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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation R-76-043
Details
Synopsis: ON JANUARY 9, 1976, AT 8:06 A.M., CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY (C TRAIN NO. 315 STRUCK THE REAR END OF TRAIN NO. 104 WHILE IT WAS STANDING AT THE ADDISON STREET STATION PLATFORM IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. THE IMPACT FORCES EXTENSIVELY DAMAGED THE LEAD CAR OF THE MOVING TRAIN AND THE REAR CAR OF THE STANDING TRAIN, AND SLIGHTLY DAMAGED THE OTHER CARS IN EACH TRAIN. DAMAGE TO THE EQUIPMENT AND TRACK WAS ESTIMATED TO BE $267,000. OF THE 381 PASSENGERS WHO WERE INJURED IN THE COLLISION, 1 PASSENGER DIED.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT, THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, THE NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, THE PORT AUTHORITY TRANSIT CORPORATION, THE PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION, THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, THE SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, AND THE GREATER CLEVELAND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY: DEVELOP A PROCEDURE TO DISCHARGE PASSENGERS AND REMOVE TRAINS FROM SERVICE IMMEDIATELY IF THEY DEVELOP AUTOMATIC TRAIN CONTROL PROBLEMS OR CAB SIGNAL PROBLEMS WHILE EN ROUTE.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Railroad
Location: Chicago, IL, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: 80015
Accident Reports: Chicago Transit Authority Collision of Trains No. 104 and No. 315 at Addison Street Station
Report #: RAR-76-09
Accident Date: 1/9/1976
Issue Date: 8/1/1976
Date Closed: 9/14/1978
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: Bay Area Rapid Transit District (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Closed - Reconsidered)
Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (Closed - Reconsidered)
Port Authority Transit Corporation (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Transit, Positive Train Control, Signals

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit
Date: 2/22/1978
Response: This Recommendation (No. R-76-43) was classified "Closed-Acceptable Action" as the Board accepted your actions on its behalf.

From: Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit
To: NTSB
Date: 8/16/1976
Response: NYCTA LETTER: "SHOULD AUTOMATIC TRAIN CONTROL OR SIGNAL PROBLEMS DEVELOP, PASSENGERS WILL BE DISCHARGED AT FIRST AVAILABLE STATION." IF AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS ARE INSTALLED, THE PROCEDURES TO MEET THE INTENT OF THE RECOMMENDATION WILL BE IMPLEMENTED.

From: NTSB
To: Bay Area Rapid Transit District
Date: 2/24/1978
Response: This Recommendation (No. R-76-43) was classified "Closed-Acceptable Action" as the Board accepted your actions on its behalf.

From: Bay Area Rapid Transit District
To: NTSB
Date: 11/1/1976
Response: LETTER FROM BART TO CHAIRMAN: ATTACHED APPROPRIATE PAGES OF BART'S MANUAL.

From: NTSB
To: Bay Area Rapid Transit District
Date: 10/13/1976
Response: Your narrative describing the procedures used by the Bay Area Rapid Transit District in coping with the conditions or situations addressed by recommendations R-76-42, R-76-43 and R-76-44, seem to adequately deal with the problems and thus fulfill the intent of the recommendations. Therefore, with the exception of a request for some clarifying information, I will recommend that the Board close them out indicating a satisfactory response. As for clarifying information, I would appreciate a more complete description of the procedures used when a train is moved with the ATC malfunctioning. For example, when you say, "manual movement of trains…", does this include absolute or manual block conditions? Specifically, what precautions are exercised by the Central Train Controller?

From: Bay Area Rapid Transit District
To: NTSB
Date: 9/24/1976
Response: FROM BART TO THE CHAIRMAN: IN INSTANCES OF IN-SERVICE ATC MALFUNCTION, BART DOES NOT OFFLOAD AS RECOMMENDED BUT REMOVES THE TRAIN FROM MAINLINE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. EVACUATION IS THEN ACCOMPLISHED. WHILE DISABLED TRAIN IS STILL ON MAINLINE, IT IS OPERATED IN THEIR SO-CALLED MANUAL MODE WITH 25 MPH RESTRICTION PROTECTED BY AUTOMATIC ON-BOARD SPEED GOVERNOR. ALL MOVEMENT IS STRICTLY CONTROLLED BY CENTRAL TRAIN CONTROLLER AS TO TRACKS AND ROUTES USED. THE PROCEDURE IS OUTLINED IN DETAIL IN BART'S OPERATING RULES.

