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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation M-05-007
Details
Synopsis: At the time of the accident, the Andrew J. Barberi, owned and operated by the New York City Department of Transportation, was at the end of a regularly scheduled trip from Manhattan to Staten Island, with 15 crewmembers and an estimated 1,500 passengers on board. The assistant captain was at the controls but, for reasons that could not be determined, was unresponsive to cues of the impending allision. Except for one deckhand, the crewmembers also did not recognize that the ferry was in danger. Ten passengers died in the accident and 70 were injured. An eleventh passenger died 2 months later as a result of injuries sustained in the accident. Damages totaled more than $8 million, including repair costs of $6.9 million for the Andrew J. Barberi and $1.4 million for the pier.
Recommendation: TO THE 50 STATES: Encourage your public ferry operators to voluntarily request application of the Federal requirements at 33 CFR 96 for implementing a safety management system, if they have not already done so.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Marine
Location: Bays and Sounds, NY, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA04MM001
Accident Reports:
Allision of Staten Island Ferry Andrew J. Barberi
Report #: MAR-05-01
Accident Date: 10/15/2003
Issue Date: 3/18/2005
Date Closed: 4/24/2009
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: Commonwealth of Kentucky (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Commonwealth of Virginia (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Alabama (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Alaska (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Arizona (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Arkansas (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of California (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Connecticut (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Delaware (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Florida (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Georgia (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Hawaii (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Illinois (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Iowa (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Louisiana (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Maine (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Maryland (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Michigan (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Minnesota (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Mississippi (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Missouri (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Montana (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Nebraska (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of New Hampshire (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of New Jersey (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of New York (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of North Carolina (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Ohio (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Oregon (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Rhode Island (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of South Carolina (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Tennessee (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Texas (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Utah (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Vermont (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Washington (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of West Virginia (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Wisconsin (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Virgin Islands of the United States (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Safety Management Systems

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: State of Hawaii
Date: 9/27/2005
Response: The Safety Board notes that Hawaii supports the SMS, has provided ferry operators in the State with a link to the Safety Board's Web site to provide them with information on the accident and the Board's findings and will notify each of the operators of existing and proposed ferries in the State of the content of the recommendation. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-07 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: State of Hawaii
To: NTSB
Date: 8/11/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 8/18/2005 11:48:02 AM MC# 2050382 Thank you for your fax dated March 18, 2005 regarding the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) recommendation made regarding the Andrew J. Barberi collision New York City. The resultant injuries and loss of lives are indeed a tragedy. We appreciate the NTSB's research into the incident and the recommendations set forth in your document. In support of your recommendation, we will notify each existing or proposed ferry operators in the State of Hawaii of the NTSB's recommendations to: ". . . voluntarily request application of the Federal requirements at 33 CFR 96 for implementing a safety management system, ..." We have provided ferry operators in Hawaii with the link to your website to provide them with further information of the incident and its findings. While we recognize that the safety management systems are not mandatory, we hope that through the efforts of the NTSB, the U.S. Coast Guard, and respective State administrations, greater number of ferry operators will volunteer to meet the standards and have their safety management systems certified. Barry Fukunaga, Deputy Director of Harbors

From: NTSB
To: Virgin Islands of the United States
Date: 12/14/2006
Response: On August 8, 2006, Safety Board staff contacted Mr. Brin and learned that (1) the Territory does not own or operate any ferries and (2) those that do operate in the islands are privately owned and under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Coast Guard. Further, the Port Authority owns the docks that commercial vessels use, including the inter-island ferries. The Board notes that the Port Authority utilizes a form of an SMS for its shoreside operations and that, although the Port Authority does not have regulatory authority, it will promote the concept of SMS with the ferry operators. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M 05-7 is classified Closed Acceptable Action.

From: Virgin Islands of the United States
To: NTSB
Date: 5/25/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 8/2/2006 2:47:06 PM MC# 2060370:Email of the USVI Port Authority letter of 5-25-05 received from Mr. Brin’s office this date, we never received a letter from the USVI, that is why we sent NMC102844 on 7-14-06. In response to your directive to review and respond to correspondence transmitted to you from the National Transportation Safety Board (Safety Board), I respectfully submit the following for your consideration. The correspondence transmitted from the Safety Board addresses issues concerning Safety Management Regulations for vessels as found In 33 Code of Federal Regulations Part 96 and discussion of the possible mandatory imposition of said regulations on passenger ferry vessels plying the domestic waters of the territory. One of the powers vested in the Virgin Islands Port Authority, Is the authority to control the harbors of the United States Virgin Islands other than controlling the mooring and anchoring of certain size vessels and not the regulation of vessel safety. However, as a responsible public corporate entity managing harbors and waterfront facilities we are aware of the mechanisms in place for the safety of the ferry vessel passengers who embark and disembark from our facilities onto these vessels, but the safe operations of such vessel rest with the U. S. Coast Guard. Therefore, respectfully on behalf on the Virgin Islands Port Authority, I would advise consideration of comments/concerns from the owners/operators of territorial passenger ferry vessels before submittal of your final recommendation(s) to the Safety Board. Sincerely, Darlan Brin, Executive Director

From: NTSB
To: State of Illinois
Date: 4/24/2009
Response: On July 14, 2006, and again on January 22, 2008, the Safety Board sent letters requesting information on what action, if any, had been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7. To date, the Safety Board has not received any information from the «Company» regarding what, if anything has been done to address this important safety issue. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. Because the Safety Board has been unable to confirm that the «Company» has completed action on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Unacceptable Action/No Response Received. Should the Board receive a timely response indicating action taken or planned to address this recommendation, we will consider reevaluating its classification.

From: NTSB
To: State of Illinois
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. A copy of the Safety Board’s March 18, 2005, and July 14, 2006, letters are enclosed for your review. If we do not receive a response from you, we will have no choice but to close the recommendation in an unacceptable status. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

From: NTSB
To: State of Illinois
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Maryland
Date: 6/27/2005
Response: The Safety Board understands that the State of Maryland does not regulate issues of passenger ferry safety operating in the State and that these waterborne businesses operate under jurisdiction of the U.S. Coast Guard. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified "Closed--Reconsidered."

From: State of Maryland
To: NTSB
Date: 4/15/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 4/19/2005 1:13:46 PM MC# 2050163 Thank you for your letter to Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., regarding safety management systems on passenger ferries (reference number M-05-07). The Governor has requested that I respond on his behalf. The state does not regulate issues of passenger ferry safety. The operators of these water-bourne businesses operate under parameters of the United States Coast Guard. You may contact Captain Curt Springer, Commanding Officer at the local office of the United State Coast Guard, Activities Baltimore, He can be reached at 410-576-2638. If you have any additional questions or would like to discuss this matter further, I can be reached at 410 865-1000. Sincerely, Robert L. Flanagan, Secretary MDOT

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Date: 4/24/2009
Response: On July 14, 2006, and again on January 22, 2008, the Safety Board sent letters requesting information on what action, if any, had been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7. To date, the Safety Board has not received any information from the «Company» regarding what, if anything has been done to address this important safety issue. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. Because the Safety Board has been unable to confirm that the «Company» has completed action on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified CLOSED—UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED. Should the Board receive a timely response indicating action taken or planned to address this recommendation, we will consider reevaluating its classification.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. A copy of the Safety Board’s March 18, 2005, and July 14, 2006, letters are enclosed for your review. If we do not receive a response from you, we will have no choice but to close the recommendation in an unacceptable status. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Date: 6/2/2008
Response: The Safety Board understands that there are presently two private ferry transportation companies operating MBTA public ferry routes within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Boston Harbor Cruises and Water Transportation Alternatives. The Board is pleased that the MBTA’s safety department will review the safety plans for both operations in the context of 33 CFR Part 96 to identify areas in which the respective safety plans can be improved and that the MBTA will urge them to comply voluntarily with the requirements of the regulation. The Board is aware that the Steamship Authority that operates several large ferries from Cape Cod to the Islands of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket has had SMS systems in place for several years. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: Commonwealth of Massachusetts
To: NTSB
Date: 2/28/2008
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 3/5/2008 11:07:01 AM MC# 2080105:On behalf of Governor Deval Patrick and the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), thank you for your correspondence of January 22,2008, addressing Safety Recommendation M-05-7 which states, Encourage your public ferry operators to voluntarily request application of the Federal requirements at 33 (Code of Federal Regulations) CFR 96 for implementing a safety management system, if they have not already done so. Presently, Boston Harbor Cruises and Water Transportation Alternatives, our two (2) private ferry transportation companies that operate MBTA public ferry routes, have safety and emergency plans in place. As a result of your letter, the Safety Department is reviewing their safety plans in the context of 33 CFR 96 to identify areas in which the respective safety plans can be immediately improved upon. We will emphasize to the carriers that NTSB wants them to voluntarily comply with 33CFR 96. Our initial plan review indicates that both private carriers have been complying with the NTSB recommendations; however we will formally review all documentation, including material contained on the vessels to ensure that we have an equivalent plan in place. To that end, we will encourage our ferry operators to voluntarily request application of the United States Coast Guard to have their safety management plans certificated. Daniel A. Grabauskas, General Manager, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Ten Park Plaza, Boston, MA 02116-3974

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. A copy of the Safety Board’s March 18, 2005, and July 14, 2006, letters are enclosed for your review. If we do not receive a response from you, we will have no choice but to close the recommendation in an unacceptable status. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Mississippi
Date: 4/24/2009
Response: On July 14, 2006, and again on January 22, 2008, the Safety Board sent letters requesting information on what action, if any, had been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7. To date, the Safety Board has not received any information from the «Company» regarding what, if anything has been done to address this important safety issue. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. Because the Safety Board has been unable to confirm that the «Company» has completed action on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Unacceptable Action/No Response Received. Should the Board receive a timely response indicating action taken or planned to address this recommendation, we will consider reevaluating its classification.

