On December 22, 2022, about 1654 local time, an engine room fire broke out aboard the passenger ferry Sandy Ground, while the vessel was underway in New York Harbor, near Staten Island, New York, with 884 persons aboard. The crew extinguished the fire by activating the engine room’s fixed fire extinguishing system. The vessel lost propulsion and electricity, and the crew deployed both anchors. The majority of the passengers transferred to responding Good Samaritan vessels; the Sandy Ground was towed to the St. George Ferry Terminal in Staten Island, where the remaining persons on board disembarked. There were no injuries, and no pollution was reported. Damage to the vessel was estimated at $12.7 million.
We found that engineering crewmembers on duty at the time of the casualty ineffectively managed fuel oil levels in the vessel’s two fuel oil day tanks, causing the difference in the two tanks’ levels to sharply increase. To correct this difference in levels, the engineering crewmembers closed the fuel oil return isolation ball valves to both day tanks, causing the fuel oil system to overpressurize and the fuel oil filters on the main engines to rupture. Fuel oil spraying from a ruptured fuel oil filter onto the operating no. 2 main engine ignited, causing a fire to break out in the engine room. After the initial alarms, the engines continued to run, so pressurized fuel oil continued to spray, increasing the severity of the fire. However, the crew’s actions to effectively contain and extinguish the fire once the engines were stopped, combined with the quick response of nearby Good Samaritan vessels, resulted in the safe evacuation of all persons on board.
We found that the engineering crewmembers on duty at the time of the casualty were not operating the fuel oil system in accordance with the operator’s written guidance. We also found that Staten Island Ferry’s training program for engineering crewmembers was inadequate because crewmembers did not receive follow-on instruction after isolation ball valves were installed in the fuel oil return piping. Additionally, because the Sandy Ground engineering crewmembers had worked on other Staten Island ferries that were equipped with relief valves in their fuel oil return systems—unlike the Sandy Ground—they likely expected that the fuel oil system could not be overpressurized.
We found that, had the Sandy Ground been equipped with a pressure relief valve installed in the fuel oil return line, the elevated fuel oil pressure caused by the closed fuel oil return isolation ball valves would have been relieved, and fuel oil system overpressurization would have been prevented. When the fuel oil system drawing (diagram) was initially submitted to the US Coast Guard and American Bureau of Shipping for approval, as was required by regulations, the drawing complied with all applicable regulations and classification rules. However, explicit requirements and guidance for maintaining unimpeded return flow in diesel engine fuel oil return systems would mitigate the risk of a system overpressurization. Additionally, specific guidance on maintaining unimpeded diesel engine fuel oil return flow would provide naval architects and engineers with additional information for the safe design of these systems. Finally, we found that other classification societies would benefit from learning about the circumstances of the engine room fire aboard the Sandy Ground in order to share that information with their members so that future vessel designs provide for unimpeded return fuel oil flow.
We determined that the probable cause of the engine room fire aboard the passenger ferry Sandy Ground was the design of the vessel’s diesel engine fuel oil return system, which included isolation valves that could be regularly adjusted by the crew and, when closed, stopped return fuel oil flow from all operating engines, resulting in the overpressurization of the fuel oil system and the ignition of fuel oil spraying from ruptured fuel oil filters onto the exhaust manifold of a running engine. Contributing to the overpressurization was the operator’s inadequate training program on fuel oil system operation, which did not provide follow-on instruction after the installation of fuel oil return isolation valves at the day tanks.
We recommended that the Coast Guard update marine engineering regulatory requirements applicable to US-flagged vessels to require diesel engine fuel oil return systems be designed to have either unimpeded return flow from the engine or the installation of a pressure relief valve. We recommended that the American Bureau of Shipping similarly revise its rules used to class vessels.
We also recommended that, until regulatory requirements can be updated, the Coast Guard develop and disseminate design guidance for new construction diesel engine fuel oil return systems so they have unimpeded flow from the engine or other arrangements to prevent overpressurization. Additionally, we recommended that the Coast Guard share our related safety alert with marine inspectors so they can ensure existing vessels’ diesel fuel oil systems have unimpeded return flow. Finally, we recommended that the American Bureau of Shipping propose to the International Association of Classification Societies that they ensure their rules require diesel engine fuel oil systems to be designed to have unimpeded return flow or other arrangements to prevent system overpressurization.
