board requested information from Radisson Seven Seas Cruises on the action taken or planned to be taken to implement Safety Recommendations M-01-7 through -10. The Safety Board has not received any further information from Radisson Seven Seas Cruises regarding these recommendations. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement these recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Carol J. Carmody, Acting Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letters and related correspondence are enclosed for your reference.

From: NTSB
To: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
Date: 10/1/2001
Response: The Safety Board requested a response from Radisson Seven Seas Cruises within 90 days, addressing the actions taken or planned to implement the recommendations. To date, the Board has not received your response. The Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Marion C. Blakey, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letter is enclosed for your reference.

From: Radisson Seven Seas Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Carnival Corporation
Date: 3/16/2005
Response: The Safety Board notes that Carnival Corporation shipbuilding now uses a number of risk analysis methods, including qualitative failure analysis, on many aspects of new design projects, including the identification of critical system components whose failure might cause a complete loss of propulsive power. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-9 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Carnival Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 12/22/2004
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 12/28/2004 3:26:30 PM MC# 2040732

From: Carnival Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 10/20/2004
Response: For Princess Cruises M-01-9 is classified 'Closed - Acceptable Action'. NTSB letter dated 14 June 2002 refers. Carnival Corporate Shipbuilding now uses a number of risk analysis methods (including qualitative failure analysis) on many aspects of new design projects. These include the identification of critical system components whose failure might cause a complete loss of propulsive power.

From: NTSB
To: Carnival Corporation
Date: 4/23/2004
Response: Thank you for your letter of December 18, 2003, inviting my staff and me to meet with Mr. Charles Arkinstall, of Carnival’s new corporate maritime affairs department, to discuss the implementation of the National Transportation Safety Board’s recommendations on a corporatewide basis, and to review the comments in the Safety Board’s letters of December 3, 2003, relating to the installation of audible smoke alarms in crew and passenger accommodation areas. I look forward to meeting with you and your staff and to having productive discussions on our safety recommendations. My staff will contact your office soon to arrange a meeting.

From: Carnival Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 12/18/2003
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 12/31/2003 11:41:13 AM MC# 2030615: Thank you for your letter of December 3,2003 regarding the implementation of Safety Board’s recommendations M-01-02, M-01-03, M-01-7 thru 01-10, made as a result of the Safety Board’s investigation of the fire on Carnival Cruise Line passenger ship M/V Ecstasy, on July 20,1998. Further, we acknowledge and thank you for recognition of Holland America’s efforts to improve the safety equipment carried aboard their vessels, in direct response to the Board’s recommendations. I would like to take this occasion to affirm to you, and the Safety Board, that Carnival Corporation treats the safety and security of its passengers, along with the promotion of a safe operating environment for its crew, with the utmost and paramount attention. Therefore, in consideration of the Safety Board’s recommendations M-01-2, M-01-3, and M, -01-7 thru M-01-10, I do wish to confirm that Carnival Corporation did ensure that all of these recommendations were addressed by our subsidiary cruise line brands. However, pursuant to our historical corporate philosophy, we deferred to the individual operating lines on the actual methodology and reporting of the implementation of the Board’s recommendations. I have nonetheless asked Carnival Corporation’s Maritime Services Group to review the status of implementation of the recommendations and confirm such. With the continued growth of Carnival Corporation and its operating subsidiaries, I a m very pleased to inform you that we have recently created a corporate maritime affairs department within Carnival Corporation that is responsible for the establishment and promotion of fleetwide safety, health and security policies throughout Carnival Corporation and its 13 global cruise brands. Mr. Charles Arkinstall, a twenty-one year veteran of P&O Princess Cruises and a naval architect with 40 years of shipping and shipbuilding experience, has been named as senior vice president of the new maritime affairs department as of November 11, 2003. Mr. Arkinstall reports directly to Carnival Corporation Vice Chair Howard Frank. I welcome the opportunity to have you and your staff meet with Mr. Arkinstall and his staff, in our Florida offices, in order to allow him to present our new program to you, discuss the implementation of the Safety Board’s recommendations on a corporatewide basis and specifically review the comments contained in your December 3rd letters including those relating to installation of audible smoke alarms in corridors. We look forward to hosting you, your fellow members of the Safety Board, and any of your staff, at your earliest convenience. Please feel free to have your staff contact us to arrange this meeting.