From: NTSB
To: State of Mississippi
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. A copy of the Safety Board’s March 18, 2005, and July 14, 2006, letters are enclosed for your review. If we do not receive a response from you, we will have no choice but to close the recommendation in an unacceptable status. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

From: NTSB
To: State of Mississippi
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Connecticut
Date: 8/19/2009
Response: Mr. Marie fully explained that the ferry operations that transit Long Island Sound and Fisher's Island Sound are privately owned and operate exclusively under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Coast Guard; Connecticut exercises no authority over these operations. The NTSB notes that the state oversees two public ferries on the Connecticut River, the Rocky Hill to Glastonbury route and the Chester to Hadlyme route, and both ferries have written standard operation procedures that establish requirements similar to the SMS requirements outlined in 33 CFR Part 96 and include preventive maintenance, training, and record-keeping. Because Connecticut’s pubic ferry operators had a form of SMS already established and Connecticut does not exercise any authority to regulate the cross-sound ferries, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Reconsidered.

From: State of Connecticut
To: NTSB
Date: 5/14/2009
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 5/28/2009 4:05:53 PM MC# 2090330: Governor M. Jodi Rell has asked me to respond to your letter dated April 24, 2009 regarding the implementation of the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) Safety Recommendation M-05-7 for the public ferries in the State of Connecticut (State). The larger ferry operations that transit Long Island Sound and Fisher's Island Sound are privately owned. They are not public operated ferries as defined in 33 CFR 96 or the NTSB Marine Accident Report MAR-05/01. Therefore, they do not fall under the purview of any State statute, regulation, or agency in Connecticut. The only publicly owned ferry operations for which the State oversees are two Connecticut River ferries. The Rocky-Hill/Glastonbury Ferry is a tug (M/V CUMBERLAND) and barge (HOLLISTER Ill) that provides a direct link between Rocky Hill and Glastonbury at Route I60 across a 0.5 mile wide spot in the Connecticut River. The barge can accommodate three cars and twenty passengers per transit. The Chester/Hadlyme Ferry (M/V SELDEN 111) is a standard double ended ferryboat that provides a direct link between Chester and Hadlyme at Route 148 across a 0.5 mile wide spot in the lower Connecticut River. The MN SELDEN III can accommodate nine cars, and as many as forty-nine passengers. Both of these ferries run seasonally (spring through fall), during limited hours. The schedule for the Rocky Hill/Glastonbury Ferry is Tuesday through Friday, 7:00 a.m. - 6:45 pm., it is closed on Mondays, and 10:30 a.m. - 5:00 p.m., Saturday and Sunday. The Chester/Hadlyme Ferry runs Monday through Friday, 7:00 a.m. - 6:45 p.m., and also 10:30 a.m. - 500 p.m., Saturday and Sunday. Each ferry has written Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) that cover emergency evolutions and situations. Both ferries have a crew of five who participate in a host of professional training and safety awareness programs during the off-season. The certification of participation in a voluntary safety management system recommended by the NTSB comes at a considerable expense. The SOP and safety awareness programs in place for the Connecticut River ferries meet the intent of the NTSB safety management system. As the State does not oversee privately owned coastal ferries, it is requested that the NTSB classify Safety Recommendation M-05-7 for Connecticut as closed.

From: NTSB
To: State of Connecticut
Date: 4/24/2009
Response: On July 14, 2006, and again on January 22, 2008, the Safety Board sent letters requesting information on what action, if any, had been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7. To date, the Safety Board has not received any information from the «Company» regarding what, if anything has been done to address this important safety issue. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. Because the Safety Board has been unable to confirm that the «Company» has completed action on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Unacceptable Action/No Response Received. Should the Board receive a timely response indicating action taken or planned to address this recommendation, we will consider reevaluating its classification.

From: NTSB
To: State of Connecticut
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested.

From: NTSB
To: State of Connecticut
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Iowa
Date: 12/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is pleased to learn that, although there are no ferries operating under the jurisdiction of the State at present, Iowa would encourage voluntary implementation of an SMS for any ferries that come under the State’s jurisdiction in the future. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M 05 7 is classified Closed Reconsidered.

From: State of Iowa
To: NTSB
Date: 8/14/2006
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 8/22/2006 10:44:07 AM MC# 2060419: Staff in the office of Governor Thomas J. Vilsack asked the Department of Transportation to respond to your July 14 letter concerning Iowa’s lack of response to Safety Recommendation M 05 07. This recommendation encourages public ferry operators to voluntary request application of Federal requirements for implanting a safety management system. The State of Iowa does not own or operate any ferryboats. Iowa has only one ferryboat serving our state at this time, and it is based in another state. When or if other ferry operations begin in Iowa, we will certainly encourage safe operations and voluntary compliance to Safety Recommendation M-05-07. Sincerely, Nancy J. Richardson, Director, IA DOT

From: NTSB
To: State of Iowa
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Arkansas
Date: 12/13/2006
Response: Because the Arkansas State Highway Commission’s inspection of the Peel Ferry, the only ferry operation in the State, included the mandatory equivalency of an SMS as outlined in 33 CFR Part 96 prior to the Safety Board’s issuing its recommendation, Safety Recommendation M 05 7 is classified Closed Reconsidered.

From: State of Arkansas
To: NTSB
Date: 8/17/2006
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 8/25/2006 8:07:40 AM MC# 2060425: Reference is made to the National Transportation Safety Board’s recent letter addressing Safety Recommendation M-05-7 concerning the AHTD’s Ferry operation. Our sole Ferry crosses Bull Shoals Lake on Highway 125 North of Peel, Arkansas at the Missouri border. This Ferry operation has one barge and tug in operation during daylight hours, 7 days a week, with an additional barge and tug in reserve for down time maintenance. The Ferry has a total of 7 crewmembers with 3 (supervisor, deck hand, and pilot) on duty during operational hours. The operation is non-commercial and averages 30 trips per day (15 round trips) and carries 2 vehicles each trip on average. No other vehicles are allowed to cross when a fuel tanker truck is transported. The weight limitation is 25 tons and the Ferry does not operate in high winds or fog. The Ferry has an excellent service and safety record over the years of its operation with one minor chargeable accident in 25 years of operation. In 1998, the Coast Guard ruled that the Ferry was non-commercial and of such small operation, that they were no longer required to do annual inspections. Two engineers from our Maintenance Division were trained by the Coast Guard in 1998 to perform the inspection and now inspect the Peel Ferry annually. The annual inspection results in the issuance of a Memo to the District, which serves as an AHTD Certification of Inspection and includes a list of any deficiencies. During the annual inspection, all aspects of the safety and maintenance operations are reviewed. Every five years the Ferry is dry-docked and inspected by two structural engineers. There is a written Inspection Procedure and Diary of Inspections on record and the AHTD takes great pride in the very personal operation of this Ferry. All Ferry employees hold regular safety meetings and are subject to the Department’s random drug testing policy. A general walk around safety inspection is performed daily and an in-depth inspection performed monthly. It is for these reasons that the AHTD believes that a voluntary application of the Federal requirements at 33 [Code of Federal Regulations] CFR 96 for implementing a safety management system based on that required by the Coast Guard for ocean going vessels in U.S. waters, should not be applied to the Peel Ferry operation. Dan Flowers, Director of Highways and Transportation

From: NTSB
To: State of Arkansas
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Rhode Island
Date: 8/19/2009
Response: The NTSB understands that, although Rhode Island does not exercise any authority over public ferry operators, the state contacted the Interstate Navigation Company, the ferry operator that services Block Island, and recommend that it consider voluntarily implementing an SMS. The NTSB is disappointed that Interstate Navigation Company rejected the recommendation, maintaining that compliance with current U.S. Coast Guard regulations (which do not require an SMS) sufficiently addresses the substance of the recommendation. Nonetheless, because Rhode Island took action as requested, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Acceptable Action.

