​​Oblique aerial illustration of the flight paths.

​​​Oblique aerial illustration of the ADS-B flight track for flight 5342 (blue line) and

the composite data–derived flight path for PAT25 (yellow line) converging near DCA.

Midair Collision PSA Airlines Bombardier CRJ700 Airplane and Sikorsky UH-60 Military Helicopter

What Happened

​​​On Jan. 29, 2025, about 2048 eastern standard time (EST), a Sikorsky UH-60L, operated by the US Army under the callsign PAT25, and an MHI (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), N709PS, operated by PSA Airlines as flight 5342, collided in flight approximately 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, and impacted the Potomac River in southwest Washington, District of Columbia. The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers aboard the airplane and all 3 crew members aboard the helicopter were fatally injured. Both aircraft were destroyed as a result of the accident.

Jan. 27, 2026 Board Meeting Presentations:

Investigator-in-Charge Presentation

Air Traffic Control (ATC) Presentation

ATC Human Perform​ance Presentation

ATC Postaccident Drug and Alcohol Testing Presentation

Collision Avoidance Presentation

Helicopter Operations Presentation

Human Performance Operations Presentation

Safety Data and Safety Management Systems Presentation


​July 30 - Aug.1, 2025 Investigative Hearing 

Watch: NTSB YouTube Playlist includes all hearings and media briefings

​Images are available on NTSB's Flickr ​


What We Found

​The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path; their failure to regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate the risk of a midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA); as well as the air traffic system’s overreliance on visual separation in order to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept. Also causal was the lack of effective pilot-applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, which resulted in a midair collision. Additional causal factors were the tower team’s loss of situation awareness and degraded performance due to the high workload of the combined helicopter and local control positions and the absence of a risk assessment process to identify and mitigate real-time operational risk factors, which resulted in misprioritization of duties, inadequate traffic advisories, and the lack of safety alerts to both flight crews. Also causal was the Army’s failure to ensure pilots were aware of the effects of error tolerances on barometric altimeters in their helicopters, which resulted in the crew flying above the maximum published helicopter route altitude. Contributing factors include:

  • ​the limitations of the traffic awareness and collision alerting systems on both aircraft, which precluded effective alerting of the impending collision to the flight crews;
  • an unsustainable airport arrival rate, increasing traffic volume with a changing fleet mix, and airline scheduling practices at DCA, which regularly strained the DCA air traffic control tower workforce and degraded safety over time;
  • the Army’s lack of a fully implemented safety management system, which should have identified and addressed hazards associated with altitude exceedances on the Washington, DC, helicopter routes;
  • the FAA’s failure across multiple organizations to implement previous NTSB recommendations, including Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast In, and to follow and fully integrate its established safety management system, which should have led to several organizational and operational changes based on previously identified risks that were known to management; and
  • the absence of effective data sharing and analysis among the FAA, aircraft operators, and other relevant organizations.​​​We determined that the probable cause of this accident was the FAA’s placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path; their failure to regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate the risk of a midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport; as well as the air traffic system’s overreliance on visual separation in order to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept. 

What We Recommended

As a result of this investigation, we made​ the following new safety recommendations.

To the Federal Aviation Administration:

