Helicopter resting on it's right side on an asohalt road

​Accident Scene.​

Collision with Powerlines and Terrain during Forced Landing MARPAT Aviation Bell Helicopter UH-1B, N98F

What Happened

​​​This accident occurred during a flight offered as part of an annual event at Logan County Airport, Logan, West Virginia, that showcased a former military UH-1B helicopter. A volunteer pilot for the event (the pilot-in-command) was in the left front seat, a passenger was in the right front seat, and four other passengers were seated in the cabin. The right front-seat passenger made a required $250 donation to fly the helicopter for 30 minutes, and the other four passengers each made a smaller donation to ride in the helicopter. About 15 minutes after the flight departed, the helicopter impacted two powerlines and a rock face located about 3.5 nautical miles east of the airport during an attempted forced landing. The helicopter came to rest partially inverted on its right side on an asphalt road, and a postcrash fire ensued. The six helicopter occupants were fatally injured, and the helicopter was destroyed. 

Postaccident examination of the engine found static damage in the compressor section; rotational damage in the gas-producer turbine; and other damage to the exhaust diffuser, rear bearing cover, the No. 2 bearing, and two power turbine blades. Postaccident examination of the helicopter’s main rotor blades found no evidence indicating a powered impact; thus, a partial or total loss of engine power occurred before impact.


What We Found

We determined that the probable cause of this accident was the operator’s failure to adequately inspect the former military turbine-powered helicopter, which allowed an engine issue to progress and result in a loss of engine power and a subsequent loss of control after the helicopter struck powerlines during a forced landing. 

​Also causal to the accident were the following: ​

  • ​the FAA’s inadequate inspection and maintenance standards for former military turbine-powered aircraft operating with an experimental exhibition airworthiness certificate;
  • the operator’s use of those standards instead of more rigorous standards, which were readily available to the operator and previously used to inspect and maintain the helicopter; and
  • the FAA’s inadequate oversight of the operator, which did not detect the inherent risk associated with the operation.

What We Recommended

As a result of this investigation, we made six new recommendations and also reiterated Safety Recommendation A-21-09 to the FAA.

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