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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation R-80-048
Details
Synopsis: ON APRIL 9, 1980, WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD (WP) FREIGHT TRAIN EXTRA UP 3734 WEST (SEALAND 6) HAD ITS CABOOSE, THREE HELPER LOCOMOTIVE UNITS BEHIND THE CABOOSE, AND SEVEN FREIGHT CARS DERAILED AT THE INDUSTRAIL PARKWAY OVERPASS AT HAYWARD, CALIFORNIA. OF THE NINE CREWMEMBERS, TWO WERE KILLED AND TWO WERE INJURED. THREE LOCOMOTIVE UNITS AND THE CABOOSE WERE DESTROYED. DAMAGE WAS ESTIMATED AT $1,382,000.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ADMINISTRATION: REQUIRE OTHER RAPID TRANSIT OPERATIONS TO ESTABLISH ADEQUATE MUTUAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES IN INSTANCES WHERE RAPID TRANSIT TRAINS OPERATE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO AN OPERATIONAL RAILROAD LINE.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action
Mode: Railroad
Location: Hayward, CA, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: 79807
Accident Reports: Derailment of Western Pacific Railroad Company Freight Train Extra Up 3734 West (Sealand 6)
Report #: RAR-80-10
Accident Date: 4/9/1980
Issue Date: 10/24/1980
Date Closed: 2/28/1989
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FTA (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FTA
Date: 2/28/1989
Response:

From: NTSB
To: FTA
Date: 7/25/1988
Response: On three separate occasions during the last 2 years, the National Transportation Safety Board has requested information from the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) regarding a number of safety recommendations that have been held in an "open" status for a considerable length of time. The Board's last letter, dated August 3, 1987, a copy of which is enclosed for your information, outlined that Board's concerns with respect to these recommendations which include Safety Recommendations R-79-62 and -63, R-80-48, and R-81-3, -6, -7, -9, -10, -11, -17, and -18. Despite our repeated requests for information, our records indicate that UMTA has provided no further response to these safety recommendations. The Board believes firmly in the merit of these recommendations, and we are disappointed that UMTA, as suggested by the lack of response, has not taken the necessary action to implement these recommendations. In view of the foregoing, the Board has, for the record, placed the above mentioned safety recommendations in a "Closed-Unacceptable Action" status. However, if UMTA can provide information which would indicate that the intent of these recommendations has been met or that an acceptable alternate course of action has been taken, the Board would consider reclassifying the recommendations upon receipt of that information.

From: FTA
To: NTSB
Date: 10/23/1987
Response: REFERENCE IS MADE TO NTSB CONCERNS RELATING TO DISTRIBUTION OF THE UMTA EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS GUIDELINES AND THE COMMENT THAT THE HEAD OF THE CLEVELAND TRANSIT SYSTEM'S SAFETY DEPARTMENT WAS UNAWARE OF THE UMTA GUIDELINES. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE GREATER CLEVELAND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY HAD A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ITS SAFETY DEPARTMENT ON THE INDUSTRY WORKING GROUP WHICH ASSISTED IN DEVELOPING THE UMTA GUIDELINES. THESE GUIDELINES WERE DISTRIBUTED TO THE APPROPRIATE RAIL TRANSIT PERSONNEL. THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION'S TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROGRAM, THE GUIDELINES WERE WIDELY DISTRIBUTED TO OTHERS IN THE TRANSIT INDUSTRY BOTH NATIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY. TO COMPLEMENT THE UMTA GUIDELINES, AN AUTOMATED EMERGENCY RESPONSE SYSTEM IS CURRENTLY IN USE AT BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT, WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND PORT AUTHORITY TRANSIT CORPORATION. OTHER TRANSIT AGENCIES, E.G., NYCTA AND MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, ARE DEVELOPING SIMILAR SYSTEMS FOR USE IN THEIR COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL CENTERS. THE UMTA GUIDELINES HAVE ALSO BEEN USED BY THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION IN REVISING ITS CIRCULAR ON EMERGENCY PLANNING, AND WE PLAN TO AGAIN DISTRIBUTE THESE GUIDELINES TO APPROPRIATE TRANSIT AGENCY PERSONNEL.