  • ​Develop and implement time-on-position limitations for supervisory air traffic control personnel, including guidance for district and facility level management to adapt these limitations to account for their own staffing and local standard operating procedures. (A-26-8)
  • Develop instructor-led, scenario-based training on threat and error management that trains controllers to continuously monitor their environment to more quickly and accurately identify threats; promote team communication to ensure that communications are clear, timely, and assertive; emphasize effective scanning habits; recognize patterns in the development of adverse events; and enhance decision-making under stress by developing habits that balance procedural compliance with problem solving to mitigate the risks of threats and errors, and provide this training to all air traffic controllers annually. (A-26-9)
  • Develop and implement a risk assessment tool for supervisors that incorporates the principles of threat and error management to assist in risk identification, mitigation, and operational decision making. (A 26 10)
  • Initiate rulemaking in 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 93 Subpart K, High Density Traffic Airports, that prescribes air carrier operation limitations at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport in 30-minute periods, similar to those imposed at LaGuardia Airport, to ensure that the airport does not exceed capacity and to mitigate inconsistent air carrier scheduling practices. (A-26-11)
  • Fully implement operational use of the time-based flow management system at Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control and its associated air traffic control towers. (A-26-12)
  • Reassess the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport’s airport arrival rate with special consideration to its airspace complexity, airfield limitations, mixed fleet operations, and traffic volume. (A-26-13)
  • ​Require each Class B or Class C air traffic control tower facility to evaluate its existing miles-in-trail procedures or agreements to ensure that the spacing provided is appropriate for operational safety, and make the results publicly available. (A-26-14)
  • Define objective criteria for the determination of air traffic facility levels considering traffic and airspace volume, operational factors unique to each facility, and cost of living. (A-26-15)
  • Using the criteria established by Safety Recommendation A-26-15, determine whether the classification of the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport’s air traffic control tower as a level 9 facility appropriately reflects the complexity of its operations. (A-26-16)
  • Develop a new and comprehensive instructor-led, scenario-based training on the proper use of visual separation, both tower- and pilot-applied. This training should include information on the inherent limitations of see and avoid, responsibilities when applying visual separation, and guidance for controllers on factors, such as current traffic volume, workload, weather or environmental factors, experience, and staffing, that should be considered when applying visual separation. Require this training for all controllers and include on a recurrent basis thereafter in annual simulator refresher training. (A-26-17)
  • Conduct a comprehensive evaluation, in conjunction with local operators, to determine the overall safety benefits and risks to requiring all aircraft to use the same frequency when the helicopter and local positions are combined in the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport air traffic control tower. (A-26-18)
  • Implement anti-blocking technology that will alert controllers and/or flight crews to potentially blocked transmissions when simultaneous broadcasting occurs. (A-26-19)
  • Develop and implement improvements to the conflict alert system to provide more salient and meaningful alerts to controllers based on the severity of the conflict triggering the alert. (A-26-20)
  • Once the improvements to the conflict alert system discussed in Safety Recommendation A-26-20 are implemented, provide training to controllers on its use. (A-26-21)
  • Revise the Air Traffic Organization’s initial event response procedures so that an appropriate on-site supervisor makes each postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing determination, based on their assessment of whether the event meets testing criteria and which controllers had duties pertaining to the involved aircraft, without needing to wait for investigation or approval. (A 26 22)
  • At least annually, provide training on the revised postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing determination procedure discussed in Safety Recommendation A-26-22 to all staff who have responsibilities under that procedure; this training should include a post-learning knowledge assessment. (A-26-23)
  • Ensure that annual reviews of helicopter route charts are being conducted throughout the National Airspace System as required by Federal Aviation Administration Order. (A-26-24)
  • Conduct a safety risk management process to evaluate whether modifications to the remaining helicopter route structure in the vicinity of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport are necessary to safely deconflict helicopter and fixed-wing traffic and provide the results to the National Transportation Safety Board. (A-26-25)
  • Amend your helicopter route design criteria and approval process to ensure that current and future route designs or design changes provide vertical separation from airport approach and departure paths. (A 26 26)
  • Once the criteria and approval process referenced in Safety Recommendation A-26-26, review all existing helicopter routes to ensure alignment with these updated criteria. (A-26-27)
  • Incorporate the lateral location and published altitudes of helicopter routes onto all instrument and visual approach and departure procedures to provide necessary situation awareness to fixed-wing operators of the risk of helicopter traffic operating in their vicinity. (A 26 28)
  • Modify airborne collision avoidance system traffic advisory aural alerts to include clock position, relative altitude, range, and vertical tendency. (A 26-29)
  • Require existing and new traffic alerting and collision avoidance system (TCAS) I, TCAS II, and airborne collision avoidance system X installations to integrate directional traffic symbols. (A-26-30)
  • ​Require all aircraft operating in airspace where Automatic Dependent Surveillance—Broadcast (ADS-B) Out is required to also be equipped with ADS B In with a cockpit display of traffic information that is configured to provide alerting audible to the pilot and/or flight crew. (A 26-31)
  • Require the use of the appropriate variant of airborne collision avoidance system X on new production aircraft that are subject to traffic alert and collision avoidance system equipage regulations. (A-26-32)
  • Require existing aircraft that are subject to traffic alert and collision avoidance system equipage regulations be retrofitted with the appropriate variant of airborne collision avoidance system X. (A-26-33)
  • Evaluate the feasibility of decreasing the traffic advisory and resolution advisory inhibit altitudes in airborne collision avoidance system Xa to enable improved alerting throughout more of the flight envelope. (A 26 34)
  • If the evaluation resulting from Safety Recommendation A-26-34 finds that the inhibit altitudes can be safely decreased, require retrofitting of the applicable airborne collision avoidance system X variant incorporating the reduced traffic advisory and resolution advisory inhibit altitudes on all aircraft that are subject to traffic alert and collision avoidance system and equipage regulations. (A 26 35)
  • Require that all rotorcraft operating in Class B airspace be equipped with airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) Xr technology once the ACAS Xr standard has been published. (A-26-36)
  • Create an objective definition of close proximity encounter and a public database of those encounters and their locations that can be used to monitor their prevalence and identify areas of potential traffic conflict for safety assurance and safety risk management. (A-26-37)
  • Develop and implement a process that will, in a timely manner, notify involved parties after events such as near midair collisions or traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory activations, such that notification occurs while relevant data remain available and before meaningful safety analysis, reporting, or corrective action is no longer practicable. (A-26-38)
  • Based on the results of the audit completed in accordance with Safety Recommendation A-26-56, ensure that all safety management system functions and data sharing activities at all air traffic control facilities are conducted in collaboration with all relevant external stakeholders. (A 26 39)
  • Establish a requirement across all air traffic control tower standard operating procedures that the operations supervisor (OS) or controller-in-charge (CIC) document in the daily facility log when any control position is combined with the local control position, or when the OS/CIC position is combined with a control position, along with a rationale for doing so. (A-26-40)