From: NTSB
To: Carnival Corporation
Date: 4/9/2002
Response: Your letter also addressed Safety Recommendations M-01-2 and -3, and M-01-7 through -10, which were issued to the Carnival Corporation because they are applicable to corporatewide policies rather than policies that should be developed individually by Carnival Corporation's subsidiary cruise lines. We appreciate the information regarding Carnival Cruise Lines' specific actions in response to these recommendations. By separate correspondence, the Safety Board has requested information from Carnival Corporation on how it intends to implement Safety Recommendations M-01-2 and -3, and M-01-7 through -10. That letter is also enclosed for your reference.

From: Carnival Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 10/8/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 10/22/2001 5:09:25 PM MC# 2010870 CCL has implemented a qualitative analysis technique for system identification, which will be conducted by an outside party. This vendor will provide a total safety assessment for the Carnival vessel SPIRIT and other vessels of that class, which will include evaluations of emergency electric power, power production, electric power, propulsion production, bridge systems, safety systems, and passenger comfort.

From: NTSB
To: Carnival Corporation
Date: 9/28/2001
Response: The Safety Board requested a response from Carnival Corporation, Inc., within 90 days, addressing the actions taken or planned to implement the recommendations. To date, the Board has not received your response. The Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Marion C. Blakey, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number. A copy of the recommendation letter is enclosed for your reference.

From: Carnival Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Renaissance Cruises, Inc.
Date: 3/8/2002
Response: The Safety Board understands that Renaissance is currently not engaged in any new building projects but that, should a new building project be undertaken, Renaissance will consider the recommendation at that time. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-9 is classified "Closed--Reconsidered."

From: Renaissance Cruises, Inc.
To: NTSB
Date: 6/27/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 07/06/2001 5:07:08 PM MC# 2010553 This recommendation is currently not applicable because Renaissance Cruises is not engaged in any new building projects at this time. Should a new building project be undertaken, the recommendation will be reconsidered at that time.

From: Renaissance Cruises, Inc.
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Norwegian Cruise Line, Orient Lines
Date: 10/1/2002
Response: Safety Board staff has learned from contact with your office that qualitative failure analysis techniques were used in the design of the Norwegian Dawn, which is scheduled to enter service in December 2002. Because the NCL Group will receive a class society special notation that requires the use of qualitative failure analysis techniques, and the techniques will also continue to be employed in future designs, Safety Recommendation M-01-9 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Norwegian Cruise Line, Orient Lines
To: NTSB
Date: 6/17/2002
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 06/26/2002 7:57:47 AM MC# 2020640 In the modern ship building process, failure analysis techniques are used as an integral part of the ship construction. During this process components and machinery are carefully examined for compliance before installation. The IMO (International Maritime Organization) through the SOLAS convention sets the minimum standards, requiring that a variety of rules and regulations be fulfilled during the construction of a new vessel or how these rules would be applied for an existing vessel. Part of these rules identify the back ups and system components, necessary to maintain the appropriate for the situation safety margins. In relation to this, the vessel incorporates sophisticated safety systems, not only for the mitigation of identified problems but also their early detection. Furthermore, the Administration and vessels' Classification Society examines this process to ensure compliance to all applicable rules and regulations as well as the company's contingency planning in relation to shipboard operations and how these plans effectively address any potential shipboard emergency.

