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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation R-87-052
Details
Synopsis: AT 4:25 P.M. E.D.T., ON JULY 8, 1986, 15 CARS OF A SOUTH BOUND BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY FREIGHT TRAIN CONSISTING OF 44 CARS AND A LOCOMOTIVE, DERAILED WHILE TRAVELING AT 45 MPH NEAR MIAMISBURG, OHIO. THREE OF THE 15 DERAILED CARS WERE TANK CARS CONTAINING YELLOW PHOSPHORUS, MOLTEN SULFUR, AND TALLOW. WHILE DERAILING ON A BRIDGE, THESE TANK CARS WERE EXTENSIVELY DAMAGED, LOST PRODUCT, AND WERE INVOLVED IN THE RESULTING FIRE. APPROX IMATELY 7,000 RESIDENTS FROM A SECTION OF MIAMISBURG WERE INITIALLY EVACUATED AS A SAFETY PRECAUTION. ON THE FOL LOWING DAY AS A WRECKAGE-CLEARING CREW CONTRACTED BY THE RAILROAD WAS PREPARING TO REMOVE THE SMOLDERING PHOSPHORUS TANK CAR, A CONCRETE STRUCTURE SUPPORTING THE TANK CAR COL LAPSED AND SEVERAL HUNDRED GALLONS OF MOLTEN PHOSPHORUS IN SIDE THE TANK CAR ESCAPED AND IGNITED, RESULTING IN AN EX TENSIVE CLOUD OF PHOSPHORUS COMBUSTION EFFLUENTS. DURING THE NEXT 48 HOURS, A 3-SQUARE-MILE AREA OF MONTGOMERY COUN TY, OHIO, WAS EVACUATED, FORCING AN ESTIMATED 30,000 PEOPLE TO LEAVE THEIR HOMES AND BUSINESSES; 569 PERSON WERE TREATED FOR VARIOUS COMPLAINTS DURING THE INCIDENT. TOTAL PROPERTY DAMAGE WAS APPROXIMATELY $3,540,000, INCLUDING THE COST OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS CLEANUP.
Recommendation: THR NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS: DETERMINE THROUGH ANALYSIS OF ITS "REPORTS OF REPAIRS" RECORDS THE CAUSES OF TANK CAR ATTACHMENT FAILURES.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Railroad
Location: Miamisburg, OH, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA86HZ003
Accident Reports: Derailment of CSX Transportation Extra 7614​​Hazardous Materials Release Following the Derailment of Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company Train No. SLFR
Report #: HZM-87-01
Accident Date: 7/8/1986
Issue Date: 10/16/1987
Date Closed: 7/10/1992
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: Association of American Railroads (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Hazmat

Safety Recommendation History
From: Association of American Railroads
To: NTSB
Date: 7/30/1992
Response:

From: NTSB
To: Association of American Railroads
Date: 7/10/1992
Response: Safety Recommendation R-87-52 urged the AAR to determine through analysis of its repair records the causes for the failure of attachments to the tank car shells. The Safety Board notes that the AAR has established a computer data base that will be used. to analyze accident and nonaccident failures on tank cars. With the development of the R-2 and SS-2 forms from which data will be collected and entered into the data base, the AAR now has the capability to analyze repair records and then to determine the causes of tank car failures, as called for by the recommendation. The AAR has also indicated that the computer data base is operational and that information is being collected and entered into the computer data base. The Safety Board believes these actions satisfy the intent of Safety Recommendation R-87-52, which is classified as "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: Association of American Railroads
To: NTSB
Date: 5/26/1992
Response: THE "REPORT OF REPAIR," AAR FORM R-1, IS NOT THE IDEAL MECHANISM TO DEVELOP THE TYPE OF ANALYSIS ENVISIONED IN R-87-52. THE TANK CAR COMMITTEE HAS DEVELOPED A NEW R-2 FORM THAT IS TO BE SUBMITTED IN THOSE CASES OF REPAIRS OF TANKS DUE TO BUCKLES, CORROSION AND CRACKS THAT ARE NON-ACCIDENT RELATED. THE R-2 FORM HAS BEEN DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE INFORMATION CAN BE ENTERED INTO A COMPUTER DATA BASE. THIS DATA BASE WILL BE USED TO IDENTIFY PROBLEMS ON TANK CARS, INCLUDING ATTACHMENT FAILURES, AND TO TRIGGER INITIATIVES FOR REVISING PRESENT STANDARDS TO CORRECT ANY DESIGN DEFICIENCIES UNCOVERED. THE DATA ON THOSE FAILURES THAT ARE ACCIDENT-RELATED ARE MAINTAINED BY THE JOINT RPI/AAR TANK CAR SAFETY PROJECT. THIS DATA BASE ALSO CONTAINS INFORMATION ON TANK CARS THAT ARE SCRAPPED AS A RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT. BOTH RPI AND AAR HAVE ACCESS TO THESE DATA FOR ANALYSIS. ADDITIONALLY, THE RPI/AAR TANK CAR SAFETY PROJECT, AS A RESULT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING STUB SILL TANK CARS, IS ENGAGED IN AN AMBITIOUS PROGRAM TO INSPECT STUB SILLS OF APPROXIMATELY 160,000 TANK CARS. A NEW FORM SS-2 WHICH CAPTURES RELEVANT INSPECTION RESULTS WILL COMPLEMENT NEW EXHIBIT R-2, AND BOTH WILL SUPPORT COMPUTERIZED DATA ANALYSIS.

From: Association of American Railroads
To: NTSB
Date: 4/13/1990
Response:

From: NTSB
To: Association of American Railroads
Date: 6/9/1988
Response: While the Board notes your comment that this work currently is conducted, it is our understanding that the "Reports of Repairs" are not stored in a form, such as computerized data, to permit thorough, routine analyses. In fact, we were advised last year that the filing system then under development would be a microfilm data base that includes a limited number of computer related access keys thereby providing rather limited data search capabilities. Consequently, it is difficult to understand how the AAR previously has or, even with its new microfilm system, will be able to achieve the objective sought by this safety recommendation. The Board would appreciate more specific information about the system used by the AAR for performing this analysis including the capabilities and limitations of this system. Additionally, the Board would appreciate receiving a copy of the report of AAR's findings from its latest thorough review of all R-l reports. Pending a further response to the Board's inquiries, Safety Recommendation R-87-52 will be held in an "Open--Acceptable Action" status.

From: Association of American Railroads
To: NTSB
Date: 2/22/1988
Response: THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS CURRENTLY CONDUCTS A THOROUGH REVIEW OF ALL R-1 REPORTS ASSOCIATED WITH AN INCIDENT, AND FURNISHES PERTINENT INFORMATION TO THE ACCIDENT REVIEW WORKING GROUP OF THE TANK CAR COMMITTEE. THE WORKING GROUP UTILIZES THE R-1 DATA, ALONG WITH ALL OTHER INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THE INCIDENT, TO DETERMINE: 1. WHAT HAPPENED. 2. WHETHER A DESIGN PROBLEM WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE INCIDENT. 3. IF A DOT AND/OR AAR SPECIFICATION IS INVOLVED. 4. WHETHER OR NOT SPECIFICATION CHANGES MIGHT BE WARRANTED. FOLLOWING THE WORKING GROUP ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS ARE FORWARDED TO THE FULL TANK CAR COMMITTEE FOR REVIEW. IN THE EVENT SPECIFICATION REVISIONS ARE INDICATED AS A MEANS TO ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED IN THE ACCIDENT REVIEW PROCESS, APPROPRIATE COMMITTEE ACTIONS ARE PROGRESSED AND, IF JUSTIFIED, PETITIONS ARE FILED WITH DOT TO AMEND REGULATIONS. THE CURRENT REVIEW PROCESS HAS PROVEN TO BE AND IS NOW EFFECTIVE IN IDENTIFYING AREAS WHERE DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS ARE NECESSARY.