To the US Army:

  • ​​Revise training procedures for flight crews assigned to operate in the Washington, DC, area to ensure that they receive initial and recurrent training on fixed-wing operations at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, including approach and departure paths, runway configurations, and the interaction of those traffic flows with published helicopter routes. (A-26-41)
  • Develop and implement a recurring procedure, at an interval not to exceed 18 months, to verify the continued accuracy of recorded flight data. (A-26-42)
  • Incorporate information within the appropriate operator’s manual for all applicable aircraft on the potential total error allowed by design that could occur in flight on an otherwise airworthy barometric altimeter, including the increased position error associated with the external stores support system configuration. (A-26-43)
  • Develop and implement a transponder inspection procedure on all aircraft with transponders capable of transmitting Mode S and Automatic Dependent Surveillance—Broadcast (ADS-B) and operated in the National Airspace System (NAS), at least annually and upon each aircraft’s entry into service in the NAS, that ensures 1) the transponder ADS-B settings are correct, 2) the transponder is transmitting ADS B, and 3) the transponder is transmitting the correctly assigned address. (A-26-44)
  • Establish a flight data monitoring program for rotary-wing aircraft the US Army operates in the National Airspace System. (A-26-45)
  • Survey US Army helicopter pilots to identify barriers to the utilization of flight safety reporting systems, develop a plan to address the identified barriers, and implement that plan across Army aviation units. (A-26-46)
  • Revise the method for allocating resources to ensure the development of a robust safety management system that will, at a minimum, identify and monitor the potential for midair collisions between Army aircraft and civil air traffic operating in the National Airspace System. (A-26-47)
  • Develop and maintain a flight safety management capability that is independently resourced and functionally separate from its occupational and environmental health management system, and ensure that this capability is both culturally and functionally integrated with units conducting sustained flight operations in the National Airspace System. (A-26-48)

