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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation R-76-044
Details
Synopsis: ON JANUARY 9, 1976, AT 8:06 A.M., CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY (C TRAIN NO. 315 STRUCK THE REAR END OF TRAIN NO. 104 WHILE IT WAS STANDING AT THE ADDISON STREET STATION PLATFORM IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. THE IMPACT FORCES EXTENSIVELY DAMAGED THE LEAD CAR OF THE MOVING TRAIN AND THE REAR CAR OF THE STANDING TRAIN, AND SLIGHTLY DAMAGED THE OTHER CARS IN EACH TRAIN. DAMAGE TO THE EQUIPMENT AND TRACK WAS ESTIMATED TO BE $267,000. OF THE 381 PASSENGERS WHO WERE INJURED IN THE COLLISION, 1 PASSENGER DIED.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT, THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, THE NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, THE PORT AUTHORITY TRANSIT CORPORATION, THE PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORPORATION, THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, THE SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, AND THE GREATER CLEVELAND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY: INSURE THAT COMMUNICATION FACILITIES ARE ADEQUATE FOR DEPENDABLE OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND THAT PROPER PROCEDURES ARE IN EFFECT TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY WARNINGS AND INSTRUCTIONS.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Railroad
Location: Chicago, IL, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: 80015
Accident Reports: Chicago Transit Authority Collision of Trains No. 104 and No. 315 at Addison Street Station
Report #: RAR-76-09
Accident Date: 1/9/1976
Issue Date: 8/1/1976
Date Closed: 7/6/1978
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: Bay Area Rapid Transit District (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Port Authority Transit Corporation (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Transit

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit
Date: 2/22/1978
Response: This Recommendation (No. R-76-44) was classified "Closed-Acceptable Action" as the Board accepted your actions on its behalf.

From: Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit
To: NTSB
Date: 8/16/1976
Response: NYCTA LETTER: "COMMUNICATION FACILITIES ARE BEING CONSTANTLY CHECKED. ALL RADIOS ARE TESTED DAILY BEFORE BEING USED. IN ADDITION, EMERGENCY TELEPHONES ARE DISTRI BUTED THROUGHOUT THE SYSTEM, GENERALLY EVERY 600 FEET."

From: NTSB
To: Bay Area Rapid Transit District
Date: 2/24/1978
Response: This Recommendation (No. R-76-44) was classified "Closed-Acceptable Action" as the Board accepted your actions on its behalf.

From: NTSB
To: Bay Area Rapid Transit District
Date: 10/13/1976
Response: Your narrative describing the procedures used by the Bay Area Rapid Transit District in coping with the conditions or situations addressed by recommendations R-76-42, R-76-43 and R-76-44, seem to adequately deal with the problems and thus fulfill the intent of the recommendations. Therefore, with the exception of a request for some clarifying information, I will recommend that the Board close them out indicating a satisfactory response. As for clarifying information, I would appreciate a more complete description of the procedures used when a train is moved with the ATC malfunctioning. For example, when you say, "manual movement of trains…", does this include absolute or manual block conditions? Specifically, what precautions are exercised by the Central Train Controller?

From: Bay Area Rapid Transit District
To: NTSB
Date: 9/24/1976
Response: FROM BART TO THE CHAIRMAN: BART CONSIDERS THEIR PRESENT COMMUNICATION FACILITIES 'ADEQUATE AND DEPENDABLE.' THEY HAVE ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN THE EVENT OF TRAIN RADIO FAILURE.

From: NTSB
To: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
Date: 8/18/1978
Response: This recommendation (R-76-44) was classified "Closed-Acceptable Action."

From: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 11/18/1977
Response: SEPTA LETTER: I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH R-76-44.

From: NTSB
To: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
Date: 11/8/1977
Response: In your letter of August 26, 1976, you stated that the above recommendations (R-76-42, -43) "while well intentioned are neither practical nor safe," but did not specifically address the first recommendation. In addition, we would like to clarify the Safety Board's intent in making the second recommendation. Many transit systems comparable to SEPTA have established emergency procedures such as the establishment of manual blocks, operating at reduced speeds, proceeding only with train dispatcher permission, and other emergency disciplines. Obviously there will be instances where a hazard would be created in discharging passengers in areas such as tunnels, bridges, or isolated locations. Our intent, however, was that the train be moved to the nearest suitable discharge point while operating under emergency restrictions, then effect passenger discharge from the substandard equipment. Safety Recommendation R-76-44 recommended that SEPTA "Insure that communication facilities are adequate for dependable operational control and that proper procedures are in effect to provide emergency warnings and instructions." The Safety Board would appreciate your further review of these three recommendations and an indication of any action with respect to them which SEPTA may take, so that our records will adequately reflect the status of these recommendations.

From: NTSB
To: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Date: 2/22/1978
Response:

From: NTSB
To: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Date: 9/2/1976
Response:

From: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 8/10/1976
Response: WMATA LETTER: EACH CAR IS EQUIPPED WITH A RADIO. RADIO CHECKS ARE MADE PRIOR TO ENTERING MAINLINE OPERATION EACH DAY. RADIO COMMUNICATION BETWEEN OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER AND EACH TRAIN IS FREQUENT THROUGHOUT THE OPERATING DAY. IN ADDITION, TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION IS AVAILABLE ALONG THE RIGHT-OF-WAY SPACED AT A MAXIMUM OF 800 FEET BETWEEN LOCATIONS.

