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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation R-96-009
Details
Synopsis: AT 2:39 P.M. ON 2/9/95, METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY/YORK CITY TRANSIT (NYCT) NORTHBOUND M LINE SUBWAY TRAIN COLLIDED WITH THE REAR CAR OF A STOPPED NYCT B LINE SUBWAY TRAIN. THE COLLISION OCCURRED ON ELEVATED TRACK ABOUT 1,011 FEET SOUTH OF THE NINTH AVENUE STATION IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, FOUR NYCT EMPLOYEES & 11 PASSENGERS SUSTAINED MINOR INJURIES. THE BOARD HAS REVIEWED THE 7/26/90, NYCT REAR-END COLLISION THAT INVOLVED KEYING BY WITHOUT PERMISSION IN WHICH THE TRACK, SIGNAL, & TRAINS WERE THE SAME AS IN THIS FEBRUARY 1995 COLLISION. THE RTO WAS INFORMED BY MEMORANDUM AFTER THE NYCT INVESTIGATION THAT THE COLLISION WAS CAUSED "BY THE FAILURE OF THE OPERATOR, OPERATING THE M TRAIN, TO ADHERE TO THE OPERATING RULES RELATIVE TO PASSING RED SIGNALS, & PASSING RED SIGNALS, & FAILING TO PAY PROPER ATTENTION TO THE OPERATION OF THE TRAIN" & WAS ISSUED A RECOMMENDATION BY THE OFFICE OF SYSTEM SAFETY TO "INSTRUCT LOCAL SUPERVISORS TO INCREASE THEIR OBSERVATION OF OPERATOR'S PERFORMANCE IN THEIR AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY AS A DETERRENT TO IMPROPER TRAIN OPERATION." AFTER THE 3/10/89, REAR-END COLLISION AT THE 103RD STREET STATION, THE BOARD ASKED THE NYCT IN R-90-4 TO CONDUCT RANDOM TESTING, USING RADAR GUNS, OF TRAIN SPEED, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS GIVEN TO THOSE LOCATIONS WHERE SPEED RESTRICTIONS ARE IN EFFECT, THE NYCT RESPONDED THAT "OPERATORS ARE REGULARLY MONITORED FOR THEIR ADHERENCE TO POSTED SPEED LIMITS; WE WILL, MANPOWER PERMITTING, INTENSIFY OUR EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT SPEED RESTRICTIONS ARE STRICTLY OBEY."
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY/NEW CITY TRANSIT: DEACTIVATE THE AUTOMATIC KEY-BY FEATURE AT EVERY ONE-SHOT GUIDE TIME SIGNAL.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Mode: Railroad
Location: BROOKLYN, NY, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA95MR001
Accident Reports: Collision and Derailment of Two Subway Trains Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit
Report #: RAR-96-01
Accident Date: 2/9/1995
Issue Date: 3/27/1996
Date Closed: 12/12/1997
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Signals, Transit

Safety Recommendation History
From: Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit
To: NTSB
Date: 12/26/1997
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 1/6/98 11:36:37 AM MC# 980006

From: Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit
To: NTSB
Date: 12/2/1996
Response:

From: NTSB
To: Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit
Date: 10/15/1996
Response: THE BOARD REGRETS THAT THE NYCT HAS REJECTED THE RECOMMENDED ACTION BASED ON OPERATIONAL IMPACTS WITHOUT CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS TO ELIMINATE THE AUTOMATIC KEY-BY FEATURE. ACCORDINGLY, THE BOARD HAS CLASSIFIED R-96-9 "OPEN--UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE." & ASKS THAT THE NYCT EXPLORE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS THAT WOULD MINIMIZE NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON OPERATIONS.

From: Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit
To: NTSB
Date: 5/22/1996
Response: MR LAWRENCE G. REUTER, PRESIDENT, METRO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT RESPONDED ON 5/22/96, THAT NYCT DOES NOT RECOMMEND DEACTIVATING THE AUTOMATIC KEY-BY FEATURE AT ONE SHOT GRADE SIGNAL LOCATIONS. THE ELIMINATION OF THIS FEATURE, CAUSES THE TRAIN OPERATOR TO LEAVE THE TRAIN & USE HIS/HER FOOT TO OPERATE THE TRAIN STOP WHEN PERMISSION IS GRANTED TO PASS A RED SIGNAL. THIS WOULD IMPACT CUSTOMER SERVICE. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE RISKS OF SYSTEM SAFETY ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ELIMINATION OF THE KEY-BY FEATURE, BECAUSE IT COULD DELAY A RESCUE TRAIN CLOSING UP TO ANOTHER TRAIN OR DELAY TRAIN MOVEMENT IN A SMOKE FIRE SITUATION OR IN THE PRESENCE OF OTHER HAZARDS.