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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation R-95-020
Details
Synopsis: ON 6/6/94, A CONDUCTOR FOR THE NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY DETECTED PRODUCT LEAKING FROM THE BOTTOM OF TANK CAR UTLX 79211 IN THE NORFOLK SOUTHERN HARRY DEBUTTS YARD IN CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE. THE TANK CAR CONTAINED 12,184 GALLONS OF A 75-PERCENT CONCENTRATION OF ARSENIC ACID, WHICH IS CLASSIFIED AS A POISONOUS MATERIAL & ALSO DESIGNATED AS A MARINE POLLUTANT UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION HAZARDOUS MATERIALS REGULATIONS.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE RAILWAY PROGRESS INSTITUTE: ASSIST THE FRA WITH THE EVALUATION OF THE FAILURE RATE & THE MODE OF FAILURE OF BOWEL-SHAPED SUMPS & EDUCTION PIPE BRACING SYSTEMS IN TANK CARS TRANSPORTING HAZARDOUS MATERIALS.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Railroad
Location: Chattanooga, TN, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA94SZ011
Accident Reports: ​Tank Car Failure and Release of Arsenic Acid
Report #: HZM-95-01
Accident Date: 6/6/1994
Issue Date: 3/2/1995
Date Closed: 1/9/2001
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: Railway Progress Institute, Inc. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Hazmat

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: Railway Progress Institute, Inc.
Date: 1/9/2001
Response: The Safety Board notes that the RPI and the Tank Car Committee of the Association of American Railroads (AAR) met in June 1995 and amended the AAR’s Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices to address sump and eduction pipe bracing systems. The RPI indicates that the amended standard should prevent the recurrence of the circumstances that caused the Chattanooga incident. The RPI and the AAR also note that, to reduce such failures, a procedure must be in place to identify the eduction pipe to the car and to insure proper orientation and fit when reinstalled or replaced per the original design. As the RPI has assisted in evaluating the sumps and bracing systems described, Safety Recommendation R-95-20 is classified “Closed—Acceptable Action.”

From: Railway Progress Institute, Inc.
To: NTSB
Date: 8/30/2000
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 09/01/2000 2:59:05 PM MC# 2001207 At the suggestion of RPI, the AAR Tank Car Committee discussed the issue at its July 18, 1995, meeting at which representatives of FRA and NTSB were present. The AAR Committee directed that a review of the design, fabrication, assembly and maintenance of bowl-shaped pumps and eduction pipe systems be carried out. The review resulted in an amendment to the specifications for tank cars in Section 2.2.4 of the AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices. The new specification is expected to prevent any recurrence of the circumstances that caused the Chattanooga incident.

From: NTSB
To: Railway Progress Institute, Inc.
Date: 7/28/2000
Response: THE SAFETY BOARD WOULD APPRECIATE LEARNING OF ANY ACTIONS THAT THE RPI HAS TAKEN OR INTENDS TO TAKE SINCE OUR LAST CORRESPONDENCE TO ADDRESS R-91-32, R-93-15, AND R-95-20.

From: NTSB
To: Railway Progress Institute, Inc.
Date: 7/17/1995
Response: THE BOARD NOTES THAT THE RPI COMMITTEE ON TANK CARS WILL WORK WITH FRA & THE ASSOCITION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS IN THIS EFFORT. WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE RESULTS OF THIS EVALUATION. PENDING ITS COMPLETING, R-95-20 IS CLASSIFIED "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE."

From: Railway Progress Institute, Inc.
To: NTSB
Date: 6/26/1995
Response: THE RAILWAY PROGRESS INSTITUTE COMMITTEE ON TANK CARS WILL WORK WITH THE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION & ASSOCIATION OF AMERICN RAILROADS IN EVALUTING THE FAILURE RATE & THE MODE OF FAILURE OF BOWL-SHAPED SUMPS & EDUCTION PIPE BRACING SYSTEMS IN TANK CAR CARRYING HAZARDOUS MATERIALS.