From: Norwegian Cruise Line, Orient Lines
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Crystal Cruises
Date: 8/10/2004
Response: Captain Valenti reports that its two older vessels, Crystal Harmony and Crystal Symphony, which were built in 1990 and 1995, have been retrofitted to ensure that an emergency shutdown would not leave the ship without propulsion. Crystal's third vessel, Crystal Serenity, launched in 2003, was built and tested in accordance with the half-ship concept, and a qualitative failure analysis procedure was not employed. In all three cases, the vessels were either completed or construction had been well underway prior to the issuance of the recommendation in 2001. Safety Board staff contacted Captain Valenti to ascertain whether Crystal plans to build any new vessels. Captain Valenti reported that there were no immediate plans to construct new vessels within the next 5 years and that Crystal might consider using a qualitative failure analysis procedure in any new build. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-9 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Crystal Cruises
To: NTSB
Date: 5/28/2004
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 6/4/2004 10:58:43 AM MC# 2040277 Crystal Harmony was built in 1990 and Crystal Symphony was built in 1995, consequently, Safety Recommendation M-01-9 does not apply to them. However, both ships have been retro-fitted to ensure that an emergency shutdown would not leave the ship without propulsion. Crystal Serenity was launched in 2003 and was built and tested in accordance with the half-ship concept. A qualitative failure analysis procedure was not employed.

From: NTSB
To: Crystal Cruises
Date: 5/13/2004
Response: To date, the Safety Board has not received any further information on the status of action to complete Safety Recommendations M-00-6 and -7, and M-01-9. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you regarding actions taken or planned to implement the recommendation. Please address your response to Ms. Ellen Engelman Conners, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendation by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letter and related correspondence is enclosed for your reference. Please call me at 202-314-6174 or by email at brownm@ntsb.gov if you have any questions. Thank you for your assistance. Sincerely, Michael T. Brown, Marine Safety Recommendations

From: NTSB
To: American Classic Voyages Company
Date: 10/3/2002
Response: Closed by Notation 6837B adopted 3 OCT 2002. From the Notation Memorandum: Because these companies have ceased operation and are being dissolved, staff recommends that safety recommendations to Renaissance and ACV be classified "Closed-No Longer Applicable" as follows: Renaissance: M-00-6 and -7, and M-01-10 and -18 AMC: M-00-6 and -7, and M-01-7 through -10 and -18

From: NTSB
To: American Classic Voyages Company
Date: 10/2/2001
Response: The Safety Board requested a response from American Classic Voyages Company within 90 days, addressing the actions taken or planned to implement the recommendations. To date, the Board has not received your response. The Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Marion C. Blakey, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letter is enclosed for your convenience.

From: American Classic Voyages Company
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Disney Cruise Line
Date: 1/23/2002
Response: The Safety Board understands that Disney is currently not engaged in any new ship building projects at this time, but should a new ship building project be undertaken, Disney will use qualitative failure analysis techniques. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-9 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Disney Cruise Line
To: NTSB
Date: 8/14/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 08/21/2001 1:13:46 PM MC# 2010672 As you recommend, in the construction of new passenger ships, we will use qualitative failure analysis techniques to identify system components whose failure might cause a complete loss of propulsive power and take action to mitigate identified problems.

