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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation M-90-094
Details
Synopsis: ON JUNE 29, 1989, THE U.S. SELF-ELEVATING UNINSPECTED LIFT BOAT M/V TITAN FINISHED ITS WORK AT CORPUS CHRISITI OIL AND GAS BLOCK 427 WHERE IT HAD BEEN ELEVATED IN ABOUT 95 FEET OF WATER. THE TITAN HAD A CREW OF FOUR, PLUS FIVE LAREDO CONSTRUCTION, INC., EMPLOYEES ABOARD. ABOUT 1330 THE MASTER LOWERED THE LIFTBOAT AND HEADED IT TOWARD FREPORT, TEXAS. WHILE THE 160-FOOT LEGS WERE BEING RAISED, THE TITAN BEGAN LISTING TO STARBOARD. THE MASTER BELIEVED THE LIST WAS CAUSED BY MUD ON THE STARBOARD LEG PAD. HOWEVER, THE MASTER FOUND ON INSPECTION THAT THE STARBOARD LEG WAS FLOODED AND GUSHING WATER ON DECK THROUGH A FRACTURE OR FRACTURES IN THE LEG. THE MASTER DIRECTED THE LEGS TO BE LOWERED TO IMPROVE THE STABILITY OF THE VESSEL. WHILE THE LEGS WERE BEING LOWERED THE TITAN CAPSIZED ABOUT 1345.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE U.S. COAST GUARD: REQUIRE THE A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF WINDOWS ON LIFTBOATS BE DESIGNED, INSTALLED, AND APPROPRIATELY MARKED FOR USE AS EXITS IN AN EMERGENCY AND THAT PROTECTIVE WINDOW COVERS BE DESIGNED SO THAT THEY DO NOT PREVENT WINDOWS FROM BEING OPENED FROM INSIDE THE VESSEL.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
Mode: Marine
Location: Gulf of Mexico, GM, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA89MM052
Accident Reports:
Capsizing and Sinking of the U.S. Self-Elevating Liftboat M/V Titan
Report #: MAR-90-07
Accident Date: 6/29/1989
Issue Date: 1/14/1991
Date Closed: 11/6/1996
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: USCG (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: USCG
Date: 11/6/1996
Response: M-90-94 ASKED THAT THE USCG REQUIRE THAT A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF WINDOWS ON LIFTBOATS BE DESIGNED, INSTALLED, & APPROPRIATELY MARKED FOR USE AS EXIST IN AN EMERGENCY & THAT PROTECTIVE WINDOW COVERS BE DESIGNED SO THAT THEY DO NOT PREVENT WINDOWS FROM BEING OPENED FROM INSIDE THE VESSEL. THE NEW RULES AT 46 CFR 127-440 REQUIRE THT WINDOW COVERS BE CAPABLE OF BEING REMOVED WITHOUT GOING OUT ON DECK. BECAUSE THIS SOLUTION IS AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE RECOMMENDED ACTION, M-90-94 HAS BEEN CLASSIFIED "CLOSED--ACCEPTABLE ALATERNATE ACTTION."

From: USCG
To: NTSB
Date: 3/15/1996
Response: THE USCG'S INTERIM FINAL RULES FOR OFFSHORE SUPPLY VESSELS/LIFTBOATS (46 CFR 90, ET AL.) (CGD82-004 & CGD86-074 PUBLISHED IN FR THURSDAY 11/16/95) BECAME EFFECTIVE THIS DATE.

From: NTSB
To: USCG
Date: 11/28/1994
Response: BECAUSE THE USCG INTENDS TO INCLUDE THIS RECOMMENDATION IN THE PENDING 46 CFR SUBCHAPTER L & REVISED NVIC 8-81, M-90-94 HAS BEEN CLASSIFIED "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE," PENDING PUBLICATION OF THE FINAL RULES.

From: USCG
To: NTSB
Date: 3/23/1994
Response: THE USCG DOES OT CONCUR WITH THIS RECOMMENDATION & WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT ADEQUATE MEANS OF ESCAPE SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT OF WINDOWS. THE USCG DOES NOT INTEND TO ESTABLISH REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DESIGN OF WINDOWS AS MEANS OF ESCAPE OF LIFTBOATS. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR MEANS OF ESCAPE WILL BE DETAILED IN THE FINAL RULE FOR 46 SUBCHAPTER L, OFFSHORE SUPPLY VESSEL [CGD 82-004 & CGD 86-074].

From: NTSB
To: USCG
Date: 5/18/1992
Response: Safety Recommendation M-90-94 asked the Coast Guard to require that a sufficient number of windows on liftboats be designed, installed, and appropriately marked for use as exits in an emergency and that protective window covers be designed so that they do not prevent windows from being opened from inside the vessel. The Safety Board is pleased that the Coast Guard concurs with the intent of this recommendation. From the March 5 discussion, we understand that 46 CFR 127.440 will require window covers to be capable of being opened from both sides of the bulkhead. Pending publication of the final rule, Safety Recommendation M-90-94 will be classified as "Open--Acceptable Response."

From: USCG
To: NTSB
Date: 7/8/1991
Response: I concur with the intent of this recommendation with regard to providing adequate means of escape. However, the Coast Guard believes that adequate means of escape should be independent of windows. The requirements for means of escape will be detailed in the final rule for 46 CFR Subchapter L, Offshore Supply Vessels [CGD 82-004 and CGD 86-0741. These requirements will be similar to proposed Subpart 127.240. The Coast Guard does not intend to establish requirements for the design of windows as means of escape on liftboats, and I request that this recommendation be closed.