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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-18-003
Synopsis: On October 28, 2016, about 1432 central daylight time, American Airlines flight 383, a Boeing 767-323, N345AN, had started its takeoff ground roll at Chicago O’Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, when an uncontained engine failure and subsequent fire occurred. The flight crew aborted the takeoff and stopped the airplane on the runway, and the flight attendants initiated an emergency evacuation. Of the 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 161 passengers on board, 1 passenger received a serious injury, and 1 flight attendant and 19 passengers received minor injuries during the evacuation. The airplane was substantially damaged from the fire. The airplane was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Establish and lead an industry group that evaluates current and enhanced inspection technologies regarding their appropriateness and effectiveness for applications using nickel alloys, and use the results of this evaluation to issue guidance pertaining to the inspection process for nickel alloy rotating engine components.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Open - Acceptable Response
Mode: Aviation
Location: Chicago, IL, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Accident #: DCA17FA021
Accident Reports: ​Uncontained Engine Failure and Subsequent Fire American Airlines Flight 383 Boeing 767-323, N345AN
Report #: AAR-18-01
Accident Date: 10/28/2016
Issue Date: 2/6/2018
Date Closed:
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Open - Acceptable Response)

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
Date: 6/6/2018
Response: We note that you regularly meet with engine and rotor grade material manufacturers as part of the Aerospace Industries Association’s (AIA’s) Rotor Integrity Steering Committee and the Jet Engine Titanium Quality Committee, and that you plan to address these recommendations as part of your meetings and discussions with these groups. Based on these discussions with industry, you plan to revise your policies requiring ultrasonic inspection techniques during manufacturing or in service for engine rotor life-limited parts, as needed. Pending your evaluation of inspection technologies for use with nickel alloys, and improved guidance pertaining to the inspection process for nickel alloy rotating engine components, Safety Recommendation A 18 3 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. Pending a requirement to use subsurface in-service inspection techniques for critical high-energy, life-limited rotating parts for all engines, Safety Recommendation A-18 4 is classified “Open—Acceptable Response.”

From: FAA
Date: 4/26/2018
Response: -From Daniel K. Elwell, Acting Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) meets regularly with engine and rotor grade material manufacturers as part of the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) Rotor Integrity Steering Committee (RISC) and Jet Engine Titanium Quality Committee (JETQC). We plan to include recommendations A-18-03 and A-1 8-04 as part of our discussions with the AJA RISC and JETQC to determine the appropriate actions and response to these recommendations. Based on our discussions with industry, the FAA will consider the need for policy requiring ultrasonic inspection techniques during manufacturing or in-service for engine rotor life -limited parts.

From: NTSB
Date: 2/6/2018
Response: On January 30, 2018, the NTSB adopted its report Uncontained Engine Failure and Subsequent Fire, American Airlines Flight 383, Boeing 767-323, N345AN, Chicago, Illinois, October 28, 2016, AAR1801. The details of this accident investigation and the resulting safety recommendations may be found in the attached report, which can also be accessed at Among the Safety Recommendations seven are issued to Federal Aviation Administration, which can be found on page 77 of the report. The NTSB is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are designed to prevent accidents and save lives. We would appreciate a response within 90 days, detailing the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement these recommendations. When replying, please refer to the safety recommendations by number.