From: State of Rhode Island
To: NTSB
Date: 5/13/2009
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 5/29/2009 9:49:39 AM MC# 2090332:This letter is in response to your most recent correspondence regarding any actions taken by the State of Rhode Island relative to the implementation of the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) Safety Recommendation M-05-7. Specifically, your letter indicates that because the NTSB has been unable to confirm that the State of Rhode Island has completed action on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified ‘Closed - Unacceptable ActionNo Response Received. However, I would like to inform you that Rhode Island has taken action in response to NTSB’s Safety Recommendation and respectfully request that this classification be reconsidered. Safety Recommendation M-05-7 seeks encouragement for ferry operators to "volunturily" request application of the Federal requirements at 33 [Code of Federal Regulations] CFR 96 for implementing a safety management system, if they have not done so. Please be advised that in response to the NTSB’s January 22,2008 correspondence, the State regulatory agency charged with overseeing intrastate ferry operations in Rhode Island, the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers (DPUC), contacted the dominant intrastate ferry carrier in the State regarding this recommendation and forwarded the NTSB correspondence. In response to the DPUC’s encouragement, please find enclosed a February 27,2008 letter from Mr. Joshua P. Linda, Vice President of Interstate Navigation Company, which provides intrastate ferry service from mainland Rhode Island to the Town of New Shoreham on Block Island, 12 miles off the Rhode Island coast in Block Island Sound. Mr. Linda’s response indicates that his company has a long-standing working relationship with the US. Coast Guard and complies with all requirements for intrastate ferry operations, including the receipt of a Certificate of Inspection for each of their vessels from the Coast Guard.

From: NTSB
To: State of Rhode Island
Date: 4/24/2009
Response: On July 14, 2006, and again on January 22, 2008, the Safety Board sent letters requesting information on what action, if any, had been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7. To date, the Safety Board has not received any information from the «Company» regarding what, if anything has been done to address this important safety issue. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. Because the Safety Board has been unable to confirm that the «Company» has completed action on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Unacceptable Action/No Response Received. Should the Board receive a timely response indicating action taken or planned to address this recommendation, we will consider reevaluating its classification.

From: NTSB
To: State of Rhode Island
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. A copy of the Safety Board’s March 18, 2005, and July 14, 2006, letters are enclosed for your review. If we do not receive a response from you, we will have no choice but to close the recommendation in an unacceptable status. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

From: NTSB
To: State of Rhode Island
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Ohio
Date: 4/24/2009
Response: On July 14, 2006, and again on January 22, 2008, the Safety Board sent letters requesting information on what action, if any, had been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7. To date, the Safety Board has not received any information from the «Company» regarding what, if anything has been done to address this important safety issue. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. Because the Safety Board has been unable to confirm that the «Company» has completed action on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Unacceptable Action/No Response Received. Should the Board receive a timely response indicating action taken or planned to address this recommendation, we will consider reevaluating its classification.

From: NTSB
To: State of Ohio
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. A copy of the Safety Board’s March 18, 2005, and July 14, 2006, letters are enclosed for your review. If we do not receive a response from you, we will have no choice but to close the recommendation in an unacceptable status. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

From: NTSB
To: State of Ohio
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Washington
Date: 9/6/2005
Response: The Safety Board is pleased that the State of Washington supports the recommendation and understands that since 1998, Washington State Ferries has had an SMS in place that meets the requirements of the International Safety Management Code and has been certified by the U.S. Coast Guard. The Board further notes that Washington State Ferries is implementing a fleetwide internal audit procedure. Because this practice predates the issuance of Safety Recommendation M-05-07, this recommendation is classified "Closed--Reconsidered."

From: State of Washington
To: NTSB
Date: 7/8/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 7/20/2005 9:51:04 AM MC# 2050348 Washington State Ferries began implementing a safety management system in 1998. In 2002, the U.S. Coast Guard approved the system as satisfying the Shipboard Safety Management and Contingency Plan standards found at 45 CFR 1999.650(f)(2). All federally mandated security procedures and protocols were incorporated into the system in 2004. This year, the ferry system is implementing a fleet-wide internal safety audit procedure. Once that work is completed, Washington State Ferries expects to explore the feasibility of applying for voluntary certification under 33 CFR Part 36 (Title). Washington State Ferries is widely recognized as a leader in ferry system operations and safety practices. As just one example, shortly after the Andrew J. Barbieri accident in New York Harbor, the New York City Department of Transportation contacted Washington State Ferries to obtain materials to assist in improving the city's marine operations safety practices. If you would like additional information about the ferry system program, please do not hesitate to contact Washington State Ferries Executive Director Mike Anderson at (206) 515-3400.

From: NTSB
To: State of Delaware
Date: 4/24/2009
Response: On July 14, 2006, and again on January 22, 2008, the Safety Board sent letters requesting information on what action, if any, had been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7. To date, the Safety Board has not received any information from the «Company» regarding what, if anything has been done to address this important safety issue. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. Because the Safety Board has been unable to confirm that the «Company» has completed action on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Unacceptable Action/No Response Received. Should the Board receive a timely response indicating action taken or planned to address this recommendation, we will consider reevaluating its classification.

From: NTSB
To: State of Delaware
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. A copy of the Safety Board’s March 18, 2005, and July 14, 2006, letters are enclosed for your review. If we do not receive a response from you, we will have no choice but to close the recommendation in an unacceptable status. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

From: NTSB
To: State of Delaware
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of California
Date: 8/24/2005
Response: Safety Board staff discussed this recommendation with Mr. Sri Balasubramanian of your staff, and learned that the State of California plans to encourage the adoption of a Safety Management System in accordance with the Federal requirements stated in 33 CFR 96. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-07 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: State of California
To: NTSB
Date: 5/20/2005
Response: Mr. Mike Brown, I have been asked by Steve Takigawa to respond to your E-mail regarding NTSB Safety Recommendation M-05-07. We are currently in the process of comparing our Safety Management System of our Ferry Boats with the regulations of 33CFR96. Even through we only have a couple of relatively low capacity Ferry Boats in service, the safety of the passengers and our employees is important. We support the safety recommendation in your letter and plan to encourage the adoption of a Safety Management System as stated in your letter and 33CFR96. Sri Balasubramanian

From: State of California
To: NTSB
Date: 5/9/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 5/9/2005 1:56:08 PM MC# 2050192 We are in receipt of your letter requesting our voluntary implementation of a safety management system in accordance with "Rules for the Safe Operation of Vessels and Safety Management Systems," Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations Part 96. We are in the process of comparing those regulations with our current operating procedures for our Ferry Boats and will take the necessary actions to insure our fleet is operating as safely as practical. We fully support your interests in improving the safety of transportation and appreciate your recommendation on this matter. If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me at 916-654-5849. Steve Takigawa, Chief Division of Maintenance

From: NTSB
To: State of New Jersey
Date: 9/7/2005
Response: The Safety Board notes that the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has forwarded a copy of 33 CFR 96 to its private ferry operators under contract, with a recommendation that operators implement an SMS. In addition, the Port Authority, as a member of the New York Harbor United States Coast, Harbor Operations Committee Water Transit Subcommittee, will request that information on 33 CFR Part 96 be distributed to the committee membership, which includes additional private ferry and pleasure tour operators. The Board further understands that the Port Authority will follow up with the recipients to determine the level of interest in applying 33 CFR 96 to their operations. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-07 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: State of New Jersey
To: NTSB
Date: 7/11/2005
Response: Following your letter and recommendation, we have forwarded information regarding 33 CFR Part 96 (Rules for the Safe Operation of Vessels and Safety Management Systems) to the private ferry operators currently under contract to the Port Authority for their voluntary application. In addition, as a member of the NY Harbor United States Coast, Harbor Operations Committee Water Transit Subcommittee, we will request that information on 33 CFR Part 96 be distributed to that membership, which includes additional private ferry and pleasure tour operators. We will follow up with the recipients to determine their level of interest in applying 33 CFR Part 96 to their operation. Please contact me directly if you require any information regarding the Port Authority's efforts to maintain and expand NY harbor private ferry services at: 212-435-7000.

From: NTSB
To: State of Maine
Date: 12/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is pleased to learn that the Maine Department of Transportation is working with a marine safety consulting firm to develop and implement (by late 2007 or early 2008) a comprehensive SMS for the Maine State Ferry System. This effort on the part of the State, in addition to its other actions to encourage ferry operators to implement SMS, constitutes an acceptable means of addressing this recommendation. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M 05 7 is classified Closed Acceptable Action. We commend the State of Maine for its proactive commitment to marine safety. The Safety Board would appreciate being informed when the SMS for the Maine State Ferry System has been implemented and would also appreciate receiving a copy of the SMS manual. Thank you for your assistance.