From: NTSB
To: FTA
Date: 8/3/1987
Response: In a letter to UMTA dated August 21, 1986, the Safety Board stated that we had found the Recommended Emergency Preparedness Guidelines for Rail Transit Systems" to be comprehensive and we believed they should prove to be useful to the transit systems in the development of their respective emergency response procedures. The Board considered these guidelines an acceptable alternative to the requirements outlined in Safety Recommendations R-79-62 and -63 and R-80-48. Safety Recommendations R-79-62 and -63 were issued to UMTA as a result of the Board's investigation of a fire onboard a Bay Area Rapid Transit District train inside the Transbay Tube on January 19, 1979. Safety Recommendation R-80-48 was issued to UMTA as a result of the Board's investigation of the derailment of a Western Pacific Railroad Company freight train at Hayward, California, on April 9, 1980. The Board, however, expressed concern in its August 21, 1986, letter that the guidelines may not have received sufficient attention during distribution to make the appropriate personnel within the transit system aware of their usefulness. The Board's investigation of the July 10, 1985, Cleveland accident revealed that the head of the Safety Department in the Cleveland transit system was not aware of the UMTA's guidelines. Our records indicate, however, that we have not received a further response from UMTA regarding this matter. Therefore, the Board would appreciate being informed if UMTA has taken the action recommended in our August 21, 1986, letter, a copy of which is enclosed. In view of the time that has elapsed since our July 30, 1986, and August 21, 1986 letters, the above recommendations have been reclassified to an "Open-Unacceptable Action" status.

From: NTSB
To: FTA
Date: 8/21/1986
Response: The Safety Board appreciates receiving and has reviewed with interest UMTA's "Recommended Emergency Preparedness Guidelines for Rail Transit Systems," which UMTA indicates has been distributed to all transit operators in the United States. The Board finds these guidelines to be comprehensive, and we believe they should prove to be useful to the transit systems in the development of their respective emergency response procedures. With respect to Safety Recommendation R-79-62 and -63, the Board notes that UMTA has recommended that appropriate personnel be trained in techniques for uncoupling cars in emergency situations and that transit systems consider a vehicle uncoupling system which allows the operator to uncouple cars without leaving the train. The Board notes also that UMTA has addressed the topic of Safety Recommendation R-80-48 urging the transit systems to establish emergency procedures with railroads operating on the adjacent tracks. The Safety Board considers these guidelines an acceptable alternative to the intent of Safety Recommendations R-79-62 and -63 and R-80-48. However, while the Board notes UMTA's statement that these guidelines have been distributed to all transit operators in the United States, the Board is concerned that these guidelines may not have received sufficient attention during distribution to make the appropriate personnel within the transit systems aware of their usefulness. The Board's ongoing investigation of the July 10, 1985, Cleveland accident has revealed that the head of the Safety Department in the Cleveland transit system was not aware of UMTA's guidelines. Since the Board is concerned that this may be true with other transit systems, the Board encourages UMTA to contact all transit systems to ascertain that the appropriate personnel have received copies of the guidelines. Pending a response to the Board's concern, Safety Recommendations R-79-62 and -63 and R-80-48 will be held in an "Open-Acceptable Alternate Action" status.

From: FTA
To: NTSB
Date: 6/6/1986
Response: GUIDELINES CONCERNING EMERGENCIES WHEN RAILROADS ARE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO TRANSIT SYSTEMS CAN BE FOUND IN APPENDIX A (INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL AGREEMENTS), SUBSECTION D (ADJACENT RAILROADS.)