From: NTSB
To: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
Date: 8/18/1978
Response: This recommendation (R-76-43) was classified "Closed-Unacceptable Action" as your response did not satisfy the intent of the recommendation and the Board recognized the existence of an impasse on the matter which in all likelihood would not be favorably resolved.

From: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 11/18/1977
Response: SEPTA LETTER: SEPTA OBJECTS TO THE RECOMMENDATION IN THAT DISCHARGING PASSENGERS FROM A DISABLED TRAIN WOULD RESULT IN CROWDED CONDITIONS ON DEPOT PLATFORMS. SEPTA PROPOSES RUNNING THE TRAIN WITH PASSENGERS, SUBJECT TO EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES.

From: NTSB
To: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
Date: 11/8/1977
Response: In your letter of August 26, 1976, you stated that the above recommendations (R-76-42, -43) "while well intentioned are neither practical nor safe," but did not specifically address the first recommendation. In addition, we would like to clarify the Safety Board's intent in making the second recommendation. Many transit systems comparable to SEPTA have established emergency procedures such as the establishment of manual blocks, operating at reduced speeds, proceeding only with train dispatcher permission, and other emergency disciplines. Obviously there will be instances where a hazard would be created in discharging passengers in areas such as tunnels, bridges, or isolated locations. Our intent, however, was that the train be moved to the nearest suitable discharge point while operating under emergency restrictions, then effect passenger discharge from the substandard equipment. Safety Recommendation R-76-44 recommended that SEPTA "Insure that communication facilities are adequate for dependable operational control and that proper procedures are in effect to provide emergency warnings and instructions." The Safety Board would appreciate your further review of these three recommendations and an indication of any action with respect to them which SEPTA may take, so that our records will adequately reflect the status of these recommendations.

From: NTSB
To: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Date: 2/22/1978
Response:

From: NTSB
To: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Date: 9/2/1976
Response:

From: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 8/10/1976
Response: WMATA LETTER: WMATA REPORTS THEY CURRENTLY REQUIRE EVACUATION AND WITHDRAWAL FROM SERVICE OF ANY TRAIN DEVELOPING MALFUNCTION OF ATC.

From: NTSB
To: Port Authority Transit Corporation
Date: 2/24/1978
Response:

From: NTSB
To: Port Authority Transit Corporation
Date: 9/2/1976
Response: Your response will be made a part of the public docket to indicate PATCO's compliance with the recommendations. Based upon your response, I will recommend to the Board that those recommendations, as they relate to PATCO's operation, be closed.

From: Port Authority Transit Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 8/11/1976
Response: PATCO LETTER: IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE OF ATC/CAB SIGNAL APPARATUS, PATCO CARS AUTOMATICALLY COME TO A FULL STOP. AFTER DETERMINING BLOCK AHEAD IS CLEAR, DISPATHCER MAY AUTHORIZE TRAIN TO PROCEED AT NOT MORE THAN 15 MPH TO END OF BLOCK. MOVEMENTS THRU SUCCEEDING BLOCKS CAN ONLY BE MADE ON THE SAM BASIS (DISPATCHER'S AUTHORITY, CLEAR BLOCK, RESTRICTED SPEED). THE DISPATCHER CAN ASCERTAIN LOCATIONS OF ALL TRAINS ON THE LINE BY MEANS OF TRACK MODEL-BOARD AND HE IS ALSO AUTHORIZED TO EVACUATE TRAINS IN CASES OF DOUBT OR UNCERTAINTY.

From: NTSB
To: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
Date: 2/22/1978
Response: This Recommendation (No. R-76-43) was classified "Closed-Reconsidered" as the Board reconsidered its position in supporting the Recommendation.