From: State of Maine
To: NTSB
Date: 8/17/2006
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 8/29/2006 8:22:15 AM MC# 2060428:We at the Maine Department of Transportation (MaineDOT) have followed with keen interest the investigation of the tragic accident involving the Andrew J. Barberi in Staten Island and the NTSB’s reports and recommendations resulting from that investigation. We are committed to the safe operation of the Maine State Ferry Service (MSFS) and are in full agreement that a Safety Management System would enhance the safety of that service. MaineDOT has operated the MSFS for over forty years and we are proud of the safety record of the service. In that time frame we have administered safety management through MSFS & MaineDOT policies and management. We also utilize the MaineDOT Safety Team, a group of safety professionals, to conduct frequent safety audits for the MSFS. While we have not experienced a serious marine casualty or accident in that time span, we also recognize that there is always room for improvement. To that end, we are presently teaming with a marine safety consulting firm, based here in the State of Maine, with the goal of developing and implementing a comprehensive Safety Management System (SMS) for the MSFS. Coincidentally, this is the same consulting firm that is assisting the NYC Department of Transportation with the development of their SMS. The target date for full implementation of the SMS for the Maine State Ferry Service is late 2007/early 2008. Again, thank you for your recommendation and your interest in the safe operation of ferries here in the State of Maine. Please feel free to contact me should you require further information. Sincerely, David A. Cole, Commissioner. cc: Governor John E. Baldacci

From: NTSB
To: State of Maine
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Wisconsin
Date: 7/28/2005
Response: The Safety Board notes that the Wisconsin Secretary of Transportation, Mr. Frank Busalacchi, has indicated that he will encourage the operators of Wisconsin's ferry, which runs in Merrimac, Wisconsin, to consider applying the Federal requirements at 33 CFR 96 to implement a safety management system. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: State of Wisconsin
To: NTSB
Date: 5/12/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 5/24/2005 11:17:14 AM MC# 2050214 I have spoken with Wisconsin Department of Transportation (WisDOT) Secretary Frank Busalacchi regarding this issue. Secretary Busalacchi has informed me that he will pass along the information contained in your letter to the operators of Wisconsin's ferry, which runs in Merrimac, Wisconsin. They will seriously consider your recommendations. I appreciate hearing about your concerns. If you have further questions regarding these safety measures, please don't hesitate to contact John Vesperman, WisDOT-DTD 1 at 2101 Wright Street, Madison, WI 53704.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Virginia
Date: 12/13/2006
Response: Because an SMS that follows the abovementioned Federal requirements is being implemented on the Jamestown-Scotland ferry and VDOT staff confirmed that safety management concepts are promoted and encouraged throughout the Commonwealth’s ferry system, Safety Recommendation M 05-7 is classified Closed Acceptable Action.

From: Commonwealth of Virginia
To: NTSB
Date: 8/17/2006
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 8/21/2006 2:50:25 PM MC# 2060416: Governor Kaine has asked me to thank you for and respond to your letter concerning the voluntary implementation of a Safety Management System at the publicly operated ferries within the Commonwealth of Virginia. Virginia has fully implemented your safety recommendation M-05-7. The Commonwealth’s largest publicly operated ferry system, the Jamestown-Scotland Ferry, is working on a Safety Management System. Ferry management has prepared a Safety Management System Manual, that is ready for third party review. The Manual gathers many policies and procedures already in place, and puts in print other practices that were being done by custom. Following the guidelines of 33 CFR Part 96, they have also incorporated other safety management features that are applicable to this operation. The best safety practices discussed in the Manual have already been put in place. The Commonwealth and the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) are committed to creating a culture of safety on the ferries and all forms of transportation. I hope that this information is helpful, thank you again for writing to Governor Kaine. Pierce R. Homer, SEC. VADOT.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Virginia
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Kentucky
Date: 12/14/2006
Response: Mr. Hazlette advised the Safety Board that the Kentucky Department of Transportation fully supports the recommendation and is encouraging voluntary implementation of an SMS on all ferries operating within the Commonwealth. The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet Division of Planning is contacting ferry operators and providing a link on its Web site to 33 CFR Part 96, emphasizing the Board’s recommendation. These actions satisfy the recommendation; accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: Commonwealth of Kentucky
To: NTSB
Date: 7/28/2006
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 8/8/2006 2:47:00 PM MC# 2060393:Governor Fletcher has asked that I respond to your request dated July 14, 2006, regarding NTSB Safety Recommendation M-05-7. The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet Division of Planning is responsible for the oversight of ferry operations in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. They are currently contacting ferry operation and providing a website link to 33 CFR 96, noting that this effort is voluntary, however, strongly suggested by the National Transportation Safety Board. Please let me know if we can be of further assistance. Sincerely, Tim Hazlette, Commissioner, Kentucky Department of Transportation Safety

From: Commonwealth of Kentucky
To: NTSB
Date: 7/21/2006
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 8/1/2006 9:03:30 AM MC# 2060381 -From Byllie Ogunsanya, Office of the Governor, Constituent Services: Thank you for your correspondence to the Governor's Office regarding your request for an update on what the state has done regarding the Safety Recommendation M-05-7. We appreciate your taking the time to bring this issue to our attention. In order to give this matter the attention it deserves, I have shared a copy of your correspondence with the Transportation Cabinet and have asked them to provide additional information to you in a timely manner.

From: NTSB
To: State of Utah
Date: 5/2/2007
Response: Safety Board staff contacted Mr. Kirkham to discuss what Utah has done to encourage the implementation of an SMS for the Charles Hall ferry. Mr. Kirkham indicated that the vessel is owned by UDOT and operated by a contract company that also supplies the crews. Staff also learned that the vessel is operated under the jurisdiction of U.S. Coast Guard regulations and that UDOT has forwarded a copy of the Board’s March 18, 2005, letter to the contract operating company for their information and consideration. Mr. Kirkham further explained that while not so exacting as the recommended Federal requirements, the UDOT contract requires the operator to maintain management, operational, and maintenance records; in addition, various safety programs, procedures, and practices are in place that are updated as the need arises. These actions satisfy the intent of the recommendation; accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Acceptable Action.

From: State of Utah
To: NTSB
Date: 10/20/2006
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 1/3/2007 9:29:40 AM MC# 2060615:The Utah Department of Transportation operates the Charles Hall as a ferry across Lake Powell, between Halls Crossing Marina and Bullfrog Manna. The U.S. Coast Guard and the National Park Service, under whose direction the ferry is operated, have reviewed the safety operation procedures of this ferry. The conclusion of these reviews was that the current safety procedures are adequate for the operation of the Charles Hall. Safety of the passengers and the vessel are of primary concern and are foremost in all aspects of the ferry operation. Safety programs and procedures will continue to be reviewed and updated during the annual Coast Guard inspections and recertification of the Charles Hall. Sincerely, Hugh P. Kirkham, PE, Price District Engineer, Price District Office, 940 South Carbon Avenue, Price, Utah 845014368 telephone 435-636-1470 facsimile 435-636-1471 www.udot.utah.gov

From: NTSB
To: State of Utah
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Nebraska
Date: 4/24/2009
Response: On July 14, 2006, and again on January 22, 2008, the Safety Board sent letters requesting information on what action, if any, had been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7. To date, the Safety Board has not received any information from the «Company» regarding what, if anything has been done to address this important safety issue. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. Because the Safety Board has been unable to confirm that the «Company» has completed action on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Unacceptable Action/No Response Received. Should the Board receive a timely response indicating action taken or planned to address this recommendation, we will consider reevaluating its classification.

From: NTSB
To: State of Nebraska
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. A copy of the Safety Board’s March 18, 2005, and July 14, 2006, letters are enclosed for your review. If we do not receive a response from you, we will have no choice but to close the recommendation in an unacceptable status. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

From: NTSB
To: State of Nebraska
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Florida
Date: 7/26/2005
Response: The Safety Board understands that the Florida Department of Transportation will encourage Florida's public ferry owners and operators to request application of the Federal requirements found in Title 33 CFR Part 96 for developing and implementing a safety management system. The Board further notes that Florida has developed a series of recommendations, which it provides, along with a copy of 33 CFR 96, to ferry operators. Thank you for providing us with a copy of those materials. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 to the State of Florida is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action"

From: State of Florida
To: NTSB
Date: 5/5/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 5/24/2005 11:19:20 AM MC# 2050217

From: NTSB
To: State of North Carolina
Date: 7/26/2005
Response: The Safety Board notes that, over the past 10 years, the North Carolina Ferry Division has developed a safety management system that complies with 33 CFR 96. Because this practice predates the issuance of Safety Recommendation M-05-7, this recommendation is classified "Closed--Reconsidered."

