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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation R-02-008
Details
Synopsis: These recommendations address (1) the determination and designation of maximum authorized train speeds with sufficient safety margins to ensure that a train can be stopped by the air brake system alone, and (2) locomotive engineer support and training. The recommendations are derived from the Safety Board's investigation of the January 30, 2000, derailment of CSX Transportation (CSXT) coal train V986-26 near Bloomington, Maryland, and are consistent with the evidence we found and the analysis we performed. As a result of this investigation, the Safety Board has issued five safety recommendations, three of which are addressed specifically to CSXT, and two of which are addressed to all class I railroads, including CSXT. Information supporting the recommendations is discussed below. The Safety Board would appreciate a response from you within 90 days addressing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement our recommendations.
Recommendation: The NTSB recommends that CSX Transportation, Inc.: Systematically ensure that engineers are provided with pilots as appropriate and that locomotive engineers are fully evaluated over the whole of their territories, particularly in critical areas of train handling such as steep grades.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Railroad
Location: Bloomington, MD, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: ATL00FR003
Accident Reports: Derailment of CSX Transportation Coal Train V986-26
Report #: RAR-02-02
Accident Date: 1/30/2000
Issue Date: 3/21/2002
Date Closed: 8/26/2002
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: CSX Transportation, Inc. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: CSX Transportation, Inc.
Date: 8/26/2002
Response: CSXT indicates that its Train and Engine Calling System on the Mountain Subdivision, implemented in September 2000, is a sophisticated system that tracks each individual's qualification over specific line segments, that the system ensures only qualified employees may accept assignments, and that the system enables crew dispatchers to arrange for pilots as needed. Unqualified employees are instructed to contact Crew Management and Local Managers to arrange for qualification. Further, following the Bloomington accident, CSXT established a Road Foreman of Engines whose sole responsibility is to ensure safe train operations on the Mountain Subdivision, including evaluating and qualifying engineers on that territory. As these actions satisfy the recommendation, Safety Recommendation R-02-8 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: CSX Transportation, Inc.
To: NTSB
Date: 5/6/2002
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 05/20/2002 7:47:49 PM MC# 2020526 In September 2000, CSX implemented its Train and Engine Calling System on the Mountain Subdivision. This sophisticated system tracks each individual's qualification over specific line segments. Employees are not permitted to make seniority moves if the qualification codes are not present. When calling crews, the system informs the crew dispatcher if an employee is not qualified allowing the crew dispatcher to arrange for a qualified employee to accept the assignment or arrange for a pilot. If an employee is not qualified, he/she is instructed to contact Crew Management and Local Managers to arrange for qualification. In addition, shortly after the Bloomington incident, CSX established a Road Foreman of Engines position whose sole responsibility is to ensure safe train operations on the Mountain Subdivision, including evaluating and qualifying engineers on that territory.