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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation M-90-108
Details
Synopsis: ON JUNE 29, 1989, THE U.S. SELF-ELEVATING UNINSPECTED LIFT BOAT M/V TITAN FINISHED ITS WORK AT CORPUS CHRISITI OIL AND GAS BLOCK 427 WHERE IT HAD BEEN ELEVATED IN ABOUT 95 FEET OF WATER. THE TITAN HAD A CREW OF FOUR, PLUS FIVE LAREDO CONSTRUCTION, INC., EMPLOYEES ABOARD. ABOUT 1330 THE MASTER LOWERED THE LIFTBOAT AND HEADED IT TOWARD FREPORT, TEXAS. WHILE THE 160-FOOT LEGS WERE BEING RAISED, THE TITAN BEGAN LISTING TO STARBOARD. THE MASTER BELIEVED THE LIST WAS CAUSED BY MUD ON THE STARBOARD LEG PAD. HOWEVER, THE MASTER FOUND ON INSPECTION THAT THE STARBOARD LEG WAS FLOODED AND GUSHING WATER ON DECK THROUGH A FRACTURE OR FRACTURES IN THE LEG. THE MASTER DIRECTED THE LEGS TO BE LOWERED TO IMPROVE THE STABILITY OF THE VESSEL. WHILE THE LEGS WERE BEING LOWERED THE TITAN CAPSIZED ABOUT 1345.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE OFFSHORE MARINE SERVICE ASSOCIATION: ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFESAVING AND SURVIVAL TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR CREWMEMBERS AND OTHERS EMPLOYED IN THE OFFSHORE MARINE INDUSTRY.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received
Mode: Marine
Location: Gulf of Mexico, GM, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA89MM052
Accident Reports:
Capsizing and Sinking of the U.S. Self-Elevating Liftboat M/V Titan
Report #: MAR-90-07
Accident Date: 6/29/1989
Issue Date: 1/14/1991
Date Closed: 7/8/1994
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: Offshore Marine Service Association (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
Keyword(s): Training and Education, Water Survival

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: Offshore Marine Service Association
Date: 7/8/1994
Response: On March 16, 1994, the National Transportation Safety Board inquired about efforts that have been or are being made to implement Safety Recommendations M-90-105 through -109, which were issued to the Offshore Marine Services Association (OMSA) on January 14, 1991. These recommendations resulted from the Safety Board's investigation of the capsizing and sinking of the self-elevating liftboat M/V TITAN in the Gulf of Mexico on June 29, 1989. The Safety Board requested that OMSA: Publicize to companies operating liftboats that liftboat masters should check legs that are supposed to be watertight for flooding before jacking down vessels. (M-90-105) Publicize to companies operating liftboats that the information and stability calculations included in the operating manuals should be clearly presented and include precautions needed to be taken when flooded legs are encountered. (M-90-106) Publicize to companies operating liftboats that safety meetings and emergency drills should be held regularly and logged by the master. (M-90-107) Encourage the development of lifesaving and survival training programs for crewmembers and others employed in the offshore marine industry. (M -90-108) Publicize the circumstances of this accident. (M-90-109) Our records indicate that the Safety Board has received no response from OMSA regarding these safety recommendations. Therefore, Safety Recommendations M-90-105 through -109 have been classified CLOSED—UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED. Should the Safety Board receive any information from OMSA concerning these safety recommendations, we will give full consideration to amending their status.

From: Offshore Marine Service Association
To: NTSB
Date: 3/3/1994
Response: WE HAVE NEVER RECEIVED A RESPONSE FROM OMSA ON ANY OF THESE RECOMMENDATIONS.