From: State of North Carolina
To: NTSB
Date: 6/7/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 6/16/2005 3:25:13 PM MC# 2050250 Governor Easley asked that I respond to your request for information regarding compliance with 33 CFR 96, which addresses a Safety Management System for the North Carolina Ferry Division. Although this system is not required at this time, we have an established system in place to ensure that North Carolina remains a leader in ferry safety. The National Transportation Safety Board requires that a Safety Management System include the following: · Provisions for safe practices in vessel operation and a safe work environment onboard the vessels; · Establishment and implementation of safeguards against all identified risks; · Establishment and implementation of actions to continuously improve safety management skills of personnel onshore and aboard vessels, including preparation for emergencies related to both safety and environmental protection; and · Compliance with mandatory rules and regulations, taking into account relevant national and international regulations, standards, codes and maritime industry guidelines when developing procedures and policies for the Safety Management System. Over the past 10 years, the North Carolina Ferry Division has compiled numerous manuals and training aids to address the requirements listed above. Although these manuals are not compiled into one document, we require that they be stored on every vessel and regularly reviewed by our employees. We believe that, by keeping these documents separate, it is quicker and easier to locate information pertaining to a particular subject. These documents include the following: · The Ferry Division Policies and Procedures Manual - This document addresses chain of authority, reporting of casualties, security patrols, public access, HAZMAT/Spill response, United States Coast Guard (USCG) Self Inspection Program requirements, Emergency Response Plan and Training Guide, and many other subjects addressing safety and preparedness. · Joint Vessel/Facility Security Plan - This document was the first of its type in the country to be approved by the USCG and addresses many subjects related to Homeland Security. These items include the qualification and responsibilities of vessel/facility personnel, chain of command, drill training/exercises/record keeping, MARSEC Level coordination and implementation, actions for MARSEC Levels, Facility and Vessel Security Reports, Vessel/Facility Layouts, and Bomb Threat guidelines. · Post Incident Response Manual - This document provides guidelines for the necessary response to marine, facility, environmental and/or security casualties. In addition to these documents, the Ferry Division conducts weekly man-overboard and fire response drills. Employees also conduct constant security patrols and vehicle screenings. Ferry Division employees are also required to attend Level 1 and Level 2 Security Training, which includes threat recognition, bomb response, agency coordination and other details related to Homeland Security measures. The Ferry Division will also participate in a multi-agency, anti-terrorism drill on August 17, 2005, the first of its kind in the state. Known as the "North Carolina Regional Homeland Security/Force Protection Exercise 2005," the joint civilian/military exercise will include local, state and federal organizations as well as military installations in Eastern and Central North Carolina. Ferry Division Security Coordinators have been an integral part of the planning process, which began in early 2004. The drill will demonstrate regional response capability, assess communication abilities and provide an opportunity to evaluate crisis response effectiveness in these areas. It will include the use of a ferry vessel and employees will take part in a simulated bomb occurrence. Currently the Ferry Division is working with the North Carolina Office of State Personnel to develop a Senior Deck Hand job classification. The duties of this classification will include the ability to assume control of the vessel in the event of the Captain becoming incapacitated and unable to operate the ferry. This will include the navigation of the vessel to the nearest port and the implementation of emergency procedures. Passenger and crew safety is paramount in the fulfillment of the Ferry Division's mission. We have ensured that our vessels are fitted with USCG approved equipment and are regularly maintained and evaluated for their compliance. We also do everything possible to ensure that our crews receive thorough training in all areas pertaining to safety and are regularly drilled to ensure proficiency. We strive to ensure that we not only meet all federal and state requirements, but exceed them whenever possible. We hope that this information assures you that we hold high standards for public safety. We are open to input and recommendations on further improvements and continue to strive for increased vigilance from within, Please feel free to contact Jerry Gaskill, Director of the Ferry Division, at (252) 726-1380 for additional information.

From: NTSB
To: State of Alaska
Date: 7/28/2005
Response: The Safety Board understands that since 1997, the Alaska Marine Highway System has had a safety management system in place that meets the more rigorous requirements of the International Safety Management Code. Because this practice predates the issuance of Safety Recommendation M-05-7, this recommendation is classified "Closed--Reconsidered."

From: State of Alaska
To: NTSB
Date: 5/31/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 6/16/2005 2:06:30 PM MC# 2050249 The AK DOT had Capt John Falvey AMHs GM send a 4-27-05 letter on what the AMH does with SMS: The Alaska Marine Highway System has maintained a Safety Management System since 1997. This Safety Management System is set forth in eleven manuals. These manuals explain in simple terms the safety and operational requirements practiced by AMHS - incorporating the International Safety Management Code. They are maintained aboard every AMHS vessel and with key shoreside personnel und are specifically tailored to the operation of the Alaska Marine Highway System. The AMHS Safety Management System clearly defines the Master's responsibilities and authority which was a concern of the NTSB. The manuals cover such topics as Safety Management, Safety Management Procedures, Crew Safety Training, Occupational Safety and Health, Bridge Practices, Ship Operations, Operational Checklists and Forms, Cargo Handling, Emergency Manual and Emergency Checklists and Forms. In addition, AMHS Fast Ferries maintain a spec& high-speed craft safety management system manual The AMHS also utilizes an outside classification society, "American Bureau of Shipping," which performs external audits to ensure that all regulatory requirements of the vessels and shoreside operations are adhered to. A recent external audit of the AMHS resulted in the re-issuance of a "Document of Compliance" from the American Bureau of Shipping. This document is, effectively, our license to operate. Each AMHS vessel that is required to comply with the ISM code has also been issued a Safety Management Certificate from this classification society. The AMHS has a full-time International Safety Management Coordinator that oversees this very important program. This coordinator oversees the revisions and updates of the safety management manuals, then identifies and tracks safety deficiencies known in the industry as "non-conformities." Additionally, the coordinator performs annual internal audits of all AMHS vessels with regard to the Safety Management System and the Intl. Safety Management Code. In order to create a greater safety culture within AMHS, the shoreside Safety Officer and Training Coordinator are also involved in identifying safety and training needs that impact our fleet and personnel. The AMHS Safety Management System is a constantly changing set of guidelines. This "living" document must be updated to reflect the ever-changing rules and regulations that affect the maritime community. Presently, AMHS is striving to incorporate technology to ensure that changes within the Safety Management System are efficiently delivered to the vessels of our fleet. (The distribution of the manuals via cd-rom will be implemented in the near future.) The Safety Management System is a valuable tool that allows management to recognize, evaluate and control workplace hazards. The implementation of a Safety Management System will not eliminate all accidents. However, having this valuable system in place does lessen the likelihood of serious maritime incidents that impact this state's ferries, personnel and the environment.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
Date: 8/8/2005
Response: Safety Board staff contacted Mr. Diaz, of the Puerto Rico Ports Authority, to discuss your letter and is pleased to note that since July 31, 2004, an SMS has been employed for the ferry service that operates at Vieques and Culebra. In addition, a contractor has been hired to update the SMS to the standards outlined in 33 CFR 96. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-07 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
To: NTSB
Date: 6/6/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 6/17/2005 1:57:58 PM MC# 2050255 In response to your letter of March 18, 2005, requesting the voluntary implementation of safety management systems on passenger ferries, I am pleased to inform you that Puerto Rico is already complying with the 33 CFR Maritime Security Manual. The Maritime Transportation Authority of Puerto Rico and the municipalities of Vieques and Culebra (MTA) is preparing safety manuals to be distributed to the operating personnel. Manuals will be addressed to those positions or sensitive personnel dealing with the operation of our vessels. In addition, DMJM Co. was contracted to design a safety plan for all our vessels and facilities. The plan has been enforced since July 31, 2004, with the approval of the US Coast Guard. Also, MTA's supervisors are constantly enforcing the rules contained in 33 CFR Maritime Security Manual. For additional information regarding the implementation of safety management systems, please contact Mr. Fernando J. Bonilla, Executive Director of Puerto Rico Ports Authority, at (787)729-8804. We look forward to continue collaborating with you and the National Transportation Safety Board to ensure the safety on all our passenger ferries.

From: NTSB
To: State of Montana
Date: 11/4/2009
Response: The NTSB is pleased to note that, although Montana does not have authority to regulate the three small free ferries that provide service across the Missouri River at Carter in Chouteau County; near Virgelle in Chouteau County; and near Winifred in Fergus, Chouteau, and Blaine Counties, respectively, the MDT passed along the NTSB recommendation and asked county operators to contact the NTSB regarding how to implement a safety management system. Captain Jim Scheffer of the NTSB Office of Marine Safety is available to assist the operators; he can be contacted at (202) 314-6459. This action by the MDT satisfies Safety Recommendation M-05-7; accordingly, the recommendation is classified Closed Acceptable Action.