To the Department of War Policy Board on Federal Aviation:

  • ​Conduct a study to evaluate the quality of radio transmissions and reception for those aircraft operated within the National Airspace System to identify factors that degrade communications equipment performance and adversely affect the safety of civilian and military flight operations. (A-26-49)
  • Implement appropriate enhancements, based on the findings of the study recommended in Safety Recommendation A-26-49, to remediate identified deficiencies in air–ground radio communications performance. (A-26-50)
  • Require the Department of War to verify on all aircraft with transponders capable of transmitting Mode S and Automatic Dependent Surveillance—Broadcast (ADS-B) and operated in the National Airspace System (NAS), at least annually and upon each aircraft’s entry into service in the NAS, that 1) the transponder ADS-B settings are correct, 2) the transponder is transmitting ADS B, and 3) the transponder is transmitting the correctly assigned address. (A-26-51)
  • Require armed services to amend their operational procedures to allow flight crews to enable Automatic Dependent Surveillance—Broadcast Out while in flight. (A-26-52)
  • Require all military aircraft operating in the National Airspace System (NAS) be equipped with Automatic Dependent Surveillance—Broadcast (ADS-B) In with a cockpit display of traffic information that is configured to provide alerting audible to the pilot and/or flight crew, and that such requirement apply wherever in the NAS the Federal Aviation Administration requires any aircraft to operate with ADS-B Out. (A-26-53)

To the Department of Transportation:

  • ​Require the Federal Aviation Administration to demonstrate at least annually that each air traffic control facility it operates has the routine capability to accomplish required postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing within the US Department of Transportation’s specified timeframes of 2 hours for alcohol and 4 hours for drugs, and implement a process to ensure that any facility without such capability will demonstrate timely remediation. (A-26-54)
  • Work with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator to convene an independent panel to conduct a comprehensive review of the safety culture within the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO), and use the findings to enhance the ATO’s existing safety management system and integrate it into all levels of the organization. (A-26-55) 

To the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General:

  • ​​Complete an audit of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Traffic Organization’s safety management system functions and data sharing activities at all air traffic control facilities and determine whether these activities are conducted in collaboration with all relevant external stakeholders, ensuring that the audit’s results are documented, reported to the Secretary of Transportation and the FAA Administrator, and made available to the public. (A-26-56)

To the RTCA Program Management Committee:

  • Finalize and publish the minimum operational performance standards for airborne collision avoidance system Xr for rotorcraft. (A-26-57)​​​​

Previously Issues Recommendations​

On March 11, 2025, the NTSB issued a safety recommendation report titled Deconflict Airplane and Helicopter Traffic in the Vicinity of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, which issued the following urgent safety recommendations addressing the potential for midair collisions between helicopters operating on Route 4 and airplanes landing on runway 33 or departing from runway 15 at DCA identified during this investigation:

To the Federal Aviation Administration:

  • Prohibit operations on Helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when runways 15 and 33 are being used for departures and arrivals, respectively, at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). (A-25-1) (Urgent)
  • ​Designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of Route 4 is closed. (A-25-2) (Urgent)

Video

Board Meeting - Jan. 27, 2026
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uR3CPcesQqM
 NTSB Animation - Boardmeeting Overview Animation - DCA Midair Collision
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2H_A6mHsHk0
NTSB Animation - Control Tower Visibility Study - DCA Midair Collision
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IpcPaBbvwnM
 NTSB Animation - Aircraft Visibility Study - DCA Midair Collision
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LJ10ZOcWuC4

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