From: Disney Cruise Line
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Imperial Majesty Cruise Line
Date: 5/24/2006
Response: The Safety Board understands from Captain Vurdubakis's letters that, because these recommendations are not required by the International Maritime Organization (NO) or by the International Council of Cruise Lines, that Imperial Majesty Cruise Line views the above recommendations simply as guidelines to improve passenger and crew safety. The Safety Board recognizes that, for the Regal Empress (Imperial Majesty Cruise Line's only vessel) to operate in the cruise ship trade, it must comply with current IMO regulations, Bureau Veritas classification rules, Bahamas Registry Flag State requirements and C.S. Port State Requirements. Current international regulations require the installation of smoke detectors throughout the vessel that sound in a central location such as the wheel house, and that certain spaces such as the engine room must have fire (heat) detectors that sound locally in the event of a fire. Further, the Board has reviewed the Report to the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), dated February 15, 2006, from the International Maritime Organization's Subcommittee on Fire Protection (FP 50121), and notes that the FP subcommittee has recommended changes to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Chapter 11-2, regulation 7, Detection und Alarm. Specifically, the subcommittee is recommending to the MSC, in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3.1, the following new text to be added at the end of the paragraphs: "Detectors fitted in cabins, when activated, shall also be capable of emitting, or cause to be emitted, an audible alarm within the space where they are located." While the Safety Board certainly applauds the recommendation by the FP and supports the MSC's adoption later this year, the Board's recommendations go beyond these existing regulations and proposed requirements. The Board's recommendations call for all smoke detectors in accommodation spaces, not just those in passenger and crew staterooms, to sound locally. Because Imperial Majesty Cruise Line has not taken action to implement Safety Recommendations M-00-6 and -7, and M-0 1-9 and - 10, as requested, these recommendations are classified "Closed-Unacceptable Action." With respect to Safety Recommendations M-01-7 and -8, because Imperial Majesty Cruise Lines operates only the 50-year-old Regal Empress, which is not similar in any way to the Carnival's Fantasy Class vessels, these recommendations are classified "Closed-Reconsidered." The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency charged with investigating marine accidents, determining cause and issuing safety recommendations to prevent recurrence of similar accidents. For your information, eight cruise lines (Celebrity Cruises, Crystal Cruises, Disney Cruise Line, Norwegian Cruise Line, Orient Lines, Radisson Seven Seas Cruises, Royal Caribbean International and Royal Olympic) have taken action as requested to implement Safety Recommendations M-0-6 and -7; nine cruise lines (Carnival Corporation, Crystal Cruises, Disney Cruise Line, Norwegian Cruise Line, Orient Lines, P & 0 Princess Cruises International, Radisson Seven Seas Cruises, Royal Caribbean Cruises and Silversea Cruises) have taken action to implement Safety Recommendation M-01-9; and seven cruise lines have implemented Safety Recommendation M-0 1- 10 (Carnival Corporation, Crystal Cruises, Disney Cruise Line, P & 0 Princess Cruises International, Radisson Seven Seas Cruises, Royal Caribbean Cruises and Silversea Cruises). Two cruise lines (Norwegian Cruise Line and Orient Lines) are nearing completion of action to implement Safety Recommendation M-0 1- 10. Should Imperial Majesty Cruise Line reconsider its position, and implement one or all four of the safety recommendations, and inform the Board of this action in a timely manner, we will consider reclassifying these recommendations.

From: Imperial Majesty Cruise Line
To: NTSB
Date: 12/19/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 1/3/2006 2:07:26 PM MC# 2060012 9-17-05: No formal response from Imperial Majesty Cruise Line, so the Board sent a request for information. 10-15-04: We are in receipt of your letter dated September 17, 2004 regarding the safety recommendations on the above referenced vessel, M/v Regal Empress. Imperial Majesty Cruise Line's top priority is Safety and compliance, the M N Regal Empress holding a Bahamas Registry is and has been in full compliance of all safety rules and regulations as allowed by SOLAS and IMO. The Regal Empress has always been found in full compliance with no deficiencies during our routine Flag, Class and Port State Control inspections and surveys Beside the electronic monitors and smoke detectors we also have a very efficient constant Fire Patrol of crew members who are trained in this task. As the contents of your letter have not been in forced by IMO and ICCL we should however use them as a guide line in order to further improve the safety of the ship for both passengers and crew. Andreas Vurdubaltis, Director Marine Operations/ DPA 12-19-05: We are in receipt of your letter dated December 12, 2005 regarding the safety recommendations on the above referenced vessel, M/V Regal Empress. Our standards for the Company are unchanged. For your reference we arc attaching our response to your letter dated September 17, 2004. As always, Imperial Majesty Cruise Line's top priority is Safety and compliance, the M/V Regal Empress holding a Bahamas Registry and Bureau Veritas Class, has successfully passed all Safety Requirements of all rules and regulations implemented by Class, Flag State, USCG, SOLAS and IMO. If you should have any questions or need further information please do not hesitate to contact me. Andreas Vurdubakis, VP Marine Operations/ DPA

From: NTSB
To: Imperial Majesty Cruise Line
Date: 12/12/2005
Response: Safety Recommendations M-01-7 through -10 were issued on May 14, 2001, as a result of the Safety Board's investigation of a fire aboard the passenger ship Ecstasy on July 20, 1998. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you, as the new owner of the Regal Empress, regarding actions taken or planned to implement these recommendations. Please refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letters and related correspondence are enclosed for your reference.