From: State of Montana
To: NTSB
Date: 6/22/2009
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 6/30/2009 9:12:35 AM MC# 2090410:6-22-09: Thank you for your letter from the National Transportation Safety Board concerning Safety Recommendation M-05-7. I contacted Jim Lynch, Director at the Montana Department of Transportation to provide background information. Director Lynch has provided a memorandum that addresses your inquiry. Thank you again for contacting me concerning the safety of ferryboats in the State of Montana. Sincerely, Brian Schweitzer, Governor, Montana. State Capitol, P.O. Box 200801 Helena, Montana 59620-0801, Telephone 406-444-3111, Fax: 406-444-5529 Website: WWW.MT.GOV. attachment and copy to: Jim Lynch, Director, Department of Transportation. Memorandum To : The Honorable Brian Schweitzer, Governor Jim Lynch, From: Director Date: June 9, 2009 Subject: Mark V. Rosenker - National Transportation Safety Board Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the inquiry of Mark Rosenker of the National Transportation Safety Board concerning their Safety Recommendation M-05-7. Montana has three operating ferryboats, which cross the Missouri River. They are owned, operated, managed, and maintained by the local county governments. The Montana Department of Transportation (MDT) will ask each county to contact the NTSB and determine what action they need to take to be compliant with 33 C.F.R. Part 96. The ferryboats are located near Carter (Chouteau County), near Virgelle (Chouteau County), and near Winifred (Fergus, Chouteau, and Blaine Counties). Each of the ferry boats are less than 100 gross tons and carry no more than six passengers, they receive no consideration for transit. The ferries are propelled by a cable system spanning the river. They operate from March through November and may close down earlier based on winter conditions. These ferryboat operations are small scale. The county government has been in touch with United States Coast Guard, and based on a comprehensive review it has been determined that an inspection is not required under Title 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Each county has an annual safety inspection and a daily schedule of service and maintenance. Additionally, each county is in the process of developing a safety plan. I have included the address for the county commissioners that have jurisdiction over the ferryboats in the State of Montana.

From: NTSB
To: State of Montana
Date: 4/24/2009
Response: On July 14, 2006, and again on January 22, 2008, the Safety Board sent letters requesting information on what action, if any, had been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7. To date, the Safety Board has not received any information from the «Company» regarding what, if anything has been done to address this important safety issue. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. Because the Safety Board has been unable to confirm that the «Company» has completed action on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Unacceptable Action/No Response Received. Should the Board receive a timely response indicating action taken or planned to address this recommendation, we will consider reevaluating its classification.

From: NTSB
To: State of Montana
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. A copy of the Safety Board’s March 18, 2005, and July 14, 2006, letters are enclosed for your review. If we do not receive a response from you, we will have no choice but to close the recommendation in an unacceptable status. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

From: NTSB
To: State of Montana
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Missouri
Date: 12/13/2006
Response: The Safety Board understands that the seven ferries operating in Missouri do so under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Coast Guard and that you have requested the Coast Guard to encourage these operators to voluntarily implement an SMS. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Acceptable Action.

From: State of Missouri
To: NTSB
Date: 9/21/2006
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 10/3/2006 10:50:30 AM MC# 2060489: Reference is made to the National Transportation Safety Board’s recent letter addressing Safety Recommendation M-05-7 concerning the AHTD’s Ferry operation. Our sole Ferry crosses Bull Shoals Lake on Highway 125 North of Peel, Arkansas at the Missouri border. This Ferry operation has one barge and tug in operation during daylight hours, 7 days a week, with an additional barge and tug in reserve for down time maintenance. The Ferry has a total of 7 crewmembers with 3 (supervisor, deck hand, and pilot) on duty during operational hours. The operation is non-commercial and averages 30 trips per day (15 round trips) and carries 2 vehicles each trip on average. No other vehicles are allowed to cross when a fuel tanker truck is transported. The weight limitation is 25 tons and the Ferry does not operate in high winds or fog. The Ferry has an excellent service and safety record over the years of its operation with one minor chargeable accident in 25 years of operation. In 1998, the Coast Guard ruled that the Ferry was non-commercial and of such small operation, that they were no longer required to do annual inspections. Two engineers from our Maintenance Division were trained by the Coast Guard in 1998 to perform the inspection and now inspect the Peel Ferry annually. The annual inspection results in the issuance of a Memo to the District, which serves as an AHTD Certification of Inspection and includes a list of any deficiencies. During the annual inspection, all aspects of the safety and maintenance operations are reviewed. Every five years the Ferry is dry-docked and inspected by two structural engineers. There is a written Inspection Procedure and Diary of Inspections on record and the AHTD takes great pride in the very personal operation of this Ferry. All Ferry employees hold regular safety meetings and are subject to the Department’s random drug testing policy. A general walk around safety inspection is performed daily and an in-depth inspection performed monthly. It is for these reasons that the AHTD believes that a voluntary application of the Federal requirements at 33 [Code of Federal Regulations] CFR 96 for implementing a safety management system based on that required by the Coast Guard for ocean going vessels in U.S. waters, should not be applied to the Peel Ferry operation. Dan Flowers, Director of Highways and Transportation

From: NTSB
To: State of Missouri
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of New Hampshire
Date: 4/24/2009
Response: On July 14, 2006, and again on January 22, 2008, the Safety Board sent letters requesting information on what action, if any, had been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7. To date, the Safety Board has not received any information from the «Company» regarding what, if anything has been done to address this important safety issue. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. Because the Safety Board has been unable to confirm that the «Company» has completed action on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Unacceptable Action/No Response Received. Should the Board receive a timely response indicating action taken or planned to address this recommendation, we will consider reevaluating its classification.

From: NTSB
To: State of New Hampshire
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. A copy of the Safety Board’s March 18, 2005, and July 14, 2006, letters are enclosed for your review. If we do not receive a response from you, we will have no choice but to close the recommendation in an unacceptable status. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

From: NTSB
To: State of New Hampshire
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of West Virginia
Date: 7/6/2006
Response: Mr. Donovan advised Safety Board staff that the West Virginia Department of Transportation fully supports the recommendation and will encourage the State's only ferry operator, the Sistersville Ferry, which operates on the Ohio River, to implement a safety management system appropriate for that ferry operation. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified "Closed-Acceptable Action."

From: State of West Virginia
To: NTSB
Date: 4/20/2006
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 4/20/2006 10:18:13 AM MC# 2060208 4-20-05: Email received from Mr. Donovan. Mr. Brown, The WVPPA fully supports your recommendation included in Safety Recommendation M-05-7. The Authority works in close cooperation with the Sistersville's ferry Board of Directors to ensure that the Sistersville Ferry on the Ohio River meets and maintains all State and National Maritime safety requirements. Sincere1y, Patrick J. Donovan, Acting Director, West Virginia Department of Transportation, Public Port Authority

From: NTSB
To: State of West Virginia
Date: 5/31/2005
Response: The Safety Board understands that the West Virginia Department of Transportation (WVDOT) has assigned the task of implementing the recommended action to the Public Port Authority, which is under the jurisdiction of WVDOT. Specifically, the Public Port Authority will be directed to work in close cooperation with both public and private ferryboat operators to encourage voluntary compliance with 33 CFR 96 to implement a safety management system. The Board is interested in knowing the outcome of this effort. Pending completion of action by the Public Port Authority to implement this recommendation, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified "Open--Acceptable Response."

From: State of West Virginia
To: NTSB
Date: 4/6/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 4/13/2005 10:53:37 AM MC# 2050159 The WVDOT takes an active interest in prevention and safety awareness for all modes of transportation in the state. The Public Port Authority, which is under the jurisdiction of WVDOT, will be directed to work in close cooperation with both public and private ferryboat operators to encourage voluntary compliance with federal requirements of 33 CFR 96 for implementing a safety management system.

From: NTSB
To: State of Louisiana
Date: 8/24/2005
Response: The Safety Board understands that the Louisiana’s Department of Transportation (LA DOT) requires the use of its SMS by all State ferries. In addition, the LA DOT is working with the local U.S. Coast Guard inspection offices to upgrade the State-required SMS to comply with all the elements of 33 CFR 96 as necessary. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-07 to Louisiana is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: State of Louisiana
To: NTSB
Date: 5/25/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 5/31/2005 10:08:21 AM MC# 2050227

From: NTSB
To: State of Vermont
Date: 8/19/2009
Response: The NTSB is pleased to note that, although Vermont does not operate any ferries or have any authority over public ferry operators, the state has contacted the Lake Champlain Transportation Company, which operates public ferries on Lake Champlain, to encourage the company to voluntarily implement a safety management system as requested. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M 05-7 is classified Closed Acceptable Action.

From: State of Vermont
To: NTSB
Date: 5/7/2009
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 5/18/2009 3:56:03 PM MC# 2090304: I have received a copy of your April 24, 2009 letter to Governor Douglas regarding Safety Recommendation M-05-7 which the NTSB issued to the State of Vermont on March 18, 2005. I understand that the Safety Board followed up with the State of Vermont on July 14, 2006 and again on January 22, 2008 requesting to know what action the State had taken to address the recommendation. Please be advised that the Vermont Agency of Transportation does not have on staff, nor do we oversee, any public ferry operators. However, by copy of this letter I am forwarding your correspondence to the Lake Champlain Transportation Company, who operates public ferries on Lake Champlain. Sincere1y, Scott A. Rogers, Director of Operations, VT Agency of Transportation, State of Vermont, Operations Division, State of Vermont, Operations Division, One National Life Drive, Montpelier, VT 05633-5001.

