From:
|
FRA
|
To:
|
NTSB
|
Date:
|
5/1/2013
|
Response:
|
-From Joseph C. Szabo, Administrator: Thank you for your January 28, 2013, letter to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) concerning the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendations R-12-39 through R-12-43. These five recommendations came as a result of the report on the Miriam, Nevada, highway-railroad grade crossing collision on June 24, 2011, in which a Peterbilt truck-tractor pulling two empty side-dump trailers and traveling north on US Highway 95 struck an Amtrak passenger train. The collision destroyed the truck-tractor and two passenger railcars. Four train passengers, the train conductor, and the truck driver were killed.
The enclosure outlines FRA's response to each recommendation and the safety systems and regulations in place to address them. Therefore, FRA respectfully requests that NTSB classify Safety Recommendations R-12-39 through R-12-41 as "Closed-Acceptable Alternate Action" and R-12-42 & -43 as "Open-Acceptable Response."
I appreciate your interest in this important matter. We look forward to working with you.
The risk of a heavy highway vehicle striking a train is documented, and served as a basis for the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) issuance of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Section 238.217, Side Structure, as part of its original Passenger Equipment Safety Standards regulations (see 64 Fed. Reg. 25540 (May 12, 1999)). Since then, equipment compliant with FRA's side structure regulation has proved to perform well in different collisions. For example, in a highway-rail grade-crossing accident where a train collides with a highway vehicle fouling the grade-crossing, the collision may cause the highway vehicle to rotate sharply and strike the side of the train. Such an accident occurred on October 23,2006, in Franklin, Massachusetts, when a Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad train travelling at around 30 mph collided with a tractor trailer hauling earth-moving equipment. In the Franklin accident, the sides of the multi-level rail cars were damaged and the lead cab car derailed, but the occupant compartment was not penetrated. Another such accident occurred on August 24, 2012, in Camarillo, California, when a Southern California Regional Rail Authority train travelling at around 55 mph collided with a loaded tractor trailer. In the Camarillo accident, some local penetration occurred into the multi-level rail cars, which resulted in several seats being destroyed. Yet, no severe injuries or fatalities occurred in either accident. The circumstances of the June 24, 2011, accident in Miriam, Nevada, were more extreme.
There, a tractor pulling two empty side-dump trailers travelling at around 60 mph struck the side of a National Railroad Passenger Corporation train, which itself was travelling at over 70 mph. The tractor embedded itself into the side of a multi-level crew dormitory car, causing a fire, and the accident resulted in the deaths of four passengers and a crewmember, along with the truck driver. Significantly more energy was absorbed by the rail car structure in the Miriam accident than in either the Franklin or Camarillo accidents.
FRA is currently updating passenger equipment crashworthiness and other performance regulations with the assistance of the Engineering Task Force (ETF) of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee's Passenger Safety Working Group (PSWG). The ETF includes representatives from all of the agency's major stakeholders, including railroads, rail labor organizations, and rail suppliers. The ETF is developing recommendations for crashworthiness requirements that rely on computer simulations and destructive component tests, as well as nondestructive car body tests. Traditional passenger rail equipment crashworthiness requirements rely on manual calculations and non-destructive car body tests. This update is expected to result in new regulations that are at least as safe as the current regulations, will be less expensive to implement, and have two applications: trains running up to 125 mph in a shared right-of-way (Tier I), and over 125 mph up to 220 mph (new Tier III) in an exclusive right-of-way. In this regard, the ETF has supported applying FRA's current side structure requirements to both tiers of operations.
This regulatory effort is intended to promote the safe use of proven passenger trainset designs that are compatible with engineering practices outside of North America, and has already been used by FRA to approve the operation of Tier I multiple-unit trains by the Denton County Transportation Authority in Denton County, Texas. The Tier III standards are intended to serve as the basis for approval of passenger trainsets for new high-speed operations, such as the California High-Speed Train Project. In both applications, the standards will help to facilitate the expansion of rail passenger service in the United States, which will also be subject to new regulations for system safety.
The PSWG's General Passenger Safety Task Force has developed recommendations for passenger railroads to enhance the overall safety of their operations using System Safety Program Plans to identify and then mitigate the hazards that each railroad faces. These recommendations led to FRA's issuance of a System Safety Program proposed rule (see 77 FR 55371 (Sept. 7,2012)). This systems approach to safety, which encompasses accident prevention, damage reduction, and effective response, can be expected to provide significant safety benefits to the traveling public and train crewmembers in a range of potential scenarios.
FRA is also considering conducting new research to determine the types and frequency of side impacts into passenger rail equipment. This research would focus on accidents that have occurred in the last ten years and investigate alternatives to the current side structure requirements. The current side structure regulation for Tier I passenger equipment is essentially stiffness based. Potentially, side structure requirements that are based on performance under prescribed impact conditions may be as equally or more effective in preserving occupied volume in the likely range of accident conditions, while being less expensive for the industry to implement.
FRA therefore requests that these actions be considered an acceptable response to the recommendations.
|
|