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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation R-76-042
Details
Synopsis: ON JANUARY 9, 1976, AT 8:06 A.M., CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY (C TRAIN NO. 315 STRUCK THE REAR END OF TRAIN NO. 104 WHILE IT WAS STANDING AT THE ADDISON STREET STATION PLATFORM IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. THE IMPACT FORCES EXTENSIVELY DAMAGED THE LEAD CAR OF THE MOVING TRAIN AND THE REAR CAR OF THE STANDING TRAIN, AND SLIGHTLY DAMAGED THE OTHER CARS IN EACH TRAIN. DAMAGE TO THE EQUIPMENT AND TRACK WAS ESTIMATED TO BE $267,000. OF THE 381 PASSENGERS WHO WERE INJURED IN THE COLLISION, 1 PASSENGER DIED.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT, THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, THE NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, THE PORT AUTHORITY TRANSIT CORPORATION, THE PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION, THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, THE SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, AND THE GREATER CLEVELAND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY: PROHIBIT TRAINS WITH INOPERATIVE AUTOMATIC TRAIN CONTROL OR CAB SIGNALS FROM DEPARTING A TERMINAL FOR MAIN TRACK OPERATION. (URGENT)
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Railroad
Location: Chicago, IL, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: 80015
Accident Reports: Chicago Transit Authority Collision of Trains No. 104 and No. 315 at Addison Street Station
Report #: RAR-76-09
Accident Date: 1/9/1976
Issue Date: 8/1/1976
Date Closed: 7/6/1978
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: Bay Area Rapid Transit District (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Closed - Reconsidered)
Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (Closed - Reconsidered)
Port Authority Transit Corporation (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Positive Train Control,Signals,Transit

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit
Date: 8/18/1978
Response: This recommendation (R-76-42) was classified "Closed-Acceptable Action."

From: Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit
To: NTSB
Date: 11/22/1977
Response: NYCTA LETTER: NYCTA PROHIBITS TRAINS WITH INOPERATIVE TRAIN CONTROL FROM DEPARTING FROM A TERMINAL FOR MAIN TRACK OPERATION. THE TRAIN EQUIPMENT CONSISTS OF THE TRIP COCK ON THE FIRST CAR.

From: NTSB
To: Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit
Date: 11/2/1977
Response: On August 16, 1976, Mr. Yunich advised the Safety Board that the New York City Transit Authority planned to introduce continuous automatic train control, with cab signalling, on its new lines in the future. This planned development would, of course, completely fulfill the objective of Safety Recommendation R-76-42, which followed a rear-end collision at the Addison Street Station platform in Chicago, Illinois, on January 9, 1976. The Safety Board would appreciate information as to the current status of the automatic train control system; also, an estimate of when the planned system will become operational.

From: NTSB
To: Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit
Date: 9/2/1976
Response: Your response will be made part of the public docket to indicate NYCTA's compliance with the recommendations. Based upon your response, I will recommend to the Board that those recommendations, as they relate to NYCTA's operation, be closed.

From: Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit
To: NTSB
Date: 8/16/1976
Response: NYCTA LETTER: NYCTA DOES NOT HAVE AUTOMATIC TRAIN CONTROL AND CAB SIGNALS BUT WHEN FUNDING BECOMES AVAILABLE, SUCH SYSTEMS ARE PLANNED.

From: NTSB
To: Bay Area Rapid Transit District
Date: 2/24/1978
Response: This Recommendation (No. R-76-42) was classified "Closed-Acceptable Action" as the Board accepted your actions on its behalf.

From: NTSB
To: Bay Area Rapid Transit District
Date: 10/13/1976
Response: Your narrative describing the procedures used by the Bay Area Rapid Transit District in coping with the conditions or situations addressed by recommendations R-76-42, R-76-43 and R-76-44, seem to adequately deal with the problems and thus fulfill the intent of the recommendations. Therefore, with the exception of a request for some clarifying information, I will recommend that the Board close them out indicating a satisfactory response. As for clarifying information, I would appreciate a more complete description of the procedures used when a train is moved with the ATC malfunctioning. For example, when you say, "manual movement of trains…", does this include absolute or manual block conditions? Specifically, what precautions are exercised by the Central Train Controller?

From: Bay Area Rapid Transit District
To: NTSB
Date: 9/24/1976
Response: LTR., FROM BART TO THE CHAIRMAN: CURRENT BART RULES AND PROCED PROHIBIT DISPATCHING TRAINS WITH MALFUNCTIONING ATC FROM YARDS OR TERMINAL ZONES INTO REVENUE SERVICE. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION SEE FILES.

From: NTSB
To: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
Date: 8/18/1978
Response: This recommendation (R-76-42) was classified "Closed-Unacceptable Action" as your response did not satisfy the intent of the recommendation and the Board recognized the existence of an impasse on the matter which in all likelihood would not be favorably resolved.

From: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 11/18/1977
Response: SEPTA LETTER: IT WOULD BE SAFER TO REQUIRE THAT WHEN AUTO MAITC TRAIN CONTROLS OR CAB SIGNALS ARE INOPERATIVE, THE CREW NOTIFY ITS SUPERVISION. IF IT IS TO PROCEED, THE CREW MUST BE GIVEN A TRAIN ORDER REDUCED TO WRITING OVER THE TELEPHONE, AS TO THE RULE BEING FOLLOWED, SUCH RULES WOULD PROVIDE STRICT PROCEDURES AND DISCIPLINE BUT WOULD AVOID DISASTROUS TIE-UPS, CONGESTION AND RESULTING ACCIDENT POTENTIAL.