From: NTSB
To: State of Vermont
Date: 4/24/2009
Response: On July 14, 2006, and again on January 22, 2008, the Safety Board sent letters requesting information on what action, if any, had been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7. To date, the Safety Board has not received any information from the «Company» regarding what, if anything has been done to address this important safety issue. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. Because the Safety Board has been unable to confirm that the «Company» has completed action on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Unacceptable Action/No Response Received. Should the Board receive a timely response indicating action taken or planned to address this recommendation, we will consider reevaluating its classification.

From: NTSB
To: State of Vermont
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. A copy of the Safety Board’s March 18, 2005, and July 14, 2006, letters are enclosed for your review. If we do not receive a response from you, we will have no choice but to close the recommendation in an unacceptable status. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

From: NTSB
To: State of Vermont
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Arizona
Date: 7/31/2009
Response: The NTSB is pleased to note that, although no Arizona law requires public ferry operators to comply with the federal program, the state is contacting the approximately 15 known vessel operators to encourage them to voluntarily implement a safety management system as requested. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Acceptable Action.

From: State of Arizona
To: NTSB
Date: 5/8/2009
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 5/12/2009 3:55:31 PM MC# 2090296: : Email from Kevin Bergersen. Per your May 6,2009, e-mail, the Arizona Game and Fish Department, on behalf of Governor Janice Brewer, provides the following response to the NTSB’s April 24, 2009, letter to the Governor concerning NTSB Safety Recommendation M-05-7 asking that the state encourage public ferry operators to voluntarily implement a safety management system as provided in 33 CFR Part 96, if they have not already done so. No state law mandates that Arizona require public ferry operators to comply with the federal program, but the state is in the process of contacting those operators we know of, advising them of the recommendation, and encouraging their participation. We anticipate this will apply to fewer than 15 vessels in Arizona. Nonetheless, the state will be involved and appreciates this opportunity to assist in the furtherance of watercraft safety.

From: NTSB
To: State of Arizona
Date: 4/24/2009
Response: On July 14, 2006, and again on January 22, 2008, the Safety Board sent letters requesting information on what action, if any, had been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7. To date, the Safety Board has not received any information from the «Company» regarding what, if anything has been done to address this important safety issue. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. Because the Safety Board has been unable to confirm that the «Company» has completed action on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Unacceptable Action/No Response Received. Should the Board receive a timely response indicating action taken or planned to address this recommendation, we will consider reevaluating its classification.

From: NTSB
To: State of Arizona
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. A copy of the Safety Board’s March 18, 2005, and July 14, 2006, letters are enclosed for your review. If we do not receive a response from you, we will have no choice but to close the recommendation in an unacceptable status. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

From: NTSB
To: State of Arizona
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Tennessee
Date: 6/27/2005
Response: Safety Board staff contacted Mr. Carl Cobble of the Tennessee Department of Transportation (TDOT) maintenance staff for clarification regarding action TDOT is taking to implement the recommendation. The Board notes that TDOT will implement a safety management system for the ferry that operates at Cumberland City, Tennessee. Because this vessel is subject to U.S. Coast Guard inspection, TDOT will work with the local Coast Guard office to develop and implement the safety management system. In addition, TDOT has contacted the ferry operators that operate on non-navigable waters of the United States to encourage them to implement a safety management system as requested. Accordingly, because the State of Tennessee has taken action to encourage ferry operators to voluntarily implement a safety management system, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: State of Tennessee
To: NTSB
Date: 4/8/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 4/20/2005 10:54:35 AM MC# 2050164 Governor Bredesen has asked that I respond to your letter of March 18, 2005 which contained the findings and recommendations concerning the accident involving the Staten Island Ferry Andrew J. Bar along with safety recommendations to prevent future ferry accidents and save lives. The Tennessee Department of Transportation operates a small ferryboat and barge over the Cumberland River at Cumberland City, Tennessee. We will contact the US. Coast Guard prior to implementing your recommendations to see if they are going to require that any additional items be included in the safety plan. The department will also forward a copy of your letter to county ferries and known private excursion ferries within the state. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Carl Cobble of our Maintenance Division at 615-741-2027. Sincerely, Gerald F. Nicely, Commissioner

From: NTSB
To: State of Alabama
Date: 4/24/2009
Response:

From: NTSB
To: State of Alabama
Date: 6/5/2008
Response: The Safety Board understands that the Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT) oversees the two ferries operating in Alabama: the Gees Bend Ferry and the Fort Morgan Ferry. In June 2005, ALDOT formed a partnership with Hornblower Marine Services (HMS) to maintain and operate the Fort Morgan Ferry, to ensure compliance with all U.S. Coast Guard inspection and safety programs, and to implement a voluntary SMS program. The Board further understands that ALDOT is working with HMS to ensure the same compliance with Coast Guard regulations and the implementation of a voluntary SMS for the Gees Bend Ferry. The actions ALDOT has taken and planned fully satisfy the recommendation. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Acceptable Action.

From: State of Alabama
To: NTSB
Date: 2/12/2008
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 2/28/2008 2:06:59 PM MC# 2080096: : On behalf of Governor Bob Riley, I apologize for the delay in making an appropriate response, on behalf of the State of Alabama, to your previous inquiry regarding Safety Recommendation M-05-7. It is certainly not normal that the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) would not have received a prompt response from the State of Alabama; but in two different instances department officials did not understand that they were intended to make the response to the NTSB correspondence, as opposed to the Governor’s Office making the response. Again, we apologize. To our knowledge, there are only two ferries operating within the State of Alabama. One of these is a river ferry operating in Wilcox County, Alabama, which periodically carries very small numbers of individuals and vehicles across the Alabama River. The other ferry is a Mobile Bay ferry which basically operates a very short relative distance between Dauphin Island to the west, across the mouth of Mobile Bay to the tip of the Fort Morgan peninsula to the east. This ferry likewise transports relatively small numbers of vehicles and individuals. These ferries are referred to, respectively, as the Gees Bend Ferry and the Fort Morgan Ferry. Safety for both the crew and the traveling public has been our utmost concern since the Alabama Department of Transportation’s (ALDOT) involvement with the Fort Morgan Ferry, which began in June of 2005. Because safety is crucial, ALDOT formed an ongoing partnership with Hornblower Marine Services (HMS), an internationally-recognized corporation. HMS was tasked not only to maintain and operate the Fort Morgan Ferry, but to evaluate standards and procedures that would directly relate to the safety and general welfare of the public while still ensuring strict compliance with all of the U.S. Coast Guard’s stringent maintenance and safety programs. The State of Alabama consulted HMS about the NTSB’s recommendation and the following are points taken from a letter we received from HMS: Despite a Coast Guard requirement that vessels engaged in oceangoing service implement safety management systems, inland ferry operations are not required, but are encouraged, to do so. HMS has been implementing the type of Safety Management System described in the recommendation for many years. All of Alabama’s managed vessels receive the same level of attention regardless of the regulatory environment. The current plans of the State of Alabama are for Wilcox County to be the owner and operator of the Gee’s Bend Ferry. They are currently in contract negotiations with HMS to provide similar marine services for the Gee’s Bend Ferry upon commissioning that vessel in the summer of 2006. However, due to financial circumstances of Wilcox County, the ALDOT may be required to retain ownership and assume the initial operation of this ferry. In either situation, HMS will be under contract to maintain and operate this vessel-either through contract with the State of Alabama or with Wilcox County. The State of Alabama has the ultimate confidence in HMS to provide an independent party for inspection and auditing that the Fort Morgan Ferry presently receives. Additionally, both the Gee’s Bend and the Fort Morgan ferries have been certified by the U.S. Coast Guard, and their monitoring both vessels on an ongoing basis will add another layer of oversight. We are pleased to report to you that the Fort Morgan Ferry is being successfully managed and operated by an internationally-recognized marine services corporation that specializes in passenger vessels. The U.S. Coast Guard will continue to be proactive in our ferry programs providing critical additional oversight. Both of these entities thoroughly embrace the NTSB’s and the State of Alabama’s commitment to passenger and crew safety. Thank you sincerely for your inquiry and for your efforts toward effective operational safety programs for ferries throughout the United States. Again, we apologize for the delay in making this response. If you have further questions or if we can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to write. Sincerely, Ken Wallis, Chief Legal Advisor. cc: Governor’s Constituent Services, Joe McInnes, Director, ALDOT

From: NTSB
To: State of Alabama
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. A copy of the Safety Board’s March 18, 2005, and July 14, 2006, letters are enclosed for your review. If we do not receive a response from you, we will have no choice but to close the recommendation in an unacceptable”status. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

From: NTSB
To: State of Alabama
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of New York
Date: 7/28/2005
Response: Because the State of New York does not presently own or operate any public ferries, nor does it grant authority to or regulate operations, Safety Recommendation is classified "Closed--Reconsidered." The Safety Board is pleased that New York agrees with the safety management system (SMS) concept, and will, to the extent it has opportunity, advocate with private ferry operators for voluntary compliance with the U.S. Coast Guard's SMS guidelines.