From: NTSB
To: Imperial Majesty Cruise Line
Date: 9/17/2004
Response: The Safety Board is aware that Regal Cruise Lines has ceased operations and is no longer in business and that in 2003 Imperial Majesty Cruise Line purchased the Regal Empress. Accordingly, these safety recommendations are being reassigned to Imperial Majesty Cruise Line for action, as they pertain to material condition and operation of the vessel. While several requests were made, the Safety Board never received any information from Regal Cruise Lines regarding these recommendations. The Safety Board is interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. We would appreciate receiving an update from you, as the new owner of the Regal Empress, regarding actions taken or planned to implement these recommendations.

From: NTSB
To: Norwegian Cruise Line
Date: 10/1/2002
Response: Safety Board staff has learned from contact with your office that qualitative failure analysis techniques were used in the design of the Norwegian Dawn, which is scheduled to enter service in December 2002. Because the NCL Group will receive a class society special notation that requires the use of qualitative failure analysis techniques, and the techniques will also continue to be employed in future designs, Safety Recommendation M-01-9 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Norwegian Cruise Line
To: NTSB
Date: 6/17/2002
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 06/26/2002 7:57:47 AM MC# 2020640 In the modern ship building process, failure analysis techniques are used as an integral part of the ship construction. During this process components and machinery are carefully examined for compliance before installation. The IMO (International Maritime Organization) through the SOLAS convention sets the minimum standards, requiring that a variety of rules and regulations be fulfilled during the construction of a new vessel or how these rules would be applied for an existing vessel. Part of these rules identify the back ups and system components, necessary to maintain the appropriate for the situation safety margins. In relation to this, the vessel incorporates sophisticated safety systems, not only for the mitigation of identified problems but also their early detection. Furthermore, the Administration and vessels' Classification Society examines this process to ensure compliance to all applicable rules and regulations as well as the company's contingency planning in relation to shipboard operations and how these plans effectively address any potential shipboard emergency.

From: Norwegian Cruise Line
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.

From: NTSB
To: Princess Cruise Lines
Date: 6/14/2002
Response: The Safety Board understands that Princess Cruises used qualitative failure analysis in 1994 and that it has an ongoing program of risk analysis for all aspects of its ships that is continuously refined. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-01-9 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Princess Cruise Lines
To: NTSB
Date: 10/30/2001
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 01/29/2002 5:17:42 PM MC# 2020096 In 1994 during the design stages of the 109,000 ton Grand Princess, we commenced a program of risk analysis for new construction and, when applicable, also for our existing ships. This program is an ongoing project. We generally apply these techniques to all aspects of the ship design, not only propulsion , and they are continually adapted and refined with the objective of meeting this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: Princess Cruise Lines
Date: 10/2/2001
Response: The Safety Board requested a response from P&O Princess Cruises International, Ltd., within 90 days, addressing the actions taken or planned to implement the recommendations. To date, the Board has not received your response. The Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all our recommendations. Please address your response to Ms. Marion C. Blakey, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, and refer to the recommendations by number in your response. A copy of the recommendation letter is enclosed for your reference.

From: Princess Cruise Lines
To: NTSB
Date: 6/15/2001
Response: On June 15, 2001, ICCL President Michael Crye advised the Director, Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments, by telephone, that he had been authorized by all but 2 of the cruise lines to respond in their behalf to the Board's recommendations, but that it would take him a few more weeks to get a complete response to the Board. He indicated that he would likely be able to report that action had been taken on three of the four recommendations and that how to accomplish the fourth recommendation was being discussed. It was made clear to Mr. Crye that the Safety Board would like information on the specific actions taken by each cruise line. Mr. Crye requested that he be copied on all NTSB responses to ICCL member cruise lines.