From: NTSB
To: Port Authority Transit Corporation
Date: 2/24/1978
Response: This Recommendation (No R-76-44) was classified "Closed-Acceptable Action" as the Board accepted your actions on its behalf.

From: NTSB
To: Port Authority Transit Corporation
Date: 9/2/1976
Response: Your response will be made a part of the public docket to indicate PATCO's compliance with the recommendations. Based upon your response, I will recommend to the Board that those recommendations, as they relate to PATCO's operation, be closed.

From: Port Authority Transit Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 8/11/1976
Response: PATCO LETTER: PATCO REPORTS ITS TRAIN OPERATORS HAVE 2-WAY RADIO COMMUNICATION WITH THEIR DISPATCHER. THEY ALSO HAVE A PRIVATE TELEPHONE SYSTEM (PAX) WITH INSTRUMENTS AT ALL STATIONS AND SIGNAL RELAY HOUSES AS WELL AS AT TRACKSIDE LOCATIONS A 1/4 MILE APART. ALL CARS HAVE PUBLIC-ADDRESS SYSTEMS CONTROLLED FROM OPERATOR'S CAB. AN ELABORATE PROCE DURE IS IN EFFECT WHICH REQUIRES POSITIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO BE FOLLLOWED IN THE EVENT OF TOTAL COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE. COMPLETE OPERATIONAL SITUATION IS MONITORED BY DISPATCHER BY MEANS OF TRACK-MODEL BOARD WHICH SHOWS LOCATIONS OF ALL TRAINS ON LINE.

From: NTSB
To: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
Date: 8/17/1978
Response: This Recommendation (R-76-44) was classified "Closed-Acceptable Action."

From: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
To: NTSB
Date: 1/3/1978
Response: PATH LETTER: THE TRAIN-TO-WAYSIDE RADIO SYSTEM IS THE FOUNDATION OF OUR COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK. THIS SYSTEM PERMITS DIRECT AND CONTINUING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER AND CREWS ON TRAINS...THE SYSTEM ALSO INCLUDES PORTABLE RADIOS FOR USE BY POLICE, MAINTEN ANCE AND OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL. AS AN ADDED SAFEGUARD, ALL THE TUNNEL AREAS ARE EQUIPPED WITH PROPRIETARY BACK-UP TELEPHONES, IN ADDITION TO CENTREX TELEPHONES. THE LAST COMPONENT IS THE STATION PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM WHICH PER MITS THE COMMUNICATION AGENT STAFF TO MAKE SYSTEM-WIDE OR SELECTED ANNOUNCEMENTS TO PASSENGERS AND STAFF.

From: NTSB
To: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
Date: 11/9/1977
Response: We agree that the first two recommendations [R-76-42, -43] are not applicable to PATH; however, we believe the last recommendation [R-76-44] may apply. We would therefore appreciate your views with respect to the adequacy and dependability of PATH communication facilities in every day operations, and any procedures in effect which provide emergency warnings and guidance.

From: NTSB
To: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
Date: 2/22/1978
Response: This recommendation (No. R-76-44) was classified "Closed-Acceptable Action" as the Board accepted your action on its behalf.

From: NTSB
To: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
Date: 9/23/1976
Response: Your response to recommendation R-76-44 is consistent with the intent of the Board. The Safety Board's record on this accident will contain your statement. When the MBTA decides to use the Automatic Train Operation - Automatic Train Control system which is in place without the manual block operation the Board would appreciate hearing from you in regard to recommendations R-76-42 and 43.

From: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 8/5/1976
Response: MBTA LETTER: MBTA REPORTS THEY HAVE AN "ADEQUATE RADIO COMMUNICATION SYSTEM FOR OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND ALL RAPID TRANSIT TRAINS ARE EQUIPPED WITH TWO-WAY RADIO COMMUNICA TION. PROCEDURES FOR RADIO COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND EMPLOYEES ARE INSTRUCTED IN THESE PROCEDURES PERIODICALLY."

From: NTSB
To: Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
Date: 1/31/1978
Response: The communication facilities of GCRTA afford radio communication between trains and the tower control supervisor with monitoring by your traffic control center. This procedure, plus the availability of wayside telephones at interlocking areas, offers a satisfactory response to recommendation R-76-44.

From: Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
To: NTSB
Date: 11/21/1977
Response: GCRTA LETTER: TRAIN TO TOWER CONTROL SUPERVISOR RADIO COMMUNICATIONS ARE ALSO MONITORED BY THE TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTER TO INSURE DEPENDABLE OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE IN EMERGENCIES. ALSO LPL TYPE LAND PHONES ARE AVAILABLE AT ALL INTERLOCKING AREAS.

From: NTSB
To: Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
Date: 11/8/1977
Response: The Safety Board would appreciate being advised of the action taken with respect to each of the three recommendations. A copy of the subject recommendations is enclosed for your convenience.