From: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 1/3/1978
Response: As you requested, we have reviewed the adequacy and dependability of PATH's communications facilities relative to routine and emergency operating procedures. We are confident that our communications systems and procedures provide the highest degree of reliability and emergency notification capability. The train-to-wayside radio system is the foundation of our communications network. This system permits direct and continuing communications between the PATH Operations Control Center and crews on trains, thereby allowing more effective supervision of train operations and facilitating the flow of information required by supervisory staff. The radio network permits PATH personnel to analyze the situation and take remedial action faster in the event of train delays or other emergency conditions. It also facilitates police surveillance and increases the efficiency of maintenance operations. The radio system utilizes train-borne two-way radios, special antenna wires strung through all tunnels, and electronic base stations to collect radio transmissions via the antennas. Transmissions are relayed by leased telephone lines to the Operations Control Center. The system also includes portable radios for use by police, maintenance and operating personnel. As an added safeguard, all key tunnel areas are equipped with proprietary emergency back-up telephones, in addition to Centrex telephones. All stations are equipped with Centrex phones, emergency back-up phones and Passenger Assistance phones permitting direct two-way communications from each such location on the system to Operations Control Center personnel. The last component of PATH's vital communications network is the station public address system which permits Communications Agent staff, located in the Operations Control Center, to make system-wide or selected station announcements to passengers and staff. I trust you will find these systems adequate relative to the Board's concern. However, if you require additional information, please let me know.

From: NTSB
To: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
Date: 11/9/1977
Response: We agree that the first two recommendations [R-76-42, -43] are not applicable to PATH; however, we believe the last recommendation [R-76-44] may apply. We would therefore appreciate your views with respect to the adequacy and dependability of PATH communication facilities in every day operations, and any procedures in effect which provide emergency warnings and guidance.

From: NTSB
To: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
Date: 9/2/1976
Response: Thank you for your July 30 letter telling us that PATH trains are not operated with automatic train control or cab signals and, therefore, our Recommendation R-76-42 resulting from the National Transportation Safety Board's investigation of the collision of rapid transit trains in Chicago on January 9, 1976, does not apply to PATH. Our recommendation was directed at all transit systems and was to apply only if relevant. Our records will show that the recommendation does not apply to PATH.

From: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 7/30/1976
Response: PATH LETTER: PATH TRAINS ARE NOT EQUIPPED WITH AUTOMATIC TRAIN CONTROL OR CAB SIGNALS.

From: NTSB
To: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
Date: 2/22/1978
Response: This recommendation (No. R-76-43) was classified "Closed-Reconsidered" as the Board reconsidered its position in supporting the Recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
Date: 9/23/1976
Response: Your response to recommendation R-76-44 is consistent with the intent of the Board. The Safety Board's record on this accident will contain your statement. When the MBTA decides to use the Automatic Train Operation - Automatic Train Control system which is in place without the manual block operation the Board would appreciate hearing from you in regard to recommendations R-76-42 and 43.

From: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 8/5/1976
Response: MBTA LETTER: MBTA REPORTS THEIR OPERATIONS ARE STRICLTY OF THE MANUAL BLOCK TYPE. ALTHOUGH THEIR CARS ARE ATC EQUIPPED, THE APPARATUS IS NOT USED AT THIS TIME.

From: NTSB
To: Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
Date: 11/24/1978
Response: This recommendation was classified "Closed-Acceptable Action" as the Safety Board accepted GCRTA's actions on its behalf.

From: NTSB
To: Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
Date: 1/31/1978
Response: The GCRTA policy of immediately discharging passengers and removing trains from service if automatic train control or cab signal problems are encountered is considered a satisfactory response to recommendation R-76-43.

From: Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 11/21/1977
Response: GCRTA: A PROCEDURE HAS BEEN DEVELOPED TO DISCHARGE PASSEN GERS AND REMOVE TRAINS FROM SERVICE IMMEDIATELY IF THEY DEVELOP AUTOMATIC TRAIN CONTROL OR CAB SIGNAL PROBLEMS WHILE EN ROUTE.

From: NTSB
To: Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
Date: 11/8/1977
Response: The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action taken with respect to each of the three recommendations. A copy of the subject recommendations is enclosed for your convenience.