From: FTA
To: NTSB
Date: 4/21/1986
Response: UMTA'S INITIAL RESPONSE OF NOVEMBER 12, 1980 ATTACHED NTSB'S FOLLOWUP LETTER OF MAY 22, 1981 ATTACHED UMTA'S FURTHER RESPONSE OF NOVEMBER 5, 1981 ATTACHED NTSB'S FOLLOWUP LETTER OF JUNE 21, 1982

From: NTSB
To: FTA
Date: 4/21/1986
Response: On November 12, 1980, UMTA responded to the Board's recommendation and indicated that it would request all U.S. rail transit properties to send UMTA a copy of notification procedures used in mutual emergencies in instances where rapid transit trains operate in close proximity to an operational railroad. UMTA indicated further that if such procedures did not exist, UMTA would request the manager of the property to take steps to establish these procedures. In its May 22, 1981 letter, the Safety Board commended UMTA for its efforts to address the recommendation and noted that UMTA planned to incorporate a "shared corridor notification" guideline in the Emergency Preparedness Document being jointly prepared by UMTA and the American Public Transit Association (APTA). Safety Recommendation R-80-48 was being held in an "Open-Acceptable Action" status pending further action toward its implementation. UMTA indicated in its November 5, 1981 letter, that it was currently reviewing the responses of the transit properties and that it would assist the properties concerning notification procedures based on the needs established in the cooperative effort of UMTA and APTA to develop a section of the Emergency Preparedness Guidelines devoted to "Outside Agency Interface." In its June 21, 1982, letter, the Board continued to hold the recommendation in an "Open-Acceptable Action" status pending completion of the guideline. The Safety Board has never received a response to its June 21, 1982 letter. In view of the time that has elapsed since that letter which indicates to the Board a lack of action on UMTA's part, Safety Recommendation R-80-48 has been placed in an "Open-Unacceptable Action" status. If the guideline discussed above was completed, the Board would appreciate being informed and receiving a copy. The Board will, however, place Safety Recommendation R-80-48 in a "Closed-Unacceptable Action" status, if we do not receive a reply within 90 days from the date of our letter.

From: NTSB
To: FTA
Date: 6/21/1982
Response: The UMTA's cooperation in this matter is appreciated. We will hold this recommendation in an "Open-Acceptable Action" status pending completion of the guideline.

From: FTA
To: NTSB
Date: 11/5/1981
Response: UMTA LTR: UMTA IS NOW REVIEWING RESPONSES TO THE LETTER OF DECEMBER 16, 1980. UMTA WILL ASSIST THE PROPERTIES CONCERNING NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES BASED ON THE NEEDS ESTABLISHED IN THE COOPERATIVE EFFORT OF UMTA AND APTA TO DEVELOP A SECTION OF THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS GUIDELINES DEVOTED TO "OUTSIDE AGENCY INTERFACE."

From: NTSB
To: FTA
Date: 5/22/1981
Response: The Safety Board commends UMTA for requesting that all rail transit properties submit mutual emergency notification procedures that now exist. We also endorse the steps that UMTA is taking to establish such procedures if they have not been developed. We are pleased to learn that UMTA will review transit property procedures "to determine if modifications are necessary to ensure that they are adequate." In addition, we understand that UMTA will incorporate a "shared corridor notification" guideline in the Emergency Preparedness Document being jointly prepared by UMTA and the American Public Transit Association. Based on the information presented, Recommendation R-80-48 will be held in an "Open-Acceptable Action" status pending further action toward its implementation. We look forward to hearing from you.

From: FTA
To: NTSB
Date: 11/12/1980
Response: UMTA LTR: UMTA IS TAKING THE FOLLOWING ACTION: ALL U.S. RAIL TRANSIT PROPERTIES WILL BE REQUESTED TO SEND TO UMTA A COPY OF NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES USED IN MUTUAL EMERGENCIES IN INSTANCES WHERE RAPID TRANSIT TRAINS OPERATE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO AN OPERATIONAL RAILROAD LINE. IF SUCH PROCEDURES DO NOT EXIST, WE ARE REQUESTING THE MANAGER OF THE PROPERTY TO TAKE STEPS TO ESTABLISH THESE PROCEDURES AND TO ADVISE US OF A SCHEDULE TO DO SO. PER UMTA 12/16/80 LETTER TO THE MASSACUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, UMTA WILL REVIEW THE PROCEDURES USED AT ALL TRANSIT PROPERTIES TO DETERMINE IF MODIFICATIONS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE ADEQUATE. IN ADDITION, WE WILL INCORPORATE A 'SHARED CORRIDOR NOTIFICATION' GUIDELINE IN THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DOCUMENT BEING JOINTLY PREPARED BY THE UMTA AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION.