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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation M-08-001
Details
Synopsis: At 1406 on July 18, 2006, the Bermuda-registered cruise ship Crown Princess, which was operated by Princess Cruises and had been in service about a month, departed Port Canaveral, Florida, for Brooklyn, New York, its last port on a 10-day round-trip voyage to the Caribbean. The vessel was equipped with an integrated navigation system1 that included a trackpilot (autopilot). About an hour after leaving port, the crew shifted from manual steering to the trackpilot. Two minutes later, the vessel’s heading began to fluctuate around the set heading. In response to an alarm indicating that the rudder had reached its set limit of movement (5° ), the staff captain increased the trackpilot’s rudder limit setting to 10° . Shortly afterward, the captain and staff captain left the bridge, leaving the second officer in charge of the navigation watch. The vessel was traveling at nearly full speed, about 20 knots, by that time.
Recommendation: TO THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD: Propose to the International Maritime Organization that, in conjunction with the upcoming revisions to the Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, it make training in integrated navigation systems and integrated bridge systems mandatory for watchkeepers on vessels equipped with such systems.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Marine
Location: Port Canaveral, FL, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA06MF018
Accident Reports:
Heeling Accident on M/V Crown Princess
Report #: MAR-08-01
Accident Date: 7/18/2006
Issue Date: 2/5/2008
Date Closed: 2/4/2013
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: USCG (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Training and Education

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: USCG
Date: 2/4/2013
Response: The NTSB is pleased that the Coast Guard made the recommended proposal to the IMO and that subsequently, the STCW Code was amended as we requested. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation M-08-1 is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: USCG
To: NTSB
Date: 8/15/2012
Response: -From Peter V. Neffenger, Vice Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Deputy Commandant for Operations: The Conference of Parties to the STCW Convention adopted the "Manila Amendments" on June 25, 2010. The result of these changes, when taken in conjunction with the existing requirements within the STCW Convention and Code, are requirements that ensure that officers in charge of a navigational watch are familiar with and trained in the use of the navigation systems they use. The STCW Code establishes the minimum standards of competence for officers in charge of a navigational watch (STCW Code, Table A-II/1) and includes requirements that mariners have knowledge, understanding and proficiency in: (1) electronic systems of position fixing and navigation, (2) the use of information from navigation equipment for maintaining a safe navigational watch, and (3) the use of ECDIS to maintain safety of navigation. These basic training requirements are then tailored to the specific systems that each watchstander uses on the vessel to which they are assigned by Regulation 1114 of the STCW Convention and Section A-I/14 of the STCW Code, which delineates the responsibility of the vessel owner/operator to ensure that seafarers are familiarized with the shipboard equipment, operating procedures and other arrangements needed for the proper performance of their duties. For those mariners assigned to stand duty as officers in charge of a navigational watch, this would include familiarization with any integrated navigation system or integrated bridge system installed on the vessel. We consider our action on this recommendation complete for and request that it be closed.

From: NTSB
To: USCG
Date: 11/16/2011
Response: This letter concerns 29 open safety recommendations, enclosed, that the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued to the U.S. Coast Guard between 1995 and 2010. For some of these recommendations, the NTSB has not received an update in almost 3 years regarding the status of action either taken or planned to address the important safety issue that the recommendation addresses. We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. NOTE TO FILE (not in original letter): The 29 safety recommendations are: M-95-013, M-98-033, M-98-037, M-99-001, M-00-004, M-01-001, M-02-005, M-04-003, M-05-006, M-06-001, M-06-002, M-07-001, M-07-006, M-07-007, M-08-001, M-08-002, M-09-001, M-09-002, M-09-003, M-09-004, M-09-009, M-09-010, M-09-014, M-09-015, M-09-016, M-09-017, M-10-005, M-10-002 and M-10-006.

From: USCG
To: NTSB
Date: 5/12/2010
Response: NMC # 103404: Update: Amendments to the STCW Convention have been proposed, but do not include specific requirements for IBS and INS. Due to the varying number of performance standards for such equipment as well as rapid introduction of new technology, it was agreed that there was a need to address this training (and familiarization) in a more generic manner; through a combination of existing text and new amendments to the provisions in Chapter II and regulation 1/14. It is anticipated that these amendments will be adopted at the Conference of Parties to the STCW Convention scheduled to be held in Manila in June 20 IO. The existing text for the operational level (Table A-lUI) includes requirements for electronic systems of position fixing and navigation. The requirements for management level (Table AII/ 2) include requirements for the use of modern electronic navigational aids and the use of the information from this equipment and systems to assist command decision making. The requirements for the familiarization with this type equipment are found in regulation 1/14. For the reasons stated above, we supported this approach. We will keep the Board advised of our actions on this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: USCG
Date: 4/8/2010
Response: NMC # 103404: Please provide a brief update on Safety Recommendations M-08-1 & -2 from the Crown Princess accident. Both had to do with 'proposing to IMO." It has been more that a year since our last exchange and my bosses are asking me for some updated status

From: NTSB
To: USCG
Date: 1/5/2009
Response: The Safety Board notes that the IMO is currently addressing training requirements for integrated navigation systems and integrated bridge systems as part of a comprehensive review of the STCW; we are pleased that the Coast Guard will propose that the IMO consider making the training mandatory for watch officers on vessels equipped with IBS systems. Pending notification of the outcome of this proposal, Safety Recommendation M-08-1 is classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: USCG
To: NTSB
Date: 8/15/2008
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 9/3/2008 10:40:13 AM MC# 2080531: - From James A. Watson, Director, Prevention Policy: We concur with this recommendation. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is currently addressing training requirements for integrated navigation systems and integrated bridge systems as part of a comprehensive review of the Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers Convention. We will propose that the IMO should consider making the training mandatory for watchkeepers on vessels equipped with such systems. We will keep the Board informed of our progress on this recommendation. James A. Watson, Rear Admiral, Director, Prevention Policy U.S. Coast Guard