From: State of New York
To: NTSB
Date: 7/11/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 7/19/2005 3:12:56 PM MC# 2050344

From: State of New York
To: NTSB
Date: 6/13/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 6/17/2005 10:24:01 AM MC# 2050253 This is in response to your letter dated March 18, 2005 which contained Safety Recommendation M-05-7 for action. Recommendation M-05-07 encouraged States with public ferry operations to voluntarily implement a safety management system (SMS) for domestic ferry operations provided for in 33 CFR 96. This recommendation was derived from the investigation of the allision of the Staten Island Ferry Andrew J. Barberi with its pier on Staten Island, on October 15, 2003. The State o f New York does not presently own or operate any public ferries, nor does it grant authority to or regulate operations. Privately operated passengers ferries do operate at several locations within the State and between New York and other states. All are subject to the standards and regulations of the US Coast Guard. The safety management approach advocated by the Board is most appropriate and one that New York applies to other modes through its oversight of Public Transportation. Please be assured that to the extent this Department has the opportunity to advocate with private ferry operators for voluntary compliance with the safety management system guidelines of the US Coast Guard, we will. Sincerely, Dennison P. Cottrell, Director, Office of Safety and Security Services.

From: NTSB
To: State of Georgia
Date: 4/24/2009
Response: On July 14, 2006, and again on January 22, 2008, the Safety Board sent letters requesting information on what action, if any, had been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7. To date, the Safety Board has not received any information from the «Company» regarding what, if anything has been done to address this important safety issue. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. Because the Safety Board has been unable to confirm that the «Company» has completed action on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Unacceptable Action/No Response Received. Should the Board receive a timely response indicating action taken or planned to address this recommendation, we will consider reevaluating its classification.

From: NTSB
To: State of Georgia
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. A copy of the Safety Board’s March 18, 2005, and July 14, 2006, letters are enclosed for your review. If we do not receive a response from you, we will have no choice but to close the recommendation in an unacceptable status. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

From: NTSB
To: State of Georgia
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Oregon
Date: 12/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is pleased that Oregon will encourage its ferry operators to work with the U.S. Coast Guard to develop an SMS appropriate for their operations. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M 05-7 is classified Closed Acceptable Action.

From: State of Oregon
To: NTSB
Date: 8/16/2006
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 9/6/2006 1:08:32 PM MC# 2060441:There are only three small public ferries in Oregon. All of them operate on the Willamette River; at Buena Vista, Wheatland and Canby. These ferries traverse the river on a fixed route system attached to wire cables anchored on each side of the river. They operate on a seasonal basis. They can only carry a dozen or fewer vehicles depending on vehicle size. In consideration of their size and fixed cable system, the type of safety management system prescribed by 33 CFR 96 may not be appropriate. Nevertheless, I am forwarding your recommendation to Marion and Clackamas counties, which operate those ferries, and encourage them to work with the United States Coast Guard, which inspects these vessels, and develop a safety management system that would be applicable to their operations.

From: NTSB
To: State of Oregon
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Michigan
Date: 7/11/2005
Response: The Safety Board notes that, while the State does not operate or regulate any ferries, the Michigan Department of Transportation will share the information contained in the Board's recommendation and the executive summary of the Andrew J. Barberi accident report with public and private ferries operating in Michigan waters. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-07 to the State of Michigan is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: State of Michigan
To: NTSB
Date: 4/18/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 4/26/2005 11:34:33 AM MC# 2050172 Governor Granholm asked me to respond to your letter of March 18, 2005, regarding the National Transportation Safety Board Safety Recommendation M-05-07. The recommendation was made as a result of the Safety Board's investigation of the allision of the Staten Island Ferry Andrew J. Barberi with a maintenance pier at St. George, Staten Island, on October 15, 2003. It was the Safety Board's opinion that operational deficiencies of the ferry could have been addressed by an aggressive safety management system by the vessel's owner. The Safety Board recommended that each governor encourage public ferry operators to voluntarily request application of the federal requirement of 33 CFR 96 for implementing a safety management system, if they have not already done so. While the State of Michigan does not directly operate any ferries, there are several public and private ferries operating within Michigan. We will share with each operator the information contained within the Safety Board's recommendation and the Executive Summary of the accident report concerning the Staten Island incident. If you have any questions, please contact either me or Susan Mortel, Director, Bureau of Transportation Planning, at 51 7-373-0343. Gloria J. Jeff, for Director

From: NTSB
To: State of Minnesota
Date: 7/11/2005
Response: Safety Board staff contacted Ms. Betsy Parker of the Minnesota Department of Transportation (MNDOT) to discuss the recommendation. The Board notes that there is only one ferry operation in Minnesota, which runs between Grand Portage and Isle Royale, and the State does not regulate the ferry operation. Ms. Parker agreed to send the Board's March 18, 2005, recommendation letter with a cover letter from MNDOT, recommending that the Grand Portage ferry operator consider implementing a safety management system. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-05-07 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: State of Minnesota
To: NTSB
Date: 4/26/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 5/3/2005 10:57:45 AM MC# 2050187 I received your letter regarding the allision of the Staten Island Ferry, Andrew J. Barberi, and the proposed implementation of a Safety Management System. I support your effort to encourage all publicly operated ferry services to improve their operational safety program. Minnesota does not have a state or municipally operated ferry service. We do have a small, privately operated passenger ferry service from Grand Portage to Isle Royale in Lake Superior. This private service operates on a seasonal basis and is under the jurisdiction of the United States Coast Guard. The Coast Guard office in Duluth, Minnesota, has assured us that they routinely inspect the two privately operated boats for safety and seaworthiness. The pilots also are licensed by and must adhere to regulations imposed by the Coast Guard office for passenger service. On our inquiry, the Duluth Coast Guard office confirmed that they were familiar with the referenced accident in the New York Harbor. Although Minnesota's privately operated ferry service only handles small groups of passengers on a limited seasonal basis, we still must be alert to maintain a safe environment for all passengers and personnel. I wish you success in providing a safe environment for all passenger ferry services throughout the country. Sincerely, Tim Pawlenty, Voice: (651) 296-3391 o r (800) 657-3717; Fax: (651) 296-2089

From: NTSB
To: State of South Carolina
Date: 4/24/2009
Response: On July 14, 2006, and again on January 22, 2008, the Safety Board sent letters requesting information on what action, if any, had been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7. To date, the Safety Board has not received any information from the «Company» regarding what, if anything has been done to address this important safety issue. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. Because the Safety Board has been unable to confirm that the «Company» has completed action on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Unacceptable Action/No Response Received. Should the Board receive a timely response indicating action taken or planned to address this recommendation, we will consider reevaluating its classification.

From: NTSB
To: State of South Carolina
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. A copy of the Safety Board’s March 18, 2005, and July 14, 2006, letters are enclosed for your review. If we do not receive a response from you, we will have no choice but to close the recommendation in an unacceptable status. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

From: NTSB
To: State of South Carolina
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.

From: NTSB
To: State of Texas
Date: 4/24/2009
Response: On July 14, 2006, and again on January 22, 2008, the Safety Board sent letters requesting information on what action, if any, had been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7. To date, the Safety Board has not received any information from the «Company» regarding what, if anything has been done to address this important safety issue. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. Because the Safety Board has been unable to confirm that the «Company» has completed action on this issue, Safety Recommendation M-05-7 is classified Closed Unacceptable Action/No Response Received. Should the Board receive a timely response indicating action taken or planned to address this recommendation, we will consider reevaluating its classification.

From: NTSB
To: State of Texas
Date: 1/22/2008
Response: On July 14, 2006, the Safety Board sent a follow-up letter requesting information from the «Company». To date the Safety Board has not yet received a response from the «Company» regarding this recommendation and would appreciate an update on what, if anything, the State has done to address this important safety issue. For your information, 25 of the 42 addressees have taken action as requested. The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. A copy of the Safety Board’s March 18, 2005, and July 14, 2006, letters are enclosed for your review. If we do not receive a response from you, we will have no choice but to close the recommendation in an unacceptable status. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

From: NTSB
To: State of Texas
Date: 7/14/2006
Response: The Safety Board is vitally interested in knowing whether and how its recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety, and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. That is why we monitor the implementation of all of our recommendations. The Board would appreciate being informed of what action, if any, has been taken or planned to implement Safety Recommendation M-05-7.