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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation P-74-001
Details
Synopsis: IN COOPERSBURG, PA., ON FEBRUARY 21, 1973, A GAS PIPELINE WAS RUPTURED BY DYNAMITE AND GAS AT 50 PSIG ENTERED AN APARTMENT HOUSE AND EXPLODED. FIVE PERSONS WERE KILLED, 16 PERSONS WERE INJURED, AND 2 BUILDINGS WERE DESTROYED.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT: THE OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ISSUE REGULATIONS TO REQUIRE THAT PIPELINE OPERATORS HAVE DEFINITE PROCEDURES TO PROTECT THEIR FACILITIES AFFECTED BY BLASTING OPERATIONS. THESE REGULATIONS SHOULD CONSIDER, AT A MINIMUM, THE AGE OF THE PIPELINE, THE OPERATING PRESSURE, THE TYPE OF WELD OR MECHANICAL JOINT, THE GENERAL CONDITION OF THE FACILITY, THE TYPE OF SOIL, AND THE AREA GEOGRAPHY.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
Mode: Pipeline
Location: Coopersburg, PA, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: 80229
Accident Reports:
UGI Corporation
Report #: PAR-74-01
Accident Date: 2/21/1973
Issue Date: 2/7/1974
Date Closed: 9/9/1982
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: RSPA (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: RSPA
Date: 9/9/1982
Response:

From: RSPA
To: NTSB
Date: 6/25/1982
Response: RESEARCH & SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION LTR: WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT FEASIBLE TO ATTEMPT TO MANDATE BY REGULATION A PRECISE SET OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES WHICH PIPELINE OPERATORS MUST TAKE TO ENSURE THEIR FACILITIES FROM THE RISK OF POSSIBLE DAMAGE DUE TO BLASTING IN THE VICINITY. NEVERTHELESS, WE FEEL THE POTENTIAL FOR HARM AND CONSEQUENT DAMAGES CAN BE REDUCED SIGNIFICANTLY IF OPERATORS COMMUNICATE IN ADVANCE WITH BLASTERS AND MONITOR THEIR PIPELINES AFTER BLASTING OCCURS. THESE STEPS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH 0PERATOR PARTICIPATION IN A DAMAGE PREVENTION PROGRAM SUCH AS A "ONE-CALL" SYSTEM. THEREFORE, MTB HAS INCLUDED IN THE FINAL RULE IN DOCKET PS 59, "DAMAGE PREVENTION PROGRAM," REQUIRED STEPS THAT AN OPERATOR MUST TAKE WHENEVER BLASTING OPERATIONS MIGHT AFFECT THE PIPELINE. WE BELIEVE THIS APPROACH SHOULD BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY BEFORE ANY FURTHER CONSIDERATION IS GIVEN TO ADDITIONAL MANDATORY REGULATION OR PIPELINE OPERATORS. CONSEQUENTLY WE HAVE REMOVED THE SCHEDULED RULEMAKING ON BLASTING FROM OUR AGENDA.

From: NTSB
To: RSPA
Date: 1/22/1979
Response:

From: RSPA
To: NTSB
Date: 11/22/1978
Response: MTB LETTER: DISCUSSES EMERGENCY PLAN REGULATION FOR PROMPT RESPONSE TO AN EMERGENCY. MTB RECOGNIZES THAT THIS IS ONLY PART OF THE INTENT OF THE RECOMMENDATION. AN AMENDMENT TO 192 WILL BE PROPOSED IN 1979 REGULATORY AGENDA FOR REQUIREMENT FOR PROCEDURES TO PROTECT AGAINST BLASTING OPERATIONS.

From: RSPA
To: NTSB
Date: 3/29/1974
Response: LETTER FROM DOT: RECOMMENDATION IS BEING STUDIED BY THE OPS. THE OPS INTENDS TO PROPOSE IN THE NEAR FUTURE NEW RULES TO CLARIFY THE INTENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE AND EMERGENCY PLANS.