



National Transportation Safety Board

Operational Issues

Captain David
Lawrence

Operational Factors



Dispatch

- Runway 18 served by 2 nonprecision approaches
- Published error in localizer approach chart
- Weather forecast 400-foot ceiling at arrival

Dispatch

- UPS removed “remarks” section of weather reports
- ACARS weather did not include “remarks”
- Pilots unaware of variable ceiling


Dispatch

- Dispatchers and pilots share equal responsibility for safety
- Dispatcher training encourages communication
- Dispatcher and pilots did not communicate with each other

En Route to Birmingham

- Flight cleared direct to Birmingham
- ATIS indicated localizer 18
- ATIS weather did not include “remarks”

Approach Setup



Sequencing the Approach

- As flight approached Birmingham, ATC gave vector to join localizer course
- Flight plan not sequenced and verified by flight crew

Navigation Display



Change to Vertical Speed

Captain

- Changed from previously briefed profile mode to vertical speed mode
- Did not verbalize his intentions to first officer
- Increased descent rate to 1,500 fpm

Standard Callouts

- First officer made 1,000-foot callout
- Descent rate exceeded stable approach criteria
- First officer did not make:
 - 500-foot callout
 - “Approaching minimums” callout
 - “Minimums” callout
- Low-altitude aural callouts were not enabled

“Sink Rate” Alert

- Captain response
- EGPWS response guidance
 - Aircraft operating manual (AOM)
 - Pilot training guide (PTG)
- AOM and PTG guidance inconsistent

Continuous Descent Final Approach

- CDFA outlined in Advisory Circular 120-108
- FAA does not require CDFA
- UPS guidance included CDFA and “dive and drive”



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