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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation R-11-003
Details
Synopsis: About 4:44 p.m., eastern standard time, on November 28, 2008, a three-car train (of a type referred to as an automated people mover, [APM]) that was operating along a fixed guideway1 on E Concourse at Miami International Airport near Miami, Florida, failed to stop at the passenger platform and struck a wall at the end of the guideway. Although a maintenance technician was monitoring train operations from the lead car of the train when the accident occurred, the train was operating in fully automatic mode without a human operator. The maintenance technician and five passengers on board the train were injured in the accident. One person on the passenger platform also required medical attention.2 The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was the installation by Johnson Controls, Inc., maintenance technicians of a jumper wire that prevented the overspeed/overshoot system from activating to stop the train when the crystal within the primary program stop module failed. Contributing to the accident were (1) the failure of Johnson Controls, Inc., to provide its maintenance technicians with specific procedures regarding the potential disabling of vital train control systems during passenger operations, (2) ineffective safety oversight by the Miami-Dade Aviation Department, (3) lack of adequate safety oversight of such systems by the state of Florida, and (4) lack of authority by the U.S. Department of Transportation to provide adequate safety oversight of such systems.
Recommendation: TO THE 50 STATES AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Obtain the statutory authority to provide safety oversight of all fixed guideway transportation systems that operate within your jurisdiction, regardless of their funding authorization or the date they began operation.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Open - Unacceptable Response
Mode: Railroad
Location: Miami, FL, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA-09-MR-002
Accident Reports:
Report #: RAR-11-01
Accident Date: 11/28/2008
Issue Date: 12/22/2011
Date Closed:
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: Commonwealth of Kentucky (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Closed - Reconsidered)
Commonwealth of Virginia (Closed - Reconsidered)
District of Columbia (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Alabama (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Alaska (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Arizona (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
State of Arkansas (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of California (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Colorado (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Connecticut (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Delaware (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Florida (Open - Acceptable Response)
State of Georgia (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
State of Hawaii (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Idaho (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Illinois (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Indiana (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Iowa (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Kansas (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Louisiana (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Maine (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Maryland (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Michigan (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Minnesota (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
State of Mississippi (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Missouri (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Montana (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Nebraska (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Nevada (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of New Hampshire (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of New Jersey (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of New Mexico (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of New York (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of North Carolina (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of North Dakota (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Ohio (Closed - Acceptable Action)
State of Oklahoma (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Oregon (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Rhode Island (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of South Carolina (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of South Dakota (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
State of Tennessee (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Texas (Open - Acceptable Response)
State of Utah (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Vermont (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Washington (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
State of West Virginia (Open - Acceptable Response)
State of Wisconsin (Closed - Reconsidered)
State of Wyoming (Closed - Unacceptable Action - No Response Received)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: State of Alaska
Date: 12/22/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 18, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Alaska
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of New York
Date: 9/6/2012
Response: The NTSB notes that New York’s Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB) has oversight of all fixed-guideway route miles that fall under Federal Transit Administration (FTA) jurisdiction, excluding systems regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration. Further, the PTSB’s current statutory authority includes safety oversight of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s New York City Transit subway system and the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority system; the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) has oversight of the AirTrain, which serves John F. Kennedy International Airport. NYSDOT has verified that (1) the program in place at the PANYNJ is similar to the safety oversight mandated by FTA requirements and (2) the oversight provided by the PTSB for FTA funded fixed guideway systems complies with 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 659.5. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION. Thank you for your commitment to transit safety.

From: State of New York
To: NTSB
Date: 6/6/2012
Response: -From Joan McDonald, Commissioner, State of New York, Department of Transportation: Governor Cuomo has asked that I respond to your safety recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) dated December 22, 2011. We at the New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) very much appreciate your commitment to preventing transportation accidents and saving lives by sharing the results of your investigative efforts. Your safety recommendations stem from the referenced investigation of an accident that occurred on November 28, 2008, at the Miami International Airport. You recommend (1) the identification of "all fixed-guideway transportation systems" within the state of New York, and (2) "obtain(ing) statutory authority to provide safety oversight of all fixed-guideway transportation systems that operate within (New York), regardless of their funding authorization or the date they began operation." NYSDOT shares the concern of the NTSB for the safety of public transportation systems and agrees that there are advantages to independent oversight. Our Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB), established by statute in 1984, serves as the State Safety Oversight (SSO) agency for "rail fixed-guideway systems" as defined by 49 CFR § 659.5. These systems include all fixed-guideway route miles ~hat fall under Federal Transit Administration (FTA) jurisdiction, excluding systems regulated; by: the Federal Railroad Administration \ (FRA): 'PTSB ',s current statutory authority includes safety oversight of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's New York City Transit system (subway) and the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority system in western New York NYSDOT has undertaken a review of fixed-guideway transportation systems in New York in accordance with your Safety Recommendation R-l1-2. The "AirTrain" that serves John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) is the only fixed-guideway system that remains outside of PTSB's current statutory authority; however, the AirTrain has never been funded by FTA and is outside of the FT A requirement cited in your letter. Safety oversight for the AirTrain is provided for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) by its Port Authority AirTrain Safety Oversight Board (PAA TSOB). The PAA TSOB was created in 2003 following NTSB's recommendations after an in-depth investigation of a fatal AirTrain accident that occurred during testing and commissioning of that system in September 2002. NYSDOT staff has confirmed with P ANYNJ that its current P A ATSOB activities provide independent oversight of the AirTrain at JFK consistent with the previous recommendations of the NTSB. NYSDOT staff has verified that the program put into place at P ANYNJ is similar to the safety oversight that would be mandated by FT A requirements. The oversight provided by the PTSB for FTA-funded fixed-guideway systems comports with 49 CFR § 659. Consequently, we believe there is no need to expand statutory authority of the PTSB to provide safety oversight to other potential fixed-guideway transportation systems. Thank you again for your continued support of our state safety oversight activities and for NTSB's significant contributions to transportation safety nationwide.

From: NTSB
To: State of Alabama
Date: 9/19/2012
Response: The NTSB appreciates that, although Alabama has no fixed guideway transportation systems operating in the state, it is prepared to address statutory authority issues and requests to operate these systems as needed in the future. However, because Alabama has no such systems at this time, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED. Thank you for your commitment to transit safety.

From: State of Alabama
To: NTSB
Date: 1/20/2012
Response: -From John R. Cooper, Transportation Director: Thank you for your letter requesting information about fixed guideway transportation systems operating within the jurisdiction of the State of Alabama and in the above-referenced safety recommendations. R-11-2: Response: Currently, Alabama has no fixed guideway transportation systems operating in our jurisdiction. R-11-3 Response: At this time, Alabama has no fixed guideway transportation systems operating in our jurisdiction. We are prepared to address statutory authority issues and requests to operate fixed guideway transportation systems.

From: NTSB
To: State of Arizona
Date: 12/21/2017
Response: We issued this recommendation because external safety oversight of public transportation systems is critical to identifying and correcting systemic safety risks that may not be readily apparent or effectively addressed by the operator or transit agency. We believe that fixed guideway transportation systems, such as the Miami airport APM system involved in the November 28, 2008, accident, need higher-level oversight to effectively analyze risk and manage safety. Our investigation of the Miami accident concluded that a lack of state and federal safety oversight can permit fixed guideway transit systems to operate with ineffective safety standards, which could in turn lead to failures in safety critical operations and procedures. In previous correspondence, the Arizona Department of Transportation said that Arizona had identified three fixed guideway transportation systems within the state and had obtained authority to provide safety oversight for two of these systems: the Valley Metro light rail system and the Tucson Sun Link streetcar system. The third system, the Phoenix Sky Train APM, was not covered by the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), and therefore was not eligible for funding from the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA’s) Chapter 53 programs. As a result, at that time, Arizona had not yet been able to identify a source of funding for the safety oversight program we recommended. We replied that we appreciated the challenge of funding a needed program to which the FTA does not contribute; however, we pointed out that Safety Recommendation R-11-3 asked Arizona to obtain statutory authority for all fixed guideway systems regardless of their funding authorization. The APM system at the Miami airport, which is similar to the Phoenix Sky Train, is also not defined by the FTA’s Chapter 53 program as public transit. We note from Mr. Clark’s letter that you do not believe it is practical to expect Arizona to take on safety oversight and funding of an APM system that does not meet the federal definition of a public transit system and is not eligible for federal grant assistance. Accordingly, you do not intend to obtain the needed statutory authority to provide safety oversight of the Phoenix Sky Train. Consequently, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: State of Arizona
To: NTSB
Date: 9/18/2017
Response: -From Matthew Clark, Transportation Policy Advisor to Governor Doug Ducey: The purpose of this letter is to respond to your safety recommendations letter addressed to Governor Doug Ducey, dated August 25, 2017. In that letter, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reminded the state of the NTSB Safety Recommendation R-11-3 that was provided to the State of Arizona on December 22, 2011. As you are aware, the Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT) has articulated in previous correspondences to NTSB on the issue regarding state oversight of the Phoenix Sky Train that the Phoenix Sky Train does not meet any of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements and is not considered a public transit system under the provisions of Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP 21). Furthermore, it is our understanding that rail fixed guideway public transportation system means any fixed guideway system that uses rail, is operated for public transportation, is within the jurisdiction of a State, and is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Railroad Administration, or any such system in engin0ering or construction. Rail fixed guideway public transportation systems include but are. not Jjmited to rapid rail, heavy rail,. light rail, monorail, trolley, inclined plane, funicular, and automated guideway. Because the Phoenix Sky Train does not meet any of the FTA requirements and is not considered a public transit system under the provisions of MAP 21, it is not eligible for federal or state funding. In addition, we believe it is not practical for the NTSB to expect Arizona or any other state to pass legislation to take on the safety oversight responsibility, the risk management exposure and funding of a "sky train" system that does not meet the federal definition of a public transit system and, moreover, is not eligible for federal grant assistance. Our view is that the safety oversight function of thy Phoenix Sky Train should be the responsibility of the service provider (e.g. City of Phoenix Aviation Department or Sky Harbor International Airport). These entities have adequate funding and expertise to perform this function and should be the rightful bearer of any risk management responsibility for this system.

From: NTSB
To: State of Arizona
Date: 8/25/2017
Response: An April 21, 2014, e-mail from Mr. Herman Bernal, Manager, State Safety and Security Oversight (SSO) Program, Arizona Department of Transportation, said that Arizona had identified three fixed guideway transportation systems within the state and had obtained authority to provide safety oversight for two of these systems: the Valley Metro light rail system and the Tucson Sun Link streetcar system. The third system, the Phoenix Sky Train (intra-terminal/intra-facility shuttle services), was not covered by the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act and therefore was not eligible for funding—including the SSO grant funding—from the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA’s) Chapter 53 programs. As a result, at that time, Arizona had not yet been able to identify a source of funding for the safety oversight program we recommended. On June 26, 2014, we replied that we appreciated the challenges of funding a needed program to which the FTA does not contribute; however, we pointed out that Safety Recommendation R-11-3 asks Arizona to obtain statutory authority for all fixed guideway systems regardless of their funding authorization. This recommendation was issued because of an accident involving the automated people mover at the Miami airport, a system similar to the Phoenix Sky Train, which is also not defined as public transit under the FTA’s Chapter 53 program. We encouraged Arizona to seek the needed funding and authority to oversee this system. We have not received any further information regarding Safety Recommendation R-11-3 in the 3 years since Mr. Bernal’s e-mail. Please update us at correspondence@ntsb.gov regarding any actions that have been completed since then to satisfy this recommendation, and do not submit both an electronic and a hard copy of the same response.

From: NTSB
To: State of Arizona
Date: 6/25/2014
Response: We note that Arizona has identified three fixed guideway transportation systems within the state and has obtained authority to provide safety oversight for two of these systems, the Valley Metro light rail system and the Tucson Sun Link streetcar system. The third system, the Phoenix Sky Train (Intra-terminal/Intra-facility shuttle services), is not covered by MAP 21 and therefore is ineligible for funding—including the SSO grant funding—from the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) Chapter 53 programs. We also note that, as a result, Arizona has not yet been able to identify a source of funding for the safety oversight program we recommended. Because you have completed action to address Safety Recommendation R-11-2, it is classified “Closed—Acceptable Action.” We appreciate your efforts to address Safety Recommendation R-11-3 for the Valley Metro light rail and Tucson Sun Link streetcar systems. We also appreciate the challenges of funding a needed program for which the FTA does not provide funds. We point out, however, that Safety Recommendation R-11-3 asks that Arizona obtain statutory authority for all fixed guideway systems regardless of their funding authorization. This recommendation was issued because of an accident involving the automated people mover at the Miami airport, a system similar in purpose to the Phoenix Sky Train, which was not defined as public transit under the FTA’s Chapter 53 programs. As this was our reason for issuing the recommendation, we encourage you to continue to seek the needed funding and authority to oversee this system. In the meantime, pending your obtaining the statutory authority for safety oversight of the Phoenix Sky Train system, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: State of Arizona
To: NTSB
Date: 4/21/2014
Response: Herman Ray Bernal, State Safety and Security Oversight Program Manager, Multimodal Planning Division, Arizona Department of Transportation: Valley Metro (Light Rail) and Tucson Sun Link (Streetcar), are addressed in Arizona Revised Statutes Title 28, Chapter 27 Light Rail Transit System Safety Article 1. General Provisions. Giving the ADOT/SSOA the statutory authority to provide safety oversight. http://www.azleg.state.az.us/ArizonaRevisedStatutes.asp?Title=28 28-9201. Minimum safety standards; violation A. As prescribed by 49 United States Code section 5330 and 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 659 (1995), the department shall establish, implement and enforce minimum safety standards for light rail transit systems and street car systems in a county with a population of more than five hundred thousand persons. B. If the department discovers a violation of the safety standards prescribed in subsection A, the department shall report the violation in writing to the federal transit administration. 28-9202. Public records; confidentiality The department's information relating to the safety oversight of light rail transit systems and street car systems in a county with a population of more than five hundred thousand persons is a public record pursuant to title 39, chapter 1, except that, if the director, in consultation with the federal transit administration, determines the release of certain information would threaten the safety and security of the public, the director may keep the information confidential. Phoenix Sky Train (Intra-terminal/Intra-facility shuttle services), per the definition of "public transportation" in MAP-21. This definition is found on Page 8 of the MAP-21 document in the link below, under § 5302, Definitions, Item 14, Subpart (14)(B) exclusions from this definition of public transportation (vii) intra-terminal or intra-facility shuttle services, is not consider "public transportation" and therefore is not eligible for funding from FTA's Chapter 53 programs, including the SSO grant funding provisions.

From: NTSB
To: State of Arizona
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Arkansas
Date: 2/12/2018
Response: Mr. Nation has informed us that there is only one fixed guideway transportation system in the state, which is operated by Rock Region Metro (formally Central Arkansas Transit Authority). Further, we note that the Arkansas Department of Transportation was designated as the state safety oversight agency by Governor Mike Beebe in 2013. These actions satisfy Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3, which are classified CLOSED--ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: State of Arkansas
To: NTSB
Date: 1/8/2018
Response: -From Greg Nation, Public Transportation Administrator, Public Transportation Programs Section, Arkansas Department of Transportation: Thank you for quickly following up on our request. In reference to Safety Recommendation, R-11-2 · Metro Streetcar operated by Rock Region Metro, formally Central Arkansas Transit Authority is the only fixed guideway transportation system operating within the jurisdiction of ArDOT. In reference to Safety Recommendation, R-11-3 · June 2013 - ArDOT was designated the State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA), by then Governor Mike Beebe. · October 2017 – ArDOT issued a legal opinion from Chief Legal Counsel to FTA and passed Arkansas Highway Commission Order 2017-096 that demonstrated and clarified ArDOT’s statutory authority to provide safety oversight of all fixed guideway transportation systems in the State of Arkansas. Status of State Safety Oversight Program Certification · December 2017 - Arkansas is currently in certification stage 3, “State has submitted all required documents to FTA and is engaged in dialogue with FTA to address comments and questions. Where applicable, all required legislation has been enacted.” If you have additional questions, please advise. Thank you.

From: NTSB
To: State of Arkansas
Date: 12/22/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 18, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Arkansas
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of California
Date: 10/16/2014
Response: We understand that CPUC has been designated as the state safety oversight agency for all fixed guideway systems in California that were planned, acquired, or constructed on or after January 1, 1979. We also understand that the Cal Expo Monorail, Dana Point Strand Funicular, Disneyland Monorail, and Six Flags Magic Mountain Funicular are subject to the oversight regulations and inspections of the California Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH). We note that the Industry Hills Golf Course Funicular no longer operates. Although most of CPUC’s inspection authority was in place prior to our issuance of Safety Recommendation R-11-3, we are pleased to learn that you recently asserted jurisdiction over the Getty Museum Train, which no state agency had previously regulated for safety. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: State of California
To: NTSB
Date: 8/22/2014
Response: -From Dareb Gilbert, Manager, Rail Transit Safety Branch, Safety and Enforcement Division, California Public Utilities Commission: The CPUC has been designated as the fixed guideway State Safety Oversight Agency by the Governor for the purposes of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 659. The California Public Utilities Code Section 99152 (cited below) gives the California Public Utilities Commission jurisdiction over public transit guideways planned, acquired, or constructed, on or after January 1, 1979. California Public Utilities Code Section 99152 Any public transit guideway planned, acquired, or constructed, on or after January 1, 1979, is subject to regulations of the Public Utilities Commission relating to safety appliances and procedures. The commission shall inspect all work done on those guideways and may make further additions or changes necessary for the purpose of safety to employees and the general public. The commission shall develop an oversight program employing safety planning criteria, guidelines, safety standards, and safety procedures to be met by operators in the design, construction, and operation of those guideways. Existing industry standards shall be used where applicable. The commission shall enforce the provisions of this section. The following is the current list of fixed guideway transportation systems under CPUC jurisdiction. 1. AMERICANA ON BRAND TROLLEY - Located in a shopping center 2. ANGEL’S FLIGHT RAILWAY COMPANY – Inclined funicular 3. BART - Bay Area Rapid Transit District 4. GETTY MUSEUM APM – Getty Museum’s Automate People Mover 5. GROVE TROLLEY - Located in a shopping center 6. LACMTA - Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority 7. NCTD Sprinter - North County Transit District’s Sprinter, in San Diego County 8. POLA RCL - Port of Los Angeles Red Car Line 9. SAC APM – Sacramento International Airport Automated People Mover 10. SCVTA - Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority 11.SDTI - San Diego Trolley, Inc. 12.SFMTA - San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency 13. SFO AirTrain - San Francisco International Airport (SFO) inter-terminal automated people mover, and connection to BART 14. SRTD - Sacramento Regional Transit District In summary, all known fixed guideway systems are under some level of state oversight for safety. The CPUC conducted a review and staff identified six fixed guideway systems in California not under the CPUC’s safety jurisdiction. One system is out of service and has been for some time. We asserted jurisdiction over one system. The remaining four systems are currently regulated by the California DOSH as amusement rides.

From: NTSB
To: State of California
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Colorado
Date: 9/19/2014
Response: We understand that, prior to issuance of this recommendation, the statutory oversight authority described in the recommendation was already in place. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED.

From: State of Colorado
To: NTSB
Date: 7/18/2014
Response: -From Doug Dean, Division Director, Colorado Public Utilities Commission: At the request of Governor John W. Hickenlooper, this letter is submitted in response to the April 18, 2014 letter from former Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman regarding the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and R-11-3, and whether and how Colorado has implemented these recommendations. Safety Recommendation R-11-2 requires Colorado to work with the U.S. Department of Transportation to identify all fixed guideway transportation systems within Colorado's jurisdiction. Safety Recommendation R -11-3 requires Colorado to obtain the statutory authority to provide safety oversight of all fixed guideway transportation systems that operate within Colorado's jurisdiction, regardless of their funding authorization or the date they began operation. In response to NTSB Safety Recommendation R-11-2, the State of Colorado has identified two fixed guideway transportation systems under the State of Colorado's jurisdiction. They are: • The Denver Regional Transportation District currently under the State Safety Oversight jurisdiction of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission; and • The Royal Gorge Inclined Railway currently under safety jurisdiction of the Colorado Passenger Tramway Safety Board. In addition, the State of Colorado has identified two fixed guideway transportation systems within the boundaries of the State of Colorado, but which are within the jurisdiction of home rule cities under provisions of the Colorado state constitution. They are: • The Denver International Airport Automated Guideway Transit System owned and operated by the City and County of Denver; and • The Fort Collins Municipal Railway owned and operated by the City of Fort Collins. In reference to NTSB Safety Recommendation R-11-3, for the fixed guideway systems that are owned by and operated within Denver and Fort Collins, both of which are home rule cities, there may be serious state constitutional challenges or prohibitions with the State of Colorado unilaterally asserting and imposing regulatory oversight over assets that are under the ownership of a home rule city. Accordingly, we do not see that any further action on the part of the State is necessary.

From: NTSB
To: State of Colorado
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Connecticut
Date: 12/22/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 18, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Connecticut
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Delaware
Date: 4/10/2018
Response: We note that you identified all fixed guideway transportation systems in Delaware and have determined that the only one in the state is the Amtrak Northeast Corridor, which is regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). Because FRA rules preempt any state rulemaking with regard to safety, no additional statutory authority is required. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R-11-2 is classified “Closed—Acceptable Action,” and Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED.

From: State of Delaware
To: NTSB
Date: 1/22/2018
Response: -From Jennifer Cohan, Secretary, Department of Transportation: I have been asked to respond on behalf of Governor Camey to your letter of December 22, 2017 concerning safety recommendations R-11-2 and R-11-3 pertaining to fixed guideway transportation systems, which were transmitted to Delaware on December 22, 2011. Delaware does not have any rail fixed guideway systems as they are defined in 49 CFR 659. That definition specifies a system which "is not regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration". The only passenger-carrying fixed guideway in the state is the Amtrak Northeast Corridor, which is regulated by FRA. Apparently, our staff who reviewed the 2011 notice did not appreciate that negative reports were requested. Please accept our apologies for any inconvenience.

From: NTSB
To: State of Delaware
Date: 12/22/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 18, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Delaware
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Florida
Date: 9/12/2017
Response: We classified Safety Recommendation R 11-3 “Open—Acceptable Response” on August 18, 2014, pending implementation of an effective safety oversight program for the fixed guideway systems at Tampa International Airport, Walt Disney World, the Miami Metro Zoo, and Busch Gardens, and at other theme parks and amusement parks that do not fall under federal or state oversight. We note from Mr. Dew’s recent letter that the Florida Legislature has not yet provided FDOT with the legal authority to oversee private and public fixed guideway systems not already covered by existing law, but it is Mr. Dew’s intention to again include this item in FDOT’s discussions with the legislature in advance of the 2018 legislative session. Pending enactment of legislation giving FDOT oversight authority for fixed guideway systems not currently subject to state oversight, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 remains classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: State of Florida
To: NTSB
Date: 8/22/2017
Response: -From Mike Dew, Secretary, Florida Department of Transportation: The Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) is in receipt of your June 21, 2017 letter to Governor Scott regarding the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendation R-11-3. The letter follows initial recommendations issued to all states and the District of Columbia on December 22, 2011, regarding actions requested of the states to obtain statutory authority to provide safety oversight of fixed guideway transportation systems, regardless of their funding authorization or the date they began operation. In the referenced 2014 letter from then Secretary Ananth Prasad, FDOT committed to work with the NTSB to ensure the safest possible transportation systems for our residents and visitors. With regard to NTSB Safety Recommendation R-11-3, we indicated " it is our intent to confer with Legislative leaders in the Florida Senate and House of Representatives prior to our next legislative session in March, 2015, to discuss and explore additional opportunities for ensuring the continued safety of all fixed guideway transportation systems in the State of Florida." Since the date of the NTSB recommendations in 2011 , the FDOT worked with the Miami International Airport to bring all of their fixed guideway transportation systems into voluntary compliance with the state's safety oversight program, including those not supported with state funds, even though Section 341.061, Florida Statutes requires compliance only for those systems funded in whole or in part with state funds. However, the Florida Legislature has not yet provided FDOT with the legal authority to oversee private and public fixed guideway systems not already covered by existing law. It is our intent to again include this item in our discussions with the Legislature in advance of the 2018 Legislative Session, so that they may consider implementation of this NTSB recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Florida
Date: 6/21/2017
Response: A July 14, 2014, letter from Ananth Prasad, then Secretary of the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT), indicated that FDOT planned to work with the legislative leaders in the Florida Senate and House of Representatives prior to the 2015 legislative session to discuss and explore additional opportunities for ensuring the continued safety of all fixed guideway transportation systems in Florida. On August 18, 2014, we classified Safety Recommendation R 11-3 OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE pending implementation of an effective safety oversight program for the systems at Tampa International Airport, Walt Disney World, the Miami Metro Zoo, and Busch Gardens, and at other theme parks and amusement parks that Secretary Prasad had identified as not falling under federal or state oversight. In the 3 years since Secretary Prasad’s letter, we have not received any further information from FDOT regarding this recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Florida
Date: 8/18/2014
Response: We understand that you intend to work with the legislative leaders in the Florida Senate and House of Representatives prior to the next legislative session in March 2015 to discuss and explore additional opportunities for ensuring the continued safety of all fixed guideway transportation systems in the State of Florida. In the meantime, pending implementation of an effective safety oversight program for the systems at Tampa International Airport, Walt Disney World, the Miami Metro Zoo, and Busch Gardens, and at other theme park and amusement park systems, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: State of Florida
To: NTSB
Date: 7/14/2014
Response: -From Ananth Prasad, P.E., Secretary: The Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) is in receipt of the April 18, 2014 letter from Chairman Hersman to Governor Scott regarding the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendations R-:-11-2 and -3. The letter follows initial recommendations issued to all states and the District of Columbia on December 22, 2011, regarding actions requested of the states to identify all fixed guideway transportation systems within the state, and to obtain statutory authority to provide safety oversight of the fixed guideway transportation systems, regardless of their funding authorization or the date they began operation. FDOT is Florida's State Safety Oversight (SSO) agency, certified by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to perform the oversight functions required under 49 CPR Part 659 with respect to FTA funded fixed guideway transportation systems. These systems include the Miami-Dade County Metrorail and Metromover systems, the Tampa TECO Streetcar system, and the Jacksonville Skyway Express people mover system. In addition, FDOT coordinates with the Federal Railroad Administration to ensure the safety of the two commuter rail systems in the state, the South Florida Regional Transportation Authority's Tri-Rail system, and SunRail in Central Florida. In addition to Federal authority, state statutory authority has been provided since 1984 to FDOT to oversee the safety of governmentally owned fixed guideway transportation systems and privately owned or operated fixed guideway transportation systems which are financed wholly or partly by state funds. Under this authority (Section 341.061, Florida Statutes), FDOT oversees and certifies the safety programs of state funded airport people mover systems at both the Miami International and Orlando International Airports. And subsequent to the NTSB recommendations in 2011, FDOT worked with Miami International Airport to bring all their people mover systems under the SSO program, regardless of whether any state funds were used to fund these systems. Governmentally owned fixed guideway transportation systems which do not currently fall under federal or state oversight include the people mover systems at Tampa International Airport. Within the state, we are also aware of privately owned and operated fixed guideway transportation systems which have not been financed wholly or in part with state funds, including the Walt Disney World Monorail, and other theme park/amusement park systems such as the narrow gauge rail train attractions at the Miami Metro Zoo and Busch Gardens. These systems do not fall under the safety oversight authority of the FDOT. It is the mission of the FDOT to "provide a safe transportation system that ensures the mobility of people and goods, enhances economic prosperity and preserves the quality of our environment and communities." On behalf of Governor Scott, we are committed to work with the NTSB to ensure the safest possible transportation systems for our residents and visitors. With regard to NTSB Safety Recommendation R-11-3, it is our intent to confer with Legislative leaders in the Florida Senate and House of Representatives prior to our next legislative session in March, 2015, to discuss and explore additional opportunities for ensuring the continued safety of all fixed guideway transportation systems in the State of Florida. We will keep you apprised of actions in this regard. Thank you once again for your assistance in helping to ensure the safety of Florida's and the nation's transportation systems.

From: NTSB
To: State of Florida
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Georgia
Date: 10/4/2017
Response: In our investigation of the APM accident in Miami, we found that trains were allowed to operate in passenger service with an important safety system, the overspeed/overshoot system, bypassed by a jumper wire. Neither the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) nor any other organization provided external safety oversight of the APM at the Miami airport, despite that, in 1988, the Florida DOT asked the airport operator to develop a system safety program plan for the APM. Although the airport operator acknowledged that Florida partly financed the system, it declined to develop a safety plan. The Florida DOT also failed to provide safety oversight for the monorail APM system at Walt Disney World Resort in Lake Buena Vista, Florida, where a fatal accident occurred on July 5, 2009, because the monorail system did not receive state or Federal Transit Administration (FTA) funding. We issued these recommendations because we believe that public transportation systems need external safety oversight to identify and correct systemic safety risks that may not be readily apparent nor effectively addressed by the operator or transit agency. The intent of Safety Recommendation R-11-2 was to identify all fixed guideway systems, regardless of whether they were subject to FTA funding or oversight. We issued Safety Recommendation R 11 3 because we believe that it is necessary for fixed guideway transportation systems, like the Miami airport APM system, to have a higher level of oversight regardless of whether they are included in FTA definitions. On June 11, 2014, Mr. Keith Golden, then commissioner of the Georgia Department of Transportation, indicated that he had used the definitions in section 5302 of the Federal Authorization Bill to identify the fixed guideway public transportation systems that were included in Georgia’s state safety oversight program. Mr. Golden noted that section 5302(14)(B) excluded several types of systems, including intraterminal or intrafacility shuttle services (such as the Miami airport APM); therefore, he determined that the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority’s rail service and the City of Atlanta’s streetcar service were Georgia’s only fixed guideway public transportation systems, and they were included within the jurisdiction of Georgia’s state safety oversight program. On July 29, 2014, we replied that Mr. Golden did not mention the APM system at Atlanta’s Hartsfield Jackson International Airport, which is also a fixed guideway transportation system, and we asked for information regarding that system’s oversight authority. The intent of Safety Recommendation R-11-2 was to identify all fixed guideway systems in your state, including those not subject to existing federal or state oversight. Mr. Golden’s letter identified only the systems defined in federal statutes. However, as discussed below with regard to Safety Recommendation R-11-3, after we identified the APM at Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport as a system in need of oversight, you considered establishing oversight for these types of systems. This represents an alternative solution that satisfies Safety Recommendation R-11-2, which is classified “Closed—Acceptable Alternate Action.” Mr. Somersall wrote that, in 2014, Georgia’s laws were updated to comply with the requirements of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations, section 674.11. When this update was enacted, the state considered expanding the definition of systems subject to state oversight to include private rail fixed guideway systems, such as the APM at Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, as recommended in Safety Recommendation R-11-3. However, the state’s executive leadership did not consider the airport APM to be subject to oversight by the state, so the revised laws apply state oversight only to public transportation systems. As a result, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: State of Georgia
To: NTSB
Date: 7/21/2017
Response: -From Michael Somersall, SSO Program Manager, Georgia Department of Transportation: We are in receipt of your request dated June 15, 2017, for an updated response to the NTSB Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and R-11-3. These recommendations were issued as a result of your agency's investigation of a 2008 accident involving an automated people mover train operating at the Miami International Airport. Specifically, you requested an update on the State of Georgia's oversight authority for the people mover at Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in the City of Atlanta. In 2014, the State of Georgia updated the Official Code of Georgia in order to comply with the requirements of 49 CFR 674.11 . For your convenience, we have attached a copy of our current legislation. At the time of the legislative update, as recommended by the NTSB, the State considered the expansion of the definition of system to include private rail fixed guideway systems, such as the people mover at Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (IUIA). However, after reviewing the requirements of 49 CFR 659 and 674, the state's executive leadership did not consider the people mover at HJIA subject to oversight by the state. Therefore, our leadership elected to maintain its authority over public transportation systems only. For your convenience, we have attached a copy of our current legislation.

From: NTSB
To: State of Georgia
Date: 7/29/2014
Response: You report that the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority’s (MARTA) and the City of Atlanta’s streetcar service are Georgia’s only fixed guideway public transportation systems, and are included within the jurisdiction of Georgia’s state safety oversight program. However, you did not discuss the people mover at the Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, also a fixed guideway transportation system, and we would appreciate receiving information regarding the oversight authority for this system, as well. Pending your further response, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: State of Georgia
To: NTSB
Date: 6/11/2014
Response: -From Keith Golden, P.E., Commissioner, Georgia Department of Transportation: The Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Title 32, Highways, Bridges, and Ferries, Chapter 9, Mass Transportation, Section 32-9-10 provides statutory authority for the Department to provide oversight of all defined fixed guide way transportation systems in our state. The statute specifically provides for sufficient and broad oversight powers and duties including review, approval and monitoring of rail system safety and security program plans; ensuring compliance with state and federal rail safety requirements; as well as investigating hazards and accidents at the fixed guideway public transportation systems currently operating within our jurisdiction. MARTA is the nation's ninth largest transit system operating 338 rail cars at 38 stations on 48.1 miles of rail. MART A's service population is 1. 7 million in the City of Atlanta, Fulton and DeKalb Counties. MARTA initiated revenue operations for its rail system in 1979. The City of Atlanta Streetcar system will operate at-grade on existing streets, with 12 stops on a 2.9 mile east-west loop from Martin Luther King, Jr. National Historic Site to Centennial Olympic Park. The system is expected to enter revenue service in late 2014.

From: NTSB
To: State of Georgia
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Hawaii
Date: 6/23/2014
Response: We note that you identified the Honolulu Authority for Rapid Transportation, expected to enter revenue service in Fiscal Year 2020, as the only fixed guideway transportation in the state of Hawaii. When it begins, this service will fall under the safety oversight of the Hawaii Department of Transportation. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R-11-2 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action," and Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED.

From: State of Hawaii
To: NTSB
Date: 4/30/2014
Response: -From Glenn M. Okimoto, Director of Transportation, State of Hawaii: The Hawaii Depmiment of Transportation (HDOT) is the designated agency for all fixed guideway safety and security oversight in the State of Hawaii. The Rail Transit State Safety & Security Oversight (SSO) program is the mechanism through which HDOT fulfills its responsibilities to develop, implement, and maintain the safety and security oversight requirements in the State. The HDOT SSO program was established in Executive Order 10-05 dated April 6, 2010 to fulfill the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) State Safety Oversight Rule ( 49 CFR Part 659), which requires states to oversee the safety and security of rail fixed guideway agencies through a designated oversight agency. This FTA rule implements a provision in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (IS TEA) of 1991 ( 49 U.S.C. 5330). With regard to statutory authority to perform safety oversight, HDOT' s current statutory authority is broad based and sufficient.

From: NTSB
To: State of Hawaii
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Idaho
Date: 12/22/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 18, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Idaho
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Illinois
Date: 7/30/2014
Response: We note that, on January 30, 2014, you designated IDOT as the Safety and Security Oversight Agency for Illinois to address the enhanced statewide rail transit safety and security requirements of Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, P.L. 112 141. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: State of Illinois
To: NTSB
Date: 5/8/2014
Response: -From Ann L. Schneider, Secretary: Thank you for your Letter of April18, 2014 to Governor Pat Quinn expressing concerns about transportation safety in the rail fixed guideway public transportation systems (RFGPTS) operating in Illinois. Governor Quinn has asked that we respond. Your inquiry was well-timed, given that the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) is in a period of transition regarding rail transit safety oversight as dictated by the federal government. Regarding the two National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendations outlined in your letter, specifically, R-11-2, please know that lDOT has jurisdiction over the two RFGPTS currently in operation within Illinois. The Chicago Transit Authority's (CTA) rail transit service operates in the greater Chicago area, while Bi-State's Metrolink provides light rail transit service through the St. Louis-East St. Louis corridor. Illinois' jurisdiction over Metrolink is only applicable on the Illinois side of the Mississippi River. Amtrak and Metra are under the jurisdiction of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and Illinois has no new rail transit systems in the engineering or construction phases, at this time. Currently, and as required by federal mandate under FTA Rule, Part 659, the Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) provides the safety and security oversight (SSO) for CTA rail operations and services. St. Clair County Transit District (SCCTD) houses the SSO program overseeing Metrolink's Illinois operations and services. Both SSOs are tasked with ensuring each rail transit system is administered and operating in full compliance with the US Department of Transportation's FTA mandates. In reference to NTSB Recommendation R-11-3, which asks states to seek statutory authority to provide safety oversight, we are pleased to announce that on January 30, 2014, Governor Quinn designated lDOT to be the Safety and Security Oversight Agency (SSOA) for Illinois to address the enhanced statewide rail transit safety and security requirements of MAP-21. MAP-21 mandates each eligible state's SSOA to pursue and obtain sufficient authority 'to compel action from the rail transit agency" to mitigate any safety deficiencies and concerns, which may include the issuance of corrective action plans, up to and including halting unsafe operations and withholding funds. Here in Illinois, we have just begun the initial work to obtain the appropriate executive and legislative authority required to comply with MAP-21. Additionally, lDOT will participate in an FTA Scoping Session later this month to finalize our transition timetable and the required actions to become an FTA certified SSOA. While we anticipate the full transition to become MAP-21 compliant may occur as early as December 2015, please be assured that in the interim, Illinois is taking specific measures to obtain the appropriate levels of statutory authority that will add enforcement enhancements and staff resources to improve Part 659 oversight, while building up our new SSOA initiative to ensure safe and secure RFGPTS services in operation at all times.

From: NTSB
To: State of Illinois
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Indiana
Date: 12/22/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 18, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Indiana
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Iowa
Date: 7/29/2014
Response: We note that you identified all fixed guideway transportation systems in Iowa and determined that you have none, other than railroads that are already subject to oversight by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). As FRA rules preempt any state rulemaking in regard to safety, no additional statutory authority is required. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R-11-2 is classified “Closed?Acceptable Action,” and Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED.

From: State of Iowa
To: NTSB
Date: 6/2/2014
Response: -From Paul Trombino III, Director, Iowa Department of Transportation: Thank you for the April 18 letter to Governor Branstad regarding fixed guideway transportation systems. As director of the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT), Governor Branstad has asked that I respond to your letter. As it relates to the identification of all fixed guideway systems in recommendation R-11-2, the state of Iowa does not have any fixed guideway systems with the exception of railroads, which are under federal oversight. Regarding recommendation R-11-3 requesting states seek the statutory authority to provide safety oversight of fixed guideway systems; this is not necessary in the state of Iowa since there are no fixed guideway systems in the state.

From: NTSB
To: State of Iowa
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Kansas
Date: 6/23/2014
Response: We note that you identified all fixed guideway transportation systems in Kansas and determined that you do not have any fixed guideway systems other than railroads that are already subject to oversight by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). As FRA rules preempt any state rulemaking in regard to safety, no additional statutory authority is required. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R-11-2 is classified “Closed?Acceptable Action,” and Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED.

From: State of Kansas
To: NTSB
Date: 5/1/2014
Response: -From Mike King, Secretary of Transportation, State of Kansas: Since there are no fixed guide way systems in Kansas, the recommended action R-11-3 would not apply to Kansas.

From: NTSB
To: State of Kansas
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN--AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Louisiana
Date: 12/22/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 18, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Louisiana
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Maine
Date: 6/24/2014
Response: We note that you identified all fixed guideway transportation systems in Maine and determined that all such systems are railroads that fall under the safety oversight of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). As FRA rules preempt any state rulemaking in regard to safety, no additional statutory authority was required. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R-11-2 is classified “Closed?Acceptable Action,” and Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED.

From: State of Maine
To: NTSB
Date: 4/30/2014
Response: -From David Bernhardt, Commissioner, Maine Department of Transportation: Pursuant to NTSB Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 the State of Maine identified all fixed guideway transportation systems in the State. This process revealed that all the fixed guideway systems in Maine are railroads that fall under the safety oversight of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). As the FRA rules preempt any State rulemaking in regard to safety, no additional statutory authority was required or obtained. We continue to work with FRA to insure our railroads have proper safety oversight.

From: NTSB
To: State of Maine
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Maryland
Date: 11/20/2014
Response: We understand that Maryland had the requested statutory oversight authority and an oversight program in place prior to our issuance of Safety Recommendation R-11-3. Accordingly, the recommendation is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED. We are pleased that Maryland is also working with the Tri-State Oversight Committee toward upgrading its oversight program to comply with the MAP-21 requirements that went into effect in October 2012.

From: State of Maryland
To: NTSB
Date: 9/25/2014
Response: -From James T. Smith, Jr., Secretary: Thank you for your letter regarding oversight of fixed guideway transportation systems in the State of Maryland. I appreciate the opportunity to respond. Maryland is fully committed to ensuring the safety of our fixed guideway systems in order to protect passengers, employees, and the general public who benefit from these important transportation links. The State of Maryland operates a State Safety Oversight (SSO) program in accordance with 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 659. In October 2012, Congress passed the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 2151 Century Act (MAP-21), which mandates the strengthening of SSO programs nationwide. Maryland committed to meeting the new oversight requirements specified by MAP-21, and we described our plans for achieving full compliance with these requirements as part of the Certification Work Plan that was approved by the Federal Transit Administration earlier this year. This Work Plan includes, but is not limited to, the following steps: • Creating the statutory authority for the oversight program to be able to enforce safety program requirements and compel the rail fixed guideway public transit systems to take action to address safety deficiencies; • Ensuring the legal and financial independence of the oversight program from the overseen rail fixed guideway public transit systems; • Enhancing the processes used to track, monitor, and audit the safety program requirements that must be implemented by the rail fixed guideway public transit system; • Ensuring that sufficient personnel resources are allocated to the implementation of the oversight program; and • Enhancing the formal training and qualifications of the personnel who will carry out these assignments. With regard to the specific recommendations at hand, the Maryland Transit Administration (MT A) is the only agency within the State of Maryland operating fixed guideway transit. MT A operates two fixed guideway systems - the Metro and Light Rail. Two additional rail transit lines in Maryland are currently in the design phase- the Purple Line connecting Bethesda to New Carrollton in Montgomery and Prince Georges counties and the Red Line connecting the Johns Hopkins Bayview campus in East Baltimore to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid in Woodlawn, Baltimore County via downtown Baltimore. At this time, Maryland has no plans to include any other fixed guideway transportation system as part of an oversight program. However, as indicated above, Maryland does plan to enact specific statutory authority to be able to effectively carry out its oversight mission. Separately, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) Metrorail system operates partially in Maryland, along with operations in the District of Columbia and Virginia. The WMATA Metrorail is subject to the oversight of the Tri-State Oversight Committee (TOC), of which Maryland is a component jurisdiction. That program is also taking steps to transition into an independent oversight entity that is fully compliant with the requirements set forth by MAP-21, complete with a separate Work Plan that involves the coordination of the three component jurisdictions. WMA T A TOC activities occur independently of the oversight program for the MT A lines. Thank you, again, for the opportunity to respond. Maryland believes that by strengthening the oversight program for fixed-guideway transit in the state of Maryland, we will be able to better ensure the safety of passengers, employees, and the general public.

From: NTSB
To: State of Maryland
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Michigan
Date: 8/18/2014
Response: On June 28, 2014, in response to Mr Steudle’s April 18, 2014, letter, we requested clarifying information on who oversees the Detroit airport people mover. Mr Steudle reports that the Detroit Metro Airport Terminal Shuttle is regulated by the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs under Michigan statute, Section 3(1) of the Elevator Safety Board Act, PA 227 of 1967, as amended. Because Michigan had this statutory authority to provide oversight of all state fixed guideway systems prior to our issuance of Safety Recommendation R-11-3, it is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED.

From: State of Michigan
To: NTSB
Date: 7/15/2014
Response: -From Kirk T. Steudle, Director: As noted in our previous letter, the Detroit Metro Airport Terminal Shuttle is regulated by the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs. Please see the enclosed correspondence confirming this designation. Note that Department of Consumer and Industry Services is now known as Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs. MDOT asks that NTSB consider the status of R-11-3 as "Closed-Acceptable Action." -From Mark Sisco, Deputy Director, Department of Consumer and Industry Services, State of Michigan, letter dated February 3, 2000: This is in response to your letter dated January 7, 2000, regarding Northwest Airlines' Automated People Mover (APM) system. You requested that the department's Elevator Safety division serve as the "operational Authority Having Jurisdiction(AHJ)'' for the APM system. We understand from the materials presented to the bureau that Otis Elevator Company will be the installing contractor for this project. Subsequent to reviewing the information related to this matter, the bureau has determined that the APM system falls within the scope of Section 3.(1) of the Elevator Safety Board Act, PA 227 of 1967, as amended. My staff intends to develop a set of inspection guidelines regarding installation of the system in cooperation with your company and the elevator contractor. We look forward to working with you and your partners in bringing a mutually satisfactory completion to this project. If there is additional information that I can provide or if you have questions regarding the information in this letter, please contact me.

From: NTSB
To: State of Michigan
Date: 6/26/2014
Response: We note that you identified all fixed guideway transportation systems in Michigan: the Detroit People Mover, M-1 Rail (under construction), the Detroit Metropolitan Airport Terminal Shuttle, the Greenfield Village Weiser Railroad (historic train), the Huckleberry Railroad, and the Detroit Zoo Railroad. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R-11-2 is classified “Closed?Acceptable Response.” We note that the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) performs state safety oversight for the Detroit People Mover and M-1 Rail, and that the other fixed guideway systems are regulated either by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or by Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs. We further note that MDOT will continue to monitor the status of state safety oversight program requirements with the Federal Transit Administration. We have contacted the FAA, which reports it does not regulate people movers at airports and that such fixed guideway systems fall under local or state regulation. Accordingly, we request that you review who oversees the airport people mover in Michigan, and obtain the necessary authority to do so, if needed. Pending your clarification of this issue, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: State of Michigan
To: NTSB
Date: 4/30/2014
Response: -From Kirk T. Steudle, Director, Department of Transportation, State of Michigan: Currently, MDOT preforms State Safety Oversight for the Detroit People Mover and M-1 Rail. MDOT does not plan to seek state regulatory authority over the other identified facilities, because they are currently regulated by either the Federal Aviation Administration or Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs. However, MDOT plans to continue monitoring the status of State Safety Oversight Program requirements with the Federal Transit Administration. MDOT asks that NTSB consider the status of R-11-2 and R-11-3 as "Closed-Acceptable Action."

From: NTSB
To: State of Michigan
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Minnesota
Date: 11/17/2014
Response: We understand that, in its 2014 legislative session, Minnesota established an Office of State Safety Oversight (SSO), in Minnesota Statute 299A.071, Sec. 30. [299A.017] STATE SAFETY OVERSIGHT, to oversee the safety of fixed guideway public rail transportation systems within the state, and that you are working with the Federal Transit Administration to obtain funding for this program. We also understand that the only system that does not fall under your SSO jurisdiction and oversight is the Metropolitan Airports Commission’s (MAC) automatic people mover (APM) system, which receives no federal funding, and that, when the MAC APM trams were installed, no APM standards had yet been published. Because the operation and safety features of these APMs were very similar to those of an elevator, the DOL approved the permit for their installation as inclined elevators, as defined in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) standard A17.1, 1996 edition of the Safety Codes for Elevators and Escalators. In addition to your requiring the system’s compliance with DOL regulations, the third party inspection consulting company that oversaw the system’s installation continues to inspect and maintain the system for the state. The DOL directly oversees the MAC APM system, ensuring that it complies with appropriate federal safety regulations and is regularly inspected and maintained. We are aware that Minnesota’s SSO has direct oversight authority under the FTA for all other fixed rail guideways in the state. Your actions satisfy Safety Regulation R 11-3 in an acceptable alternate manner. Accordingly, the recommendation is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATE ACTION.

From: State of Minnesota
To: NTSB
Date: 8/4/2014
Response: -From Mark Dayton, Governor of Minnesota: Response: 1. In the 2014 Legislative session, the State of Minnesota established an Office of State Safety Oversight and designated statutorily a funding source directly from the State's General fund. The Office of State Safety Oversight is funded separate from the transit agency. The State of Minnesota is also working through the process with Federal Transit Administration to apply for grant funding under MAP-21. Minnesota Statute 299A.071; Sec. 30. [299A.Ol7] STATE SAFETY OVERSIGHT. Subdivision 1. Office created. The commissioner of public safety shall establish an Office of State Safety Oversight in the Department of Public Safety for safety oversight of rail fixed guide way public transportation systems within the state. The commissioner shall designate a director of the office. Subdivision 2. Authority. The director shall implement and has regulatory authority to enforce the requirements for the state set forth in United States Code, title 49, sections 5329 and 5330, federal regulations adopted pursuant to those sections, and successor or supplemental requirements.

From: NTSB
To: State of Minnesota
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Mississippi
Date: 12/22/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 18, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Mississippi
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Missouri
Date: 5/14/2018
Response: We note that all fixed guideway transportation systems in Missouri are currently subject to state or federal safety oversight, and that the statutory authority for this oversight was sought and granted before we issued our recommendation. Therefore, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED.

From: State of Missouri
To: NTSB
Date: 1/8/2018
Response: From Eric J. Curtit, Administrator of Railroads, State of Missouri: In response to R-11-2, the following fixed-guideway transportation systems currently operate in Missouri, or are planned for operation: • Amtrak service along the Missouri River Runner, Lincoln Service, Texas Eagle, and Southwest Chief routes. Amtrak is overseen by the Federal Railroad Administration and is not covered by the MoDOT State Safety Oversight (SSO) Program. • Bi-State Development's MetroLink, which runs between the St. Louis, Missouri metropolitan area and St. Clair County, Illinois. MetroLink is jointly overseen by the MoDOT SSO Program and the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) SSO Program. Both SSO Programs receive formula funding from the Federal Transit Administration (FT A) and state match funding to administer oversight. • Kansas City Streetcar, which runs within downtown Kansas City, Missouri. The Streetcar is overseen by the MoDOT · SSO Program, which receives FTA formula funding and state match funding to administer oversight. • Delmar Loop Trolley, which is currently in testing and will run between University City, Missouri, and St. Louis, Missouri. The Trolley is currently projected to begin revenue service in 2018. It is overseen by the MoDOT SSO Program, which receives FTA formula funding and state match funding to administer oversight. In response to R-11-3, MoDOT offers the following: The State of Missouri has long maintained a firm commitment to the safety of the fixed guideway transportation systems that operate in our state. In fact, Missouri is one of the only states in the country with statutory rail transit oversight authority and state regulations covering rail transit safety that pre-date 49 U.S.C. 5329(e), part of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 51 Century (MAP-21) Act of2012. As you know, MAP-21 required all states with rail fixed guideway public transportation systems (RFGPTS) to establish legal and enforcement authorities for SSO programs. In 1996, the Missouri Division of Motor Carrier and Railroad Safety (MCRS) was designated by the state of Missouri as the SSO Agency for Bi-State Metro Link, which at the time was the only RFGPTS operating within the state. In 2002, the oversight authority was transferred to MoDOT. The MoDOT SSO Program has been actively overseeing the safety and security of MetroLink since then, with the St. Clair County Transit District (SSCTD) of Illinois as a partner from 2002 through 2016, and with IDOT as a partner starting in 2017. The MoDOT SSO Program has also actively overseen the Kansas City Streetcar and Delmar Loop Trolley systems since their entry into engineering. MoDOT ensured that the Streetcar did not enter passenger service without first obtaining necessary SSO Agency approvals and concurrences on key project and system documents. MoDOT performed a rigorous PreRevenue Service Review of the Kansas City Streetcar in 2016 before it opened for passenger service, and carefully reviewed and concurred with the City of Kansas City's safety certification process for the project. The SSO Program is now conducting a similar prerevenue oversight process with the Delmar Loop Trolley as it prepares to enter passenger service in 2018. Missouri Revised Statutes, Chapter 389, Sections 998 and 1005 endow MoDOT with SSO Agency responsibilities and enforcement authorities. In these state laws, MoDOT is established as the entity responsible for adoption and enforcement of rules relating to the operation and maintenance of light rail systems within the state. Missouri state code 7 CSR 265 Chapter 9 regulates rail fixed guideway systems operating within the state. This regulation references the MoDOT SSO Program Standards Manual and contains requirements that go beyond the scope of federal regulations, such as those pertaining to hours of service and rail grade crossings. Ever since the enactment ofMAP-21, MoDOT has worked closely with the FTA to strengthen its resources, technical capabilities, and enforcement powers to oversee critical safety and security program requirements for the covered RFGPTS. MoDOT is currently at a Stage 3 out of 4 toward achieving certification by the FT A as a MAP-21 compliant SSO Program. MoDOT does not anticipate a conflict with achieving certification prior to the April 2019 federal deadline. It is Mo DOT' s hope this response fulfills NTSB' s request for information to satisfactorily close R-11-2 and R-11-3. Thank you for your attention to this matter and for your agency's vital work in advancing rail transportation safety.

From: NTSB
To: State of Missouri
Date: 12/22/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 17, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Missouri
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Montana
Date: 12/22/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 17, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R 11 2 and 3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Montana
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN--AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Nebraska
Date: 4/10/2018
Response: We note that, although there are no fixed guideway transportation systems operating in Nebraska, you are prepared to address statutory authority issues and requests to operate these systems as needed in the future. Because Nebraska has no such systems at this time, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED.

From: State of Nebraska
To: NTSB
Date: 2/6/2018
Response: -From Kyle Schneweis, P.E., Director, Nebraska Department of Transportation: Thank you for the December 22nd letter to Governor Ricketts regarding fixed guideway transportation systems. As the Director of the Nebraska Department of Transportation (NDOT), Governor Ricketts has asked that I respond to your letter. As it relates to the identification of all fixed guideway systems in recommendation R-11-2, the State of Nebraska does not have any fixed guideway systems, with the exception of railroads, which are under federal oversight. Regarding recommendation R-11-3 requesting states seek the statutory authority to provide safety oversight of fixed guideway systems; this is not necessary in the State of Nebraska since there are no non-federally regulated fixed guideway systems in the state. If the status of fixed guideway transportation systems changes in Nebraska, the Nebraska DOT will work with the State Legislature to examine the formalization of safety oversight options.

From: NTSB
To: State of Nebraska
Date: 12/22/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 17, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R 11 2 and 3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Nebraska
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN--AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Nevada
Date: 12/22/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 17, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Nevada
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of New Hampshire
Date: 6/24/2014
Response: We note that the New Hampshire Department of Transportation determined that there is no rail fixed guideway system in New Hampshire as defined by Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 659. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R-11-2 is classified “Closed?Acceptable Action,” and Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED.

From: State of New Hampshire
To: NTSB
Date: 4/21/2014
Response: -From Shelley Winters, Bureau Administrator, New Hampshire Department of Transportation, Bureau of Rail and Transit: The New Hampshire Department of Transportation is in receipt of your recent correspondence relative to Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and R-11-3. Our staff has reviewed the contents of NTSB’s April 17, 2014 letter and the December 22, 2011 Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and R-11-3 and determined that this does not apply to New Hampshire as there is no “Rail Fixed Guideway System” in NH as defined by Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 659. Thank you for keeping the State and the NH Department of Transportation apprised of ongoing rail related issues.

From: NTSB
To: State of New Hampshire
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of New Jersey
Date: 9/19/2012
Response: Because New Jersey has identified all fixed guideway transportation systems as requested, Safety Recommendation R-11-2 is classified “Closed—Acceptable Action.” Because the state had statutory authority over those systems before these recommendations were issued, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED. Thank you for your commitment to transit safety.

From: State of New Jersey
To: NTSB
Date: 3/16/2012
Response: -From Talvin E. Davis, Director, Multi-Modal Services, State of New Jersey, Department of Transportation: The State of New Jersey will work with the United States Department of Transportation to ensure that Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and R-11-3 are implemented. The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 required the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to create a state managed oversight program to improve rail transit safety and security (49 U.S.C. 5330) and issue a Rule requiring states to oversee the safety of operational Rail Fixed Guideway Transit Systems not regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). The program, 49 CFR Part 659, Rail Fixed Guideway Systems; State Safety Oversight; Final Rule, became effective on January 26, 1996. The Rule requires an Agency designated by the State to oversee safety and security and prepare standards that must be met by transit agencies operating Rail Fixed GUideway Transit Systems (FGTS) within the State of New Jersey. (§659.15). In 1997, under Executive Order No. 65 (attached), the New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) was designated to oversee the safety and security of Rail Fixed GUideway Transit Systems in the State of New Jersey and further, to promulgate safety oversight standards for compliance by operating Rail Fixed Guideway Transit Systems. To further NJDOT's authority, the State of New Jersey included NJDOT's Office of Safety and Security Oversight's (OSSO) purpose and responsibility in State Title 27:1A and in N.J.A.C. 16:53E (both attached). The NJDOT is empowered to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public, and is responsible for safety oversight of FGTS not regulated by the FRA. As the designated OSSO, the NJDOT responds to requirements in 49 CFR, Part 659 to avoid financial penalties that the FTA might otherwise impose on federal funding of rail transit for the State of New Jersey. The NJDOT through the issuance of its program standard requires that the State of New Jersey FGTS operators develop and implement system safety and security program plans. Currently, there are six (6) fixed guideway transit systems not regulated by the FRA in the State of New Jersey, and safety oversight and security oversight is provided for the six: 1. Newark Light Rail 2. Hudson Bergen Light Rail 3. River LINE Light Rail System 4. Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) 5. Pine Creek Railroad 6. AirTrain Newark Of these six fixed Guideway transit systems in the State of New Jersey, five are under the jurisdiction of NJDOT's Office of Fixed Guideway Safety and Security Oversight. NJ TRANSIT's Newark Light Rail, Hudson Bergen Light Rail and the River LINE, along with the Delaware River Port Authority's PATCO system fall under the FTA's regulation 49CFR659. The Pine Creek Railroad is part of the New Jersey Transportation Museum and its oversight is performed under State jurisdiction (N.JAC. 16:53E). NJ TRANSIT owns and operates its Newark Light Rail System which operates in the cities of Newark, Belleville and Bloomfield. The system is approximately 6.5 miles in length, and operates approximately 450 trains each weekday. Newark Light Rail has been in continuous operation since 1935. The system was modernized in 2001, and a one mile extension between the terminal located under Newark Penn Station and NJ TRANSIT's Broad Street Commuter Rail station was placed into revenue operation in 2006. NJ TRANSIT's Hudson Bergen Light Rail System began revenue service in April, 2000. NJ TRANSIT owns the transit system and contracted the operation and maintenance to the 21st Century Rail Corporation. The system is approximately 17.5 miles in length, operating roughly 515 trains providing 44,000 daily passenger trips. NJ TRANSIT owns the River LINE, a light rail system, and has contracted out its operation and maintenance to Southern New Jersey Rail Group LLC. The River LINE began service in March 2004. The system is 34.5 miles in length, operating 97 trains providing over 9,800 passenger trips daily. The River LINE is a Shared Use Transit System operating on the general railroad system of the United States, under a Shared Use Waiver issued by the FRA in accordance with the July, 2000 Joint Statement of Agency Policy Concerning Shared Use of the Tracks of the General Railroad System by Conventional and Light Rail Systems (Federal Register, Vol. 65, No. 132 page 42526). The Delaware River Port Authority, a Bi-State Authority, owns and operates its PATCO System, a heavy rail transit system and entered revenue service in February, 1969. The system operates between Center City Philadelphia and Camden County, New Jersey. PATCO was one of the first transit systems in the United States to incorporate Automatic Train Operation for regular service. The system was designed for one person train operation by exclusively utilizing island platforms and right-handed operation with operators sitting on the left side of the vehicle where they can open their window and monitor the boarding process. The line transports over 40,000 people daily, and operates 24 hours a day. Under State authority, NJDOT provides oversight to the Pine Creek Railroad. Founded in 1952, the New Jersey Museum of Transportation, Inc. Pine Creek Railroad is one of the oldest continually operating narrow gauge preservation railways in the United States. The railroad is a loop track which is located within the Allaire State Park, and is not connected to any rail line. NJDOT provides oversight utilizing 49CFR659 as the basis. The final Fixed Guideway Transit System is AirTrain Newark, which is owned by the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey (PA), has contracted its operation to Bombardier Transportation. The safety oversight of this line is provided by the PA Air Train Safety Oversight Board (PA ATSOB). The NTSB recommended that the Port Authority establish an independent AirTrain Safety Oversight Board to monitor conformance with established safety procedures and current industry standards for the operation and maintenance of AirTrain JFK and AirTrain Newark. The PA AirTrain Safety Oversight Board was created on April 15, 2003 to fulfill this responsibility. The PA ATSOB subject matter expert consultant is currently Transportation Resources Associates and ATSOB activities are in comportment with the FTA State Safety Oversight Program using 49CFR659 as the basis. Oversight is provided for the six fixed guideway transit systems identified, and if you require any additional information please contact Mr. David Morgan, the Manager of the Fixed Guideway Safety/Security Oversight Office for the NJ Department of Transportation.

From: NTSB
To: State of New Mexico
Date: 6/23/2014
Response: We note that you identified all fixed guideway transportation systems in New Mexico and determined that all such systems are railroads that fall under the safety oversight of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). As FRA rules preempt any state rulemaking in regard to safety, no additional statutory authority was required. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R-11-2 is classified “Closed-Acceptable Action,” and Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED.

From: State of New Mexico
To: NTSB
Date: 5/5/2014
Response: -From Frank Sharpless, Transit and Rail Director, New Mexico Department of Transportation: NMDOT Response: No actions have been taken to obtain statutory authority to provide oversight of fixed guideway transportation systems as defined in Title 49, CFR Part 659 because no such rail fixed guideway systems are in operation in New Mexico and no such system is currently planned for the foreseeable future. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions or would like additional information regarding this matter.

From: NTSB
To: State of New Mexico
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN--AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of North Carolina
Date: 12/21/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 17, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R 11 2 and 3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of North Carolina
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of North Dakota
Date: 6/26/2014
Response: We note that you have determined that North Dakota does not have any fixed guideway systems other than railroads, which are already subject to oversight by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). As FRA rules preempt any state rulemaking in regard to safety, no additional statutory authority is required. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R-11-2 is classified “Closed?Acceptable Action,” and Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED.

From: State of North Dakota
To: NTSB
Date: 5/6/2014
Response: -From Grant Levi, P.E., Director, North Dakota Department of Transportation: Based on the fact that we do not have any fixed guideway transportation systems within our jurisdiction, the NDDOT currently does not have any plans to provide safety oversight.

From: NTSB
To: State of North Dakota
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Ohio
Date: 8/20/2015
Response: We understand that you identified one fixed guideway transportation system in Ohio, the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, which is overseen by the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) State Safety Oversight Program and is regulated by the Federal Transit Administration under Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 659. We note that, when the Cincinnati Streetcar begins operating in late 2016, ODOT will oversee that operation as well. Accordingly, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and R-11-3 are classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: State of Ohio
To: NTSB
Date: 6/19/2015
Response: -From David Seech, State Safety Oversight Program Manager, Ohio Department of Transportation: On behalf of Governor Kasich, regarding Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3, the State of Ohio does not have any fixed guide way systems other than railroads that are already under State Safety Oversight (SSO) as defined by title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 659 ( 49 CFR 659). The Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) through the issuance of its State Safety Program Oversight Standard requires that Ohio "Rail Fixed Guideway Transportation Systems" (RFGTS) develop and implement safety and security program plans under the FTA's regulation 49 CFR 659. Currently, ODOT provides safety and security oversight for the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (GCRTA), which is the only operating RFGTS that is not regulated by the FRA in the State of Ohio; and therefore, subject to FTA's regulation under title 49 CFR 659. In the latter part of2016, the Cinci1mati Streetcar will begin operations and will also be under ODOT's SSO purview. Thank you for keeping the State and ODOT apprised of ongoing rail related issues.

From: NTSB
To: State of Ohio
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Oklahoma
Date: 12/21/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 17, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R 11 2 and 3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Oklahoma
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Oregon
Date: 2/21/2018
Response: We are pleased to hear that your state safety oversight program has covered all fixed railway systems since 1997, and that the state has had statutory authority over fixed guideway transportation systems, regardless of funding or revenue date, since 1995. We note that you most recently revised this authority in 2017 to comply with Title 49 United States Code section 5329. In light of this information, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED.

From: State of Oregon
To: NTSB
Date: 1/8/2018
Response: -From Lynda Horst, Program Manager, State Safety Oversight Program, State of Oregon: We are in receipt of a copy of a letter you sent to Oregon's Governor Kate Brown, dated December 21, 2017. The letter referenced two safety recommendations, R-11-2 and R-11-3 issued to the State of Oregon on December 22, 2011. R-11-2 recommends that we "[work] with the US Department of Transportation [to] identify all fixed guideway transportation systems within your jurisdiction." This was done prior to issuance ofR-1 1-2, in as much as Oregon has had a State Safety Oversight Program covering all rail fixed guideway systems since 1997. R-11 -3 recommends the state "obtain the statutory authority to provide safety oversight of all fixed guideway transportation systems that operation within your jurisdiction, regardless of their funding authorization or the date they began operation." Oregon has statutory authority over all rail fixed guideway transportation systems within the state, regardless of funding or revenue date. Initial authority was granted in 1995, and revised in 1997 and 2001. The latest revision was completed during our 2017 session, to comply with 49 USC 5329, which gave us additional authority. It may be that your letter did not receive a response because your recommendations had already been implemented prior to that time. In any event, we trust that this answers your questions. If you have frniher concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me.

From: NTSB
To: State of Oregon
Date: 12/21/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 17, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Oregon
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Rhode Island
Date: 8/18/2014
Response: We note that Rhode Island has no fixed guideway transportation systems as defined by the Federal Transit Administration, that your commuter rail system operates under a contract with the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, and that this system is regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R-11-2 is classified “Closed—Acceptable Response,” and Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED.

From: State of Rhode Island
To: NTSB
Date: 7/9/2014
Response: -From Lincoln D. Chafee, Governor: Based on the above R-11-2 explanation, obtaining statutory authority is not required.

From: NTSB
To: State of Rhode Island
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of South Carolina
Date: 12/21/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 17, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R 11 2 and 3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of South Carolina
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of South Dakota
Date: 12/21/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 17, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R 11 2 and 3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECIEVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of South Dakota
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Tennessee
Date: 8/6/2013
Response: We understand that, since 2006, the DMTR has exercised safety and security oversight for (1) the Memphis Trolleys and the Memphis Suspension Railway in Memphis, Tennessee; (2) the Secret City Scenic Excursion Train in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; (3) the Three Rivers Rambler in Knoxville, Tennessee; (4) the Chattanooga Incline and the Tennessee Valley Railway Museum in Chattanooga, Tennessee; and (5) the Music City Star and the Tennessee Central Railway Museum in Nashville, Tennessee. We note that all other railroads in the state are regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration. Because the state of Tennessee had the authority to provide the recommended safety oversight before this recommendation was issued, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Tennessee
Date: 12/18/2012
Response: The NTSB notes that TDOT’s Division of Multimodal Transportation Resources provides safety and security oversight of the Memphis Trolleys and the Chattanooga Incline. The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development’s Division of Boilers, Elevators, and Amusement Devices provides oversight of both the Mud Island Monorail (Memphis Suspension Railway) in Memphis and the Gatlinburg Aerial Tramway in Gatlinburg. The Federal Railroad Administration has jurisdiction over the following tourist, commuter, and excursion railroad operations within Tennessee: • Secret City Scenic Excursion Train, Oak Ridge • Three Rivers Rambler, Knoxville • Tennessee Valley Railway Museum, Chattanooga • Tennessee Central Railway Museum, Nashville • Music City Star, Nashville • Dollywood Express, Pigeon Forge • Blue Ridge Scenic Railway, Copperhill • New River Scenic Railway, Huntsville TDOT has verified that all fixed guideway transportation systems in the state have either state or federal safety oversight and has identified which agency provides this oversight. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION. Thank you for your commitment to transportation safety.

From: State of Tennessee
To: NTSB
Date: 10/16/2012
Response: -From John C. Schroer, Commissioner, State of Tennessee, Department of Transportation: Your letter of September 19, 2012 to Governor Bill Haslam was forwarded to the Tennessee Department of Transportation (TOOT) for a response. We would like to provide this update on Tennessee's response to NTSB's recommendations R-11-2 and R-11-3 regarding oversight of fixed-guideway passenger transportation systems. Although NTSB's recent correspondence indicated that R-11-2 was closed, TOOT would like to amend our list of fixed-guideway passenger facilities in Tennessee that was provided in our January 25, 2012 correspondence. TOOT has identified several excursion train operations and two aerial tramways. The excursion train operations include the following: Secret City Scenic Excursion Train, Oak Ridge, TN Three Rivers Rambler, Knoxvi"e, TN Tennessee Valley Railway Museum, Chattanooga, TN Tennessee Central Railway Museum, Nashvi"e, TN Dollywood Express, Pigeon Forge, TN Blue Ridge Scenic Railway, Copperhill, TN New River Scenic Railway, Huntsville, TN In addition to the excursion trains, there are two fixed-guideway aerial passenger transportation facilities in Tennessee: Mud Island Monorail (Memphis Suspension Railway), Memphis, TN Gatlinburg Aerial Tramway, Gatlinburg, TN With regard to R-11-03, TOOT had previously communicated that we would seek FTA guidance on obtaining statutory authority to provide oversight for the fixed-guideway systems listed above. Currently, TOOT does not have plans to seek statutory regulatory over the facilities listed above because they are already regulated by either the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) or the Tennessee Department of Labor. The FRA will exercise jurisdiction over tourist, commuter, and excursion railroad operations. The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development's Division of Boilers, Elevators, and Amusement Devices provides oversight for aerial tramways. Aerial tramways are regulated by the Elevator and Amusement Device Safety Board, authorized in TCA 68-121-102. The rules of the Board state that passenger tramways must comply with the American National Standard Safety Requirements for Aerial Passenger Tramways, Lifts, Surface Lifts and Tows, edition dated March 26, 1990. Since we have identified existing oversight for the fixed-guideway facilities in Tennessee, we ask that you change the status of R-11-3 from "Open-Acceptable Response" to "Closed Acceptable Action."

From: NTSB
To: State of Tennessee
Date: 9/19/2012
Response: The NTSB notes that the DMTR has safety and security oversight for the Memphis Trolleys and the Chattanooga Incline. Because the DMTR plans to work with the Federal Transit Administration to obtain guidance on obtaining oversight of the other rail systems located in the state, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE, pending completion of the recommended action.

From: State of Tennessee
To: NTSB
Date: 1/25/2012
Response: -From John C. Schroer, Commissioner, State of Tennessee, Department of Transportation: On behalf of Governor Haslam, thank you for your recent letter regarding Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3. The Tennessee Department of Transportation's Division of Multimodal Transportation Resources (DMTR) has Safety and Security oversight for the Memphis Trolleys, Memphis TN and the Chattanooga Incline, Chattanooga, TN. In addition to the systems located in Chattanooga and Memphis, there are other rail systems located in Tennessee. DMTR staff is in the process of contacting the Federal Transit Administration for further guidance on the possible oversight of these rail systems: Secret City Scenic Excursion Train, Oak Ridge, TN Three Rivers Rambler, Knoxville, TN Tennessee Valley Railway Museum, Chattanooga, TN Tennessee Central Railway Museum, Nashville, TN Music City Star, Nashville, TN Memphis Suspension Railway, Memphis, TN

From: NTSB
To: State of Texas
Date: 5/14/2018
Response: In our investigation of the APM accident in Miami, we found that trains were allowed to operate in passenger service with the overspeed/overshoot system bypassed by a jumper wire, and neither the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) nor any other organization provided external safety oversight of the APM. Further, the Florida DOT did not provide safety oversight for the monorail APM system at Walt Disney World Resort in Lake Buena Vista, Florida, where a fatal accident occurred on July 5, 2009, and neither the Miami Airport APM nor the monorail system at Walt Disney World received state or Federal Transit Administration (FTA) funding or safety oversight. We issued these recommendations because public transportation systems need external safety oversight to identify and correct systemic safety risks that may not be readily apparent nor effectively addressed by the operator. The intent of Safety Recommendation R-11-2 was to identify all fixed guideway systems, regardless of whether they were subject to state or FTA funding or oversight. We issued Safety Recommendation R 11 3 because we believe that it is necessary for fixed guideway transportation systems, like the Miami airport APM system, to have a higher level of oversight, regardless of whether they are included in FTA definitions. Mr. Bass’s letter identified six fixed guideway systems in operation in Texas and described legislation assigning state safety oversight authority of these systems to the Texas Department of Transportation. However, we are aware of the following four additional fixed guideway systems operating in Texas that were not included in Mr. Bass’s letter: 1. Las Colinas Area Personal Transit System in Irving, Texas. 2. Skylink People Mover at Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) International Airport. 3. Skyway at George Bush Intercontinental Airport near Houston. 4. The Subway, also at George Bush Intercontinental Airport. The systems at DFW and George Bush Intercontinetal airports are substantially similar to the APM system at the Miami Airport involved in the accident that resulted in these recommendations. As with the Miami Airport APM system, the four systems listed above were built and are operated without FTA funding or oversight. Please tell us if there are any other fixed guideway systems in Texas not included in the FTA definitions for Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 674 and section 20021 of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act. Pending your response, Safety Recommendation R 11 2 is classified “Open—Acceptable Response.” Please also tell us if the Texas Department of Transportation has safety oversight authority for the four systems listed above and, if not, whether you will obtain the statutory authority to provide safety oversight for these systems. Pending an acceptable answer to that question, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. On December 21, 2017, we told you that we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and had yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R 11 2 and 3 were classified “Closed—Unacceptable Action/No Response Received.” We also said that if you provided information on actions you had taken, we would consider changing the classifications. Although you have taken action to partially address these recommendations, other actions are needed to fully satisfy them. We are concerned by the age of these recommendations and we ask that you respond promptly.

From: State of Texas
To: NTSB
Date: 2/12/2018
Response: -From Dede Keith, Deputy Director, Constituent Communication Division, Office of the Governor, State of Texas: Thank you for your correspondence to Governor Abbott dated December 21, 2017, and received by our office on January 2, 2018, regarding Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3. We have shared your letter with the appropriate member of the governor's staff, and it is our understanding that the Texas Department of Transportation will be responding to you on this matter. Please let us know if we can assist you in the future.

From: State of Texas
To: NTSB
Date: 1/22/2018
Response: -From James M. Bass, Executive Director: This letter is in response to your letter dated December 21, 2017, to Governor Greg Abbott (attached) regarding the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) previously issued Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and R-11-3. The Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) believes that the following information and actions of the State of Texas are responsive to the NTSB recommendations. In 1997, the Texas Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law Senate Bill 753 (attached), which designated TxDOT as the state agency responsible for identifying all fixed guideway transportation systems in Texas and implementing the federally required State Safety Oversight (SSO) program. Those fixed guideway systems include: Dallas Area Rapid Transit, City of Dallas - Dallas Streetcar, McKinney Avenue Transit Association, Houston METRO, City of Galveston - Galveston Trolley and the City of El Paso - El Paso Streetcar. In 2017, the Texas Legislature passed and the Governor signed in to law Senate Bill 1523 (attached), which granted TxDOT explicit enforcement authority and broad investigative authority as required by the SSO program. Senate Bill 1523 meets the federal requirements placed on states in the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP-21), Section 20021 and Part 67 4, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulation, dealing with safety oversight of fixed guideway transportation systems in Texas. TxDOT is currently working with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the agency responsible for overseeing SSO implementation. TxDOT currently anticipates final adoption of state regulations in March 2018 to ensure compliance with the SSO program. TxDOT will then combine the regulations with the SSO Program Standard, as required by the FTA, to apply for certification. This application is anticipated in mid-April 2018. As previously stated, TxDOT believes these actions will fully implement NTSB Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and R-11-3, as defined in your letter.

From: NTSB
To: State of Texas
Date: 12/21/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 17, 2014, and August 18, 2014, requests for updates. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R 11 2 and 3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECIEVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Texas
Date: 8/18/2014
Response: On April 17, 2014, we requested an update regarding action you have taken to address these safety recommendations. To date, we have received no response and would appreciate a reply. We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Texas
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPOONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Utah
Date: 6/23/2014
Response: We note that you identified only one fixed guideway transportation system?the Utah Transit Authority TRAX Light Rail, which includes the “S-Line Streetcar”?that is overseen by the Utah Department of Transportation’s Rail State Safety Oversight Program. The Utah Transit Authority FrontRunner and Amtrak are both regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R-11-2 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Action, and Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED.

From: State of Utah
To: NTSB
Date: 5/1/2014
Response: -From Carlos M. Braceras, P.E., Executive Director: The State of Utah is committed to the safety of its fixed guideway transportation systems, and we have demonstrated that commitment through our strengthened State Safety Oversight program. Utah is also committed to meeting the requirements set forth by the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP-21) Act of2012. Utah has been working closely with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to ensure that we are taking appropriate steps to continue to bolster our oversight program, and we look forward to the challenge of enhancing our technical and resource capabilities in response to the federal requirements under 49 C.F.R. 5329(e). In response to your request to respond to the aforementioned recommendations, the fixed guideway transportation systems that currently operate within the State of Utah consist of the following. • Amtrak (overseen by the Federal Railroad Administration) • Utah Transit Authority FrontRunner (overseen by the Federal Railroad Administration) • Utah Transit Authority TRAX Light Rail (overseen by the Utah Department of Transportation Rail State Safety Oversight Program. This includes the "S-Line Streetcar.") In accordance with our efforts over the next several years to meet the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329(e), the State ofUtah plans to enhance the Rail State Safety Oversight Program. However, there are no current plans to add any additional fixed guideway transportation systems to that oversight program or to subject such systems to oversight by some other state agency. We look forward to continuing our mission to constantly improve the safety of the fixed guideway transportation systems operating within the State of Utah, and we welcome any feedback, guidance, and/or technical assistance that NTSB may be able to provide to us as we move forward. Thank you very much for your consideration. Please contact me with any questions or comments.

From: NTSB
To: State of Utah
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Vermont
Date: 7/23/2014
Response: Mr. Delabruer’s e-mail clarified that the state of Vermont rail system includes only rail systems that are regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration and that the state has no rail fixed guideway systems under independent authority. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation R-11-2 is classified “Closed—Acceptable Action.” Because Vermont has no fixed guideway systems, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED--RECONSIDERED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Vermont
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: State of Vermont
To: NTSB
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: -From Dan Delabruere, Rail Program Director, State of Vermont: Because the State of Vermont does not have any Rail Fixed Guideway Systems, there are no plans to obtain statutory authority to provide oversight. If and when the need comes, the State of Vermont will address this issue.

From: NTSB
To: State of Washington
Date: 12/21/2017
Response: Our last communication from Washington regarding these recommendations was a January 26, 2012, letter from the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) saying that it had discussed these recommendations with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and planned to work with the FTA to identify any fixed guideway systems that fell outside of current state safety oversight authority. The WSDOT also planned to add Washington Administrative Code 468-550 to the list of state regulations that would be reviewed and updated in 2012 to expand the state safety oversight program’s authority, as recommended. Although these actions were a good initial response, they did not satisfy the recommendations. Accordingly, pending the completion of the recommended actions, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 were classified “Open—Acceptable Response” on July 17, 2012. In the 5 years since then, we have not received any further information, despite our September 16, 2015, letter requesting an update. We generally expect that the actions we recommend can be completed within 5 years of a recommendation being issued. These recommendations are now over 5 years old, and we have not been able to learn if you have taken any further actions to satisfy them. Consequently, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: NTSB
To: State of Washington
Date: 9/16/2015
Response: We understood at that time that WSDOT had taken the following actions: • Discussed these issues with representatives of the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) Region 10 and with the FTA’s Office of Safety and Security • Made plan to work with both offices to identify any fixed guideway systems that fall outside of current state safety oversight authority • Added Washington Administrative Code 468-550 to the list of state regulations that will be reviewed and updated this year, in order to expand the authority of the state safety oversight program, as recommended Although these actions constituted a good initial response, they did not satisfy the recommendation. Accordingly, pending the completion of the recommended actions, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 were classified “Open—Acceptable Response” on July 17, 2012. Completing actions to address our safety recommendations usually takes recipients 3 to 5 years, and these recommendations are now nearly 4 years old. To date, we have received no further information about Washington’s progress in addressing Safety Recommendations R-11-2 or -3. Accordingly, we would appreciate receiving a prompt update on your plans and actions to satisfy them. We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure the public the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that can be shared with others. Pending your timely reply, Safety Recommendations R 11-2 and -3 will retain their current classification. (OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE)

From: NTSB
To: State of Washington
Date: 7/17/2012
Response: The NTSB notes that WSDOT has taken the following actions: • Discussed these issues with representatives of the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) Region 10 and with the FTA’s Office of Safety and Security • Made plan to work with both offices to identify any fixed guideway systems that fall outside of current state safety oversight authority • Added Washington Administrative Code 468-550 to the list of state regulations that will be reviewed and updated this year, in order to expand the authority of the state safety oversight program, as recommended Accordingly, pending the completion of actions to address Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3, these recommendations are classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: State of Washington
To: NTSB
Date: 1/26/2012
Response: -From Brian Lagerberg, Director, Public Transportation, Washington State Department of Transportation: On December 22,2011, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued safety recommendations R-II-2 and -3 to the USDOT, the 50 states, and the District of Columbia concerning fixed guideway systems that fall outside of the regulatory authority and oversight of the designated state safety oversight agencies. Specifically, these recommendations advise the state to work with USDOT to identify all fixed guideway systems within its jurisdiction that are not under the authority of its designated State Safety Oversight program and to take the necessary steps to obtain this authority. Washington's designated State Safety Oversight agency, the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT), is taking necessary steps to implement findings R-11-2 and -3. WSDOT has discussed these findings with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Office of Safety & Security and FTA Region 10, and WSDOT will work with both offices in the identification of any fixed guideway systems that fall outside of current State Safety Oversight authority. WSDOT has also added WAC 468-550 to the list of state administrative codes that will be reviewed and updated this year. A revision to this code would be necessary in order to expand the authority of the State Safety Oversight program. Washington, and its designated State Safety Oversight agency, remains committed to implementing NTSB Safety recommendations R-11-2 and -3.

From: NTSB
To: State of West Virginia
Date: 6/21/2017
Response: An April 24, 2014, letter from Mr. Paul A. Mattox, Jr., then Secretary of the West Virginia Department of Transportation (WVDOT), informed us that the Morgantown Personal Rapid Transit System (MPRT) was the only fixed guideway system within the state. Mr. Mattox also stated that the Division of Public Transit within the WVDOT had been designated as the state safety oversight agency, and the division was working to implement the safety requirements outlined in the federal Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century law, including obtaining statutory authority to provide safety oversight of the MPRT. On June 23, 2014, we classified Safety Recommendation R-11-3 OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE pending the completion of the division’s effort to obtain the statutory authority.

From: NTSB
To: State of West Virginia
Date: 6/23/2014
Response: We note that the West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Public Transit, has identified the Morgantown Personal Rapid Transit System as the only fixed guideway system within the state. Consequently, Safety Recommendation R-11-2 is classified “Closed-Acceptable Action.” We further note that the division is working to obtain the statutory authority needed to provide safety oversight of the system. Pending the completion of this effort, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: State of West Virginia
To: NTSB
Date: 4/24/2014
Response: -From Paul A. Mattox, Jr., P.E., Secretary of Transportation/ Commissioner of Highways: Thank you for your letter to Governor Tomblin dated April 17 regarding the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Recommendations R-11-2 and -3. Governor Tomblin has asked me to response on his behalf. The West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Public Transit has identified the Morgantown Personal Rapid Transit System (MPRT) as the only fixed guideway system within the State. This identification addresses the R-11-2 recommendation mentioned in your letter. Additionally, in January 2014, Governor Tomblin designated the Division of Public Transit as the State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) for the State of West Virginia. The Division is currently working to implement the safety requirements as outlined in Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP-21). Among the safety requirements is to provide statutory authority to provide safety oversight of the MPRT. We expect this legislation to be enacted and legislative rules promulgated within two to three years which address the R-11-3 recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: State of West Virginia
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: State of Wisconsin
Date: 11/6/2012
Response: Because the state of Wisconsin has completed the recommended review and determined that there are no fixed guideway transportation systems operating in the state, Safety Recommendation R-11-2 is classified “Closed—Acceptable Action,” and Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED. Thank you for your cooperation and for your commitment to transportation safety.

From: State of Wisconsin
To: NTSB
Date: 2/15/2012
Response: -From John Alley, Chief, Transit Section, Bureau of Transit, Local Roads, Rails, and Harbors, Division of Transportation Investment Management, Wisconsin Department of Transportation: Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker and Wisconsin Department of Transportation Secretary Mark Gottlieb have asked me to respond to your December 22, 2011 Safety Recommendation in relation to potential Fixed Guideway Transportation Systems in our jurisdiction for which there is no safety oversight. In consultation with my staff and with my colleague in our Rails and Harbors Section, we have determined that we are not aware of any such systems in existence in Wisconsin. Please let me know if you have any additional questions.

From: NTSB
To: State of Wyoming
Date: 12/21/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 17, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R 11 2 and 3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: State of Wyoming
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: District of Columbia
Date: 12/21/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 17, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R 11 2 and 3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECIEVED.

From: NTSB
To: District of Columbia
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Date: 8/18/2014
Response: We note that Mr. Cristy has determined (1) that there is only one fixed guideway transportation system in the state, operated by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), and (2) that Massachusetts has no automated people movers. We further note that the Department of Public Utilities, Transportation Oversight Division (the designated state safety oversight agency for the MBTA), has met the pre-certification and oversight requirements for rail transit established by the Federal Transit Administration in the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (PL 112-141), Title 49 United States Code, Section 5302. These actions satisfy Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3, which are classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: Commonwealth of Massachusetts
To: NTSB
Date: 6/17/2014
Response: -From Brian F. Cristy, Director, Transportation Oversight Division: I write on behalf of Massachusetts in response to correspondence from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), dated Apri118, 2014, regarding NTSB Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3. Specifically, the NTSB has requested the Commonwealth of Massachusetts identify all fixed guideway transportation within Massachusetts and to describe the state safety oversight for each. Massachusetts has one fixed guideway transportation system which is operated by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA). There are no Automated People Mover's (APM's) in Massachusetts. The Department of Public Utilities, Transportation Oversight Division is the designated State Safety Oversight Agency (SSO) for the MBTA. The Department's SSO program is one of only two SSO programs in the United States to meet the "pre-certification" requirements established by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) specific to the MAP-21, 49 U.S.C. Section 5302. The Department's comprehensive SSO program has met the requirements specific to the enhanced rail transit State Safety Oversight requirements mandated by MAP-21.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN--AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Kentucky
Date: 12/22/2017
Response: We have not heard from you regarding these recommendations since they were issued, despite our April 18, 2014, request for an update. We normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. Because we issued these recommendations 6 years ago and have yet to hear from you regarding them, Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and -3 are classified CLOSED--UNACCEPTABLE ACTION/ NO RESPONSE RECEIVED.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Kentucky
Date: 4/18/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Date: 12/18/2012
Response:

From: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
To: NTSB
Date: 10/22/2012
Response: -From Elizabeth G. Bonini, RTSRP Program Manager, Bureau of Public Transportation: On September 19, 2012 Governor Corbett’s office received the NTSB’s request for an update on Recommendation R-11-2, which states: R-11-2: Working with the U.S. Department of Transportation, identify all fixed guideway transportation systems within your jurisdiction. PennDOT has reached out to the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to identify fixed guideways under the Commonwealth’s jurisdiction. FTA has not yet provided a response. Additionally, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation has undertaken a review collaborating with the Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry, as well as the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture, to complete a comprehensive investigation of all tourist and airport rail operations which may fall under the Commonwealth’s jurisdiction and identify the governing bodies responsible for the safety oversight of those properties. This project is anticipated to come to fruition by the close of the 2012 calendar year. Once completed, a comprehensive listing and description of the identified systems and their oversight agency will be developed and shared with both the NTSB and FTA. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania supports the NTSB’s safety mission, and is committed to properly reviewing and addressing the issues associated with these findings. Thank you for the opportunity to present this update. Again, please feel free to contact me for further information in this regard.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Date: 9/19/2012
Response: Because PennDOT plans to work with the U.S. Department of Transportation as requested, Safety Recommendation R-11-2 is classified “Open—Acceptable Response.” Because PennDOT had sufficient statutory oversight authority before these recommendations were issued, Safety Recommendation R-11-3 is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED.

From: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
To: NTSB
Date: 1/24/2012
Response: Emily Adams, Administrative Assistant, Bureau of Public Transportation, Pennsylvania Department of Transportation: This email is in response to correspondence from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to the Honorable Tom Corbett, Governor of Pennsylvania, dated December 22, 2011, regarding NTSB safety recommendations R-11-2 and R-11-3. Those safety recommendations are as follows: •?Working with the U.S. Department of Transportation, identify all fixed guideway transportation systems within your jurisdiction. (R-11-2) •?Obtain the statutory authority to provide safety oversight of all fixed guideway transportation systems that operate within your jurisdiction, regardless of their funding authorization or the date they began operation. (R-11-3) The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) is the designated agency for all fixed guideway safety and security oversight in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Rail Transit Safety Review Program (RTSRP) is the mechanism through which PennDOT fulfills its responsibilities to develop, implement, and maintain the safety and security oversight requirements in the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s RTSRP was established in 1991 to fulfill requirements of revised Pennsylvania statutes in Title 74 and is currently legislatively authorized under Act 44 of 2007, § 1510. The RTSRP also fulfills the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) State Safety Oversight Rule (49 CFR Part 659), which requires states to oversee the safety and security of rail fixed guideway agencies through a designated oversight agency. This FTA rule implements a provision in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 (49 U.S.C. 5330). Note: The Pennsylvania program pre-dates the FTA’s requirements under Part 659 for the oversight of rail transit. With regard to the new National Transportation Safety Board recommendations: •?PennDOT will work with the U.S. DOT to identify all fixed guideway transportation within the RTSRP jurisdiction. •?With regard to statutory authority to perform safety oversight, PennDOT’s current statutory authority is broad based and sufficient. Thank you for the opportunity to present Pennsylvania’s response to NTSB’s recommendations.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Virginia
Date: 9/26/2014
Response: We understand that the commonwealth of Virginia designated the Department of Rail and Public Transportation as the state oversight agency responsible for overseeing Virginia’s rail transit safety and security, and that this department has been developing, managing, and carrying out the Federal Transit Administration’s Safety and Security Oversight program requirements within Virginia since 2007. Because this policy predates our issuance of Safety Recommendation R-11-3, the recommendation is classified CLOSED—RECONSIDERED.

From: Commonwealth of Virginia
To: NTSB
Date: 8/14/2014
Response: -From Terence R. McAuliffe, Governor: Thank you for your letter dated April 17, 2014, addressing NTSB Safety Recommendations R-11-2 and R-11-3. The Commonwealth of Virginia appreciates the urgency with which the NTSB issues these recommendations. Below, we have identified the safety oversight mechanisms currently in place regarding the rail fixed guideway systems in the Commonwealth. The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 required the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to create a state managed oversight program to improve rail transit safety and security (49 U.S.C. 5330) and issue a Rule requiring states to oversee the safety of operational Rail Fixed Guideway Transit Systems not regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). The program, 49 CFR Part 659, Rail Fixed Guideway Systems; State Safety Oversight (SSO); Final Rule, became effective on January 26, 1996. The Rule requires an agency designated by the State to oversee safety and security to prepare standards that must be met by transit agencies operating Rail Fixed Guideway Transit Systems (RFGTS) within that state (§659 .15). Through Section 33.1-391 et seq. ofthe Code of Virginia, the Commonwealth of Virginia has designated the Department of Rail and Public Transportation (DRPT) as the State Oversight Agency (SOA) responsible for rail transit safety and security oversight in the Commonwealth. Virginia Code and the April 2007 Commonwealth Transportation Board (CTB) Amendment grants authority to DRPT to develop, manage, and carry out PTA's Safety and Security Oversight program requirements in the Commonwealth. DRPT's current oversight program is fully compliant with 49 CFR Part 659, and as part of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP 21), DRPT is currently assessing and enhancing its program to comply with the new state safety oversight regulation 49 U.S.C. 5329(e). Presently, there are three Rail Fixed Guideway Transit Systems not regulated by the FRA that operate within the Commonwealth of Virginia: • Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) Metrorail system • Hampton Roads Transit (HRT) Tide Light Rail system • Washington Dulles International Airport Aero Train system WMATA's Metrorail system includes five lines, 86 stations, and 106.3 miles (171.1 km) of track. The Silver Line will extend the system another 23 miles ( 45 km) and add another 11 stations. Oversight for the WMATA metro rail system is provided by the Tri-State Oversight Committee (TOC). The TOC's SSO program is a joint effort of the DC Department of Transportation, the Maryland Department of Transportation, and the Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation. This arrangement developed because WMATA's rail system operates in the three jurisdictions. HRT's Tide Light Rail system consists of 7.4 miles of track and 11 stations. The system utilizes nine Siemens-built S70 vehicles as its rolling stock. The HRT Tide system opened for operation in August of 2011. Oversight for the Tide system is provided by the Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation. The Washington Dulles International Airport's AeroTrain system was built by Sumitomo under contract with the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority (MWAA). Aero Train is a 3.78-mile (6.08 km) underground transportation system that utilizes 29 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Crystal Mover vehicles (with rubber wheels) as its rolling stock. MWAA's safety and security program for the Aero Train system is in accordance with 49 CFR Part 659 Rail Fixed Guideway Systems and follows the structure of auditing 21 safety elements and 5 security elements of the Program Standard, at least once every three years. MWAA's Safety Committee also meets no less than quarterly and is comprised of representatives from Fire, Police, Legal, Risk Management and the Aero Train Operator. Oversight for the Aero Train system is provided by MWAA' s Safety and Security Consultant, Lea and Elliott.

From: NTSB
To: Commonwealth of Virginia
Date: 4/17/2014
Response: We are interested in knowing whether and how our recommendations are implemented, both to ensure that the traveling public is provided the highest level of safety and to identify creative solutions that might be shared with others, and we normally expect actions to address our recommendations to be completed within 3 to 5 years. As we issued this recommendation more than 2 years ago and we have yet to hear from you regarding it, we would appreciate receiving a response within 90 days indicating actions you have taken or plan to take to implement it. In the meantime, the recommendation will retain its current classification of OPEN—AWAIT RESPONSE.