From: NTSB
To: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
Date: 11/8/1977
Response: In your letter of August 26, 1976, you stated that the above recommendations (R-76-42, -43) "while well intentioned are neither practical nor safe," but did not specifically address the first recommendation. In addition, we would like to clarify the Safety Board's intent in making the second recommendation. Many transit systems comparable to SEPTA have established emergency procedures such as the establishment of manual blocks, operating at reduced speeds, proceeding only with train dispatcher permission, and other emergency disciplines. Obviously there will be instances where a hazard would be created in discharging passengers in areas such as tunnels, bridges, or isolated locations. Our intent, however, was that the train be moved to the nearest suitable discharge point while operating under emergency restrictions, then effect passenger discharge from the substandard equipment. Safety Recommendation R-76-44 recommended that SEPTA "Insure that communication facilities are adequate for dependable operational control and that proper procedures are in effect to provide emergency warnings and instructions." The Safety Board would appreciate your further review of these three recommendations and an indication of any action with respect to them which SEPTA may take, so that our records will adequately reflect the status of these recommendations.

From: NTSB
To: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Date: 2/22/1978
Response:

From: NTSB
To: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Date: 9/2/1976
Response:

From: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 8/10/1976
Response: WMATA LETTER: WMATA REPORT THEY PERFORM DAILY SAFETY CHECKS ON ALL CARS AND NO CARS WITH DEFECTIVE OR INOPERATIVE AUTO MATIC TRAIN CONTROL ARE PUT INTO SERVICE.

From: NTSB
To: Port Authority Transit Corporation
Date: 2/24/1978
Response:

From: NTSB
To: Port Authority Transit Corporation
Date: 9/2/1976
Response: Your response will be made a part of the public docket to indicate PATCO's compliance with the recommendations. Based upon your response, I will recommend to the Board that those recommendations, as they relate to PATCO's operation, be closed.

From: Port Authority Transit Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 8/11/1976
Response: PATCO LETTER: PATCO REPORTS THAT ATC AND CAB SIGNAL APPARATUS ON LEAD CAR OF EVERY TRAIN IS FULL-CYCLE TESTED ON A TEST TRACK, AND ONLY TRAINS WITH FULLY FUNCTIONING APPARTATUS ARE THEN ALLOWED TO ENTER MAINLINE TRACK.

From: NTSB
To: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
Date: 2/22/1978
Response: This Recommendation (No. R-76-42) was classified :Closed-Reconsidered" as the Board reconsidered its position in supporting the Recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
Date: 11/9/1977
Response: We agree that the first two recommendations [R-76-42, -43] are not applicable to PATH; however, we believe the last recommendation [R-76-44] may apply. We would therefore appreciate your views with respect to the adequacy and dependability of PATH communication facilities in every day operations, and any procedures in effect which provide emergency warnings and guidance.

From: NTSB
To: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
Date: 9/2/1976
Response: Thank you for your July 30 letter telling us that PATH trains are not operated with automatic train control or cab signals and, therefore, our Recommendation R-76-42 resulting from the National Transportation Safety Board's investigation of the collision of rapid transit trains in Chicago on January 9, 1976, does not apply to PATH. Our recommendation was directed at all transit systems and was to apply only if relevant. Our records will show that the recommendation does not apply to PATH.

From: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 7/30/1976
Response: PATH LETTER: PATH TRAINS ARE NOT EQUIPPED WITH AUTOMATIC TRAIN CONTROL OR CAB SIGNALS.

From: NTSB
To: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
Date: 2/22/1978
Response: This recommendation (No. R-76-42) was classified "Closed-Reconsidered" as the Board reconsidered its position in supporting the Recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
Date: 9/23/1976
Response: Your response to recommendation R-76-44 is consistent with the intent of the Board. The Safety Board's record on this accident will contain your statement. When the MBTA decides to use the Automatic Train Operation - Automatic Train Control system which is in place without the manual block operation the Board would appreciate hearing from you in regard to recommendations R-76-42 and 43.

From: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 8/5/1976
Response: MBTA LETTER: MBTA REPORTS THEIR OPERATIONS ARE STRICTLY OF THE MANUAL BLOCK TYPE.

From: NTSB
To: Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
Date: 1/31/1978
Response: Concerning safety recommendation R-76-42, the testing facilities planned for the Windermere and Airport terminals will provide GCRTA with the means of checking both the automatic train control and cab signal systems. We will hold the recommendation in "open" status and the Safety Board will appreciate being informed when the planned installation is placed in operational mode.

From: Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 11/21/1977
Response: GCRTA LETTER: CAB SIGNAL TESTING LOOPS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED AT WINDERMERE AND BROOKPARK. GCRTA HAS ON ORDER FROM GENERAL RAILWAY SIGNAL COMPANY TEST FACILITIES FOR THE WINDERMERE AND AIRPORT TERMINALS. THEY WILL BE INSTALLED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER DELIVERY. THIS WILL PROHIBIT TRAINS FROM DEPARTING FROM A YARD OR TERMINAL WITH INOPERATIVE TRAIN CONTROL OR CAB SIGNALS.

From: NTSB
To: Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
Date: 11/8/1977
Response: The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action taken with respect to each of the three recommendations. A copy of the subject recommendations is